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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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29 December 1982

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MILITARY AFFAIRS**

No. 1732

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1983 MILITARY BUDGET--V. F. Garbuzov, USSR Minister of Finance, in the report "On the USSR State Budget for 1983 and the Fulfillment of the USSR State Budget for 1981," presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet on 23 November, announced that the 1983 budget provides for 17.05 billion rubles to be spent on defense. This accounts for 4.8 percent of the total budget expenditures. [Editorial Report] [Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Nov 82 p 3]

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ARMED FORCES

MILITARY DISCIPLINE: STANDARDS AND IMPROVEMENT METHODS DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 82 (signed to press 3 Aug 82) pp 3-8

[Article: "Strengthen Organization and Regulation Order"]

[Text] In order to achieve success in anything it is important to have well organized and efficient people and precise interaction among all available personnel and equipment. It is impossible to fulfill assignments covered by the 11th Five-Year Plan, the 26th CPSU Congress pointed out, without improving organizational and political work, increasing demandingness with respect to the cadres and to the fulfillment of assignments, without a high level of organization precision in the work, without strict observance of plan discipline in all sections.

The CPSU outlines grand plans of economic, social and cultural development for our homeland, for strengthening its defense capability and improving the people's welfare, and it develops in every Soviet individual a great sense of personal responsibility for their successful fulfillment. The party teaches us that the large goals can only be achieved with persistent work by all the people, with organization and efficiency on the part of every worker, carried to their highest levels. In his speech at the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed the importance of the Food Production Program of the USSR for the Period Extending to 1990 as a basic turning point in the improvement of agriculture and related branches, and of its large scope, and made special mention of the decisive role played by the selfless labor, initiative, strong will and persistence of urban and rural workers in its implementation, first and foremost, the communists, who are expected to set an example of good organization, discipline and efficiency in their assigned sections of the work.

The party's demand that we strive for precision, good performance discipline and strict order in all things, increasing the personal responsibility of every individual in the process, is especially important in the army. We cannot seriously expect success in the accomplishment of the difficult tasks assigned to every military collective, unit, ship, subunit, team and section, to every individual specialist, without strict observance of regulation requirements, organization and discipline. "Good organization, constant self-possession and irreproachable

performance on the part of every individual are of exceptionally great importance today," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev tells us, "when the decisive role in military affairs goes primarily to the teamwork types of weapons and when their successful employment depends upon the skillful and coordinated performance of many people."

Soviet fighting men, inspired by decisions coming out of the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, are tirelessly perfecting their field, air and naval training, working persistently to master the complex combat equipment and strengthening discipline and organization. Their summer training was a crucial phase of the socialist competition for a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR, which has the slogan "For the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet Union--Reliable Protection!" They are focusing their efforts upon the achievement of good end results in the combat and political training and upon the complete fulfillment of the commitments they have accepted. In the process, they never forget for a single minute that unweakened vigilance and good combat readiness are essential and that even isolated incidents of irresponsibility, carelessness, the lack of discipline are unacceptable in the complex international situation of today.

One of the most important tasks for commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, for all fighting men of the army and navy, consists in making every subunit, unit and ship, every formation, an example of organization and strict observance of the rules contained in Soviet laws and military regulations. By accomplishing this task we will raise the combat readiness of the Armed Forces to a new and higher level. This was pointed out to participants in the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense. In his report at the conference, he stressed the necessity of purposefully indoctrinating in the fighting men the strictest of discipline and organization, of seeing to it that every serviceman's position in life is defined by the conviction that the regulation and the order are law and must be fulfilled by all personnel, without exception, absolutely and unquestioningly.

Strict regulation discipline and organization call for every serviceman to observe the ethical standards of behavior, for skillful and coordinated work on the part of the specialists and of entire military collectives, technical competence, punctuality, restraint and steadfastness on the part of all those who service the modern combat equipment and perform alert duty. This means that we must strive with even greater demandingness for good performance and efficiency and a sense of responsibility on the part of the servicemen for the absolute observance of requirements contained in regulations and instructions, of orders and instructions issued by commanders and chiefs.

The sole-commander has the crucial role with respect to strengthening discipline. Regulations charge him with personal responsibility for the combat and mobilizational readiness of the unit, ship or subunit, for the combat and political training, the military discipline and the political and moral state of the personnel. Skillful work by the commander, his demandingness and his ability to

focus the efforts of the officers, the party and Komsomol aktiv on providing firm regulation order and organization have a great deal to do with the level of discipline in the military collective.

The best qualities of a commander are developed and strengthened in the performance of the practical work, the training and indoctrination of subordinates and the fulfillment of combat training tasks. It is therefore important for every commander to make full and purposive use of the extensive possibilities he has for improving his professional and political expertise and his practical skills in working with people, for learning to be demanding and properly applying the authority granted to him.

It is not an easy matter to unite the military collective, to see that a climate of demandingness and well-meaning attitudes reigns in it, to develop in every fighting man a desire to make the greatest possible contribution to the common job, to assure that classes and drills are at a high level, to see that there is regulation order throughout, to assure precision and organization in the accomplishment of the tasks set for the personnel. It requires good commander's qualities, professional skill, pedagogical know-how and a knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology. It is important that commanders, political organs and party organizations constantly keep the officers' work, especially the young officers, within their field of attention, to teach them and indoctrinate them in a spirit of party-mindedness.

A great deal has been done to build up the officer cadres in the army and navy. Today, most commanders of regiments, ships, battalions, companies and platoons are communists, and almost everyone has a higher education, diversified military expertise and experience in the training and indoctrination of subordinates. They strive determinedly and persistently for a high level of combat readiness and create strict regulation order in all things. Major V. Prokopenko is one such so-commander. He is a good organizer and indoctrinator of the men, and a skilled methods expert. With the help of the communists he has succeeded in creating in the collective a moral climate in which every fighting man considers it his prime duty to apply all his abilities to improving his professional expertise, to fulfill his duty in a highly responsible manner and to persistently move forward from one position to another in the socialist competition. The personnel are aided by a way of life which conforms strictly to regulations and precisely organized training, leisure time and living conditions, the establishment of which receives the most careful of attention from the commander. In this situation the collective naturally achieves good results from their performance of the tasks assigned to them.

I must mention the fact that the commander's efforts are backed up and amplified by goal-oriented work on the part of the party and Komsomol organizations. They strive successfully to see that the communists and Komsomol members are in the vanguard in the training and discipline, and set up Leninist readings, lectures and reports, evenings of discussion devoted to special subjects and talks on military duty and loyalty to the oath. Other methods are used for instilling in the personnel a profound understanding of the nature of Soviet military discipline, a sense of responsibility for protecting the socialist homeland, respect for the commanders and a readiness to carry out their orders and instructions promptly and unquestioningly.

In the subunit a great deal of attention is devoted to the use of socialist competition for indoctrinal purposes, as a potent means of developing the fighting man's creative initiative, uniting the collective and motivating it to successfully accomplish the combat training tasks. A persistent effort is made to see that the campaign for honor, dignity, irreproachable conduct, exemplary appearance and military sharpness, on the part of the servicemen, for their observance of communist moral and ethical standards and military ethics, and a campaign to strengthen friendship and comradeship among the troops are always an inseparable part of the competition.

There are numerous other examples of good organization and discipline among personnel of the units and ships.

It should be noted, however, that questions pertaining to the all around enhancement of organization and the maintenance of regulation order are still not being successfully resolved everywhere and in all cases. In their struggle to strengthen military discipline not all of the commanders and chiefs, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, unfortunately, are giving full consideration to its moral-political and ethical aspects or to the changes taking place among the personnel and in the conditions under which their service duties are performed. Some commanders rely solely upon the force of the order and administrative measures to resolve questions pertaining to the establishment of regulation order, forgetting that the element of conviction should be given priority in this manner. V. I. Lenin underscored the fact that "...we have employed force correctly and successfully, when we have first competently given it a foundation of conviction." Senior chiefs, political organs and party organizations can and must do everything possible to teach the officers how to skillfully employ methods of conviction in their work with the men, how to correct them and focus their efforts upon the improvement of their pedagogical skills.

Any extreme is harmful in the campaign for regulation order, the campaign to enhance organization and discipline. Crudeness and lack of tact are unacceptable, as are excessive familiarity and lack of demandingness to subordinates. Experience has taught us that such things are eliminated where they are assessed from a standpoint of principle, where a determined struggle is made to eliminate them. While developing and supporting the commander's demandingness in every possible way, it is important constantly to bear in mind the fact that it produces the greatest results when it is backed up with concern for the personnel, respect for and a closeness with subordinates, an understanding of and constant consideration for their moods, interests and requests. Naturally, we cannot speak of effective regulation demandingness on the part of any officer, without underscoring the special importance of personal example and prestige in this matter. To be efficient, honest, principled and conscientious, always and in all things, to have an excellent knowledge of the assigned job, is to exert a positive influence upon subordinates.

Military discipline, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, noted at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, is first and foremost a political and moral matter. Its foundation

is comprised of the ideological conviction of the fighting men and the spiritual maturity of the collective. Naturally, this very foundation must first be reinforced, in order to strengthen military discipline. For this reason the party organizations must lay the main stress on the ideological-political and military indoctrination of the servicemen, upon the development in them of an acute sense of responsibility for the nation's security and for the defense of socialism. The main thing in this work is to see that the communists and Komsomol members set an irreproachable personal example in the fulfillment of their military duty and in the observance of the requirements for military discipline.

Ideological, political and indoctrinal work are highly important to the continued strengthening of regulation order and organization. It would be difficult to overestimate their role in this matter. Instructions from the 26th CPSU Congress and the requirements set forth in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological, Political and Indoctrinal Work" are being persistently implemented in the units and on the ships. Efficiency and effectiveness are being improved in the ideological conditioning of the personnel, and this is assuring that every fighting man takes an active part in the struggle for the complete fulfillment of combat training plans and plans for strengthening discipline. The process of keeping the personnel informed politically has been improved, and the Marxist-Leninist preparation of the officers, the political training for seagoing and shore-based warrant officers and political classes for the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers are being conducted on a higher level. Such forms of ideological and indoctrinal work as theoretical and practical scientific conferences on current problems of CPSU theory and policy, Marxist-Leninist studies of war and the army and the Soviet military organizational development, evening discussions on special subjects, talks and debates are being extensively employed. All of this is designed to develop in the fighting men a strong sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of their duty and a profound understanding of the fact that constant combat readiness is impossible without iron military discipline, without organization and order.

The urgency of further improving the ideological, political and indoctrinal work continues, however. It is the duty of commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations to assure the complete fulfillment of requirements set forth at the 26th party congress and in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Ideological, Political and Indoctrinal Work," and on this basis, to increase the responsibility of the cadres for the assigned job, for organization and performance, and to unite the military collectives.

It is also important to develop public opinion, constantly and competently, to react promptly and effectively to the moods of the personnel, to promptly satisfy their needs and requests. This creates the need for commanders systematically to communicate with their subordinates, making it possible to give them regular political briefings, to answer questions arising in the minds of the fighting men, promptly and convincingly, to spot and support beneficial initiative. The solidarity of the military collective grows stronger in such an atmosphere, and it has a greater, positive indoctrinal effect upon each serviceman. It also helps

to confirm the authority of the commander, who has the opportunity to channel public opinion into the campaign against negative developments.

The political organs and party organizations are the agents of party policy in the Armed Forces. It is their duty to demonstrate principle in all things pertaining to the observance of regulations and the fulfillment of orders, and to take all necessary steps to see that every serviceman thoroughly grasps the importance of strictly fulfilling regulations and uses them as a guide in his daily life and service. Active propaganda of the military oath and regulations, the summarization and adoption of progressive experience in the guard and internal service, and the clarification of legal standards are all absolute conditions of a successful struggle for precise organization of the service and firm discipline. It is also important to assure unity of actions on the part of commanders, staffs, political workers, the party and Komsomol aktiv, to enhance their influence upon the personnel, to instill in each fighting man a sense of participating in the life of his subunit, in its successes and failures, and to determinedly combat passiveness and indifference toward the affairs of the collective.

The tasks involved in training and indoctrinating the soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, and consequently, those involved in improving combat readiness, are accomplished primarily in the companies and equivalent subunits. It is here that we find the youngest and therefore, the less experienced, commanders and political workers, however. There are few communists in many companies and equivalent subunits, and some of them have no party organizations. This makes it necessary for superior commanders and political workers and the more experienced communists to provide the young officers in the subunits with effective assistance, to share their knowledge with them and focus their efforts each day on the improvement of training and indoctrination for their men and on the strengthening of discipline and organization.

It is also essential to do everything possible to enhance the militancy of Komsomol organizations of companies and equivalent subunits, to motivate them to promptly reveal and eliminate the preconditions for infractions of discipline and to indoctrinate the young fighting men in a spirit of zealous performance of their service duties.

We cannot seriously count on success in the struggle to strengthen discipline and to enhance organization, without seeing to it that the communists and Komsomol members set a good personal example in the training and the service, without increasing their responsibility for the observance of laws and regulations. During the days of intense summer combat training it is the communists and Komsomol members who set an example of performance efficiency, organization and diligent handling of the assigned job. They affect the personnel with their personal example and appeals, and motivate them to perform their military duty, training plans and programs and socialist commitments in an exemplary manner. The fighting men look to them as their models, see in them an example of selfless service to the homeland, discipline and efficiency, worthy of emulation.

The communists of small subunits located at remote sites for the performance of certain assignments bear special responsibility. Their personal example of the conscientious handling of the job, their diligence, good performance efficiency and demandingness of themselves and those around them are of exceptionally great importance. The fighting men, the development of good moral qualities and fighting efficiency in them, are affected by how well the communist masters the equipment and weapons, acquires political knowledge and fulfills the requirements set forth in the military oath and in the regulations, by the kind of principle he exhibits in the resolution of specific questions and by how self-critical he is.

One of the most important demands made of the communist is that he not only set an example in the training and in discipline himself, but that he also persistently explain to his coworkers the importance of industry and efficiency, the need to maintain strict regulation order and organization in the subunit and to be an active ideological fighter and a skilled organizer. Most communists in the sub-units understand this very well and attempt to fulfill their duties diligently, devoting all their abilities, knowledge and know-how to the job.

We still have cases, unfortunately, in which a certain communist does not demonstrate proper persistence in the study of the equipment and weapons, in the political training or in the observance of regulation order. This is intolerable. Passiveness, all-forgivingness and lack of demandingness on the part of certain communists are equally harmful. To ignore shortcomings, failure to take steps to eliminate them, to live and function according to the principle "this is none of my business," is to fail to fulfill the party's Charter. This is the way to assess the performance of a communist who does not apply his fighting qualities on the practical level.

The increased requirements being made of combat readiness and organization among the troops and naval forces are making it necessary to enhance the personal responsibility of the communists for the assigned job, for the observance of regulations and instructions. Those party organizations are performing properly, which constantly deal with questions of assuring that the party members and candidate members are in the vanguard and systematically discuss these issues at party meetings, which assess the conduct of the comrades from a standpoint of principle, criticize deficiencies and work out ways of preventing them.

We must not forget, however, that thorough, critical discussions and the adoption of a good decision must always be followed by specific action, by a persistent struggle to implement suggestions directed toward the absolute implementation of regulations in the life of the collective.

Communists of the staffs and directorates have an especially important role in the struggle for precise organization of the service for the personnel, for the strict observance of planned discipline in the work. The successful fulfillment of the complex training tasks and the state of military discipline depend greatly upon how demanding and principled they are, how objective they are in evaluating the state of affairs and how well they provide concrete, on-the-spot assistance.

It is impossible to thoroughly strengthen regulation order and discipline in the units and on the ships, without demonstrating constant concern for the living conditions, rest and relaxation of the servicemen. Questions of living conditions are moral-political questions, which have a direct effect upon organization and upon the fighting man's attitude toward the service. A great deal has been accomplished toward their successful resolution. Many military camps, barracks, mess halls and clubs have been remodeled, and the military trade system is being improved. There are still numerous unutilized reserves in this important area, however. It is the duty of commanders, political organs and party organizations to demonstrate constant concern for the personnel, to strive for complete satisfaction of their needs.

Along the increasing complexity of the tasks involved in training the troops and naval forces, the importance of good organization and discipline on the part of the personnel is also growing. To assure the very best performance from each serviceman and to see that they observe the requirements set forth in regulations and the military oath, orders and instructions from commanders and chiefs, is to demonstrate genuine concern for good combat readiness of the units and ships. Commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations should proceed from precisely this standpoint in their handling of the organizational, ideological, political and indoctrinal work.

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## ARMED FORCES

### INDOCTRINATION ON PATRIOTISM AND INTERNATIONALISM

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3 Aug 82) pp 9-18

[Article by Col Gen A. Lizichev: "Indoctrinate Patriots, Internationalists"]

[Text] A great holiday is approaching, the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet people are commemorating it with new successes in the accomplishment of the historic tasks outlined at the 26th party congress and the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

Fighting men of the army and navy are preparing a fitting reception for the glorious anniversary. The intensity of socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR is growing. An intense effort is under way to achieve new successes in the combat and political training, to master the modern weapons and combat equipment, increase military discipline and enhance combat readiness. The Armed Forces of the USSR are capable of successfully performing any task required to defend our homeland. Their combat strength is formed on a solid alloy of good technical equipment, combat skill and indestructible morale.

The defenders of our socialist homeland have always demonstrated fervent patriotism and internationalism. These valuable moral-political qualities of the fighting men are passed on from generation to generation. "Today," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed at the 26th CPSU Congress, "the sons and grandsons of the Great Patriotic War heroes serve in the ranks of the homeland's defenders. They have not experienced the rigorous trials which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. They are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and our people, however. And each time the nation's security or the defense of peace requires it, every time victims of aggression need help, the Soviet fighting man shows the world an example of the selfless and courageous patriot, the internationalist, prepared to overcome any difficulties."

Patriotism is a person's love for his homeland, a desire to serve its interests, honorably and selflessly, to defend it against its enemies. In the words of V. I. Lenin, it is one of the most profound feelings reinforced by centuries and millennia of separate homelands. This feeling has always been a part of the workers.

In the capitalist society true patriotism is expressed and carried forward by the working class, which has consistently battled to liberate all workers from exploitation and national oppression.

Socialist patriotism got its start in the October Revolution, a patriotic feat by the working class, by all of our nation's workers. The Soviet people's love for their own country, their own people and their culture, for the progressive traditions under socialism are organically merged with devotion to the new social and state order and to the Communist Party, with pride in our successes in various areas of life, with a readiness to work selflessly for the sake of communism, to defend the revolutionary gains with weapon in hand.

The great strength of Soviet patriotism has been brilliantly manifested in all stages of existence of the homeland of October. It was one of the main contributors to our victories at the front and in the rear. During the civil war years the proletariat, allied with all of Russia's workers, defended the socialist homeland's freedom and independence, made great sacrifices and bore unprecedented hardships. "Without this patriotism," V. I. Lenin said in December of 1920, "we would not have been able to defend the Soviet Republic.... This is the best kind of revolutionary patriotism."

Patriotism became a part of daily life for the Soviet people during the first five-year plans. They spared no effort to overcome the centuries-old backwardness, to turn the workers' and peasants' state into a nation with a developed industry and agriculture and an advanced culture, to strengthen our defense capability and create our mighty Armed Forces.

During the terrible years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people defended their land and their revolutionary conquests in a duel to the death with the Hitlerite invaders and made the decisive contribution to the defeat of imperialism's strike force. Their great feat will not fade through the centuries. The mass heroism shown by the homeland's defenders brilliantly demonstrated the patriotism and combat fraternity of our nation's peoples, their fervent desire to give their all, their life, if necessary, for the sake of the freedom and independence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the common homeland of them all.

Fervent Soviet patriotism possessed the minds and the hearts of those who restored the national economy, destroyed by the war, who rebuilt the cities and villages out of the ruins and ashes, developed industry, agriculture and science, cultivated the virgin lands and developed the vast expanses rich in natural resources, who defended the sacred borders of our socialist homeland with weapon in hand.

Fervent love for the homeland and a desire to make it even richer, even more powerful and wonderful, are motivating the youth who go out, at the call of the Communist Party, to the shock-labor projects of the 11th five-year period, to build BAM, to develop the resources of Tyumen Kray, the Far East and North, to develop the Nonchernozem Zone and to carry out the Food-Production Program.

A distinguishing feature of Soviet patriotism is its close unity, its inseparable link with socialist internationalism. Explaining the essence of internationalism, V. I. Lenin wrote: "There is in fact one and only one internationalism: selfless work to develop the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one's country, support (in the form of propaganda, sympathy and material aid) for just such a struggle, just such a line, and for it alone, in all countries, without exception."

The Great October Socialist Revolution broke the chain of social and national oppression, established the power of the working class and public ownership of the means of production, thereby laying a solid foundation for the free development of our nations and ethnic groups, for their close friendship and inviolable unity. On 30 December 1922 the liberated peoples created the USSR on a volunteer basis--the world's first unified, multinational union state of workers and peasants, a state in which the individual's natural attachment to the land on which he was born is combined with love for the sole multinational homeland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics--with pride in its great achievements and a willingness to defend its interests and protect it to the last drop of blood.

The emergence of the world socialist system and its strengthening has been the most important event of postwar years. The interests of peoples in the socialist nations are inseparable from the development and strengthening of the entire socialist commonwealth. The successes and achievements of each of them are organically linked to the development and flourishing of the entire socialist system. A military threat to any of the socialist countries is also a threat to the other fraternal states. The socialist homeland cannot be defended without defending the entire socialist commonwealth.

The Warsaw Pact is one of the main forms of cooperation among the socialist states. It reliably serves the interests of peace and socialism. This fact was underscored at the 26th CPSU Congress. In his speech at the congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated: "...the military-political defensive alliance of the socialist countries loyally serves the cause of peace. It possesses everything necessary to reliably defend the socialist conquests of the peoples. And we will do everything necessary to see that this continues to be the case!"

The principle of socialist internationalism has become the main principle underlying interrelations among nations of the socialist commonwealth. It consists of the application and development of the principles of proletarian internationalism in relations among nations and ethnic groups which have set out on the path of socialism and among sovereign socialist states. Socialist internationalism implies united actions by fraternal nations for the sake of building up and strengthening the world socialist system, their all round cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance, respect for the national and historical peculiarities of each nation, the exchange of achievements in all areas of life and the joint defense of socialism's conquests. Socialist internationalism, as pointed out at the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference in Riga, essentially embraces all areas of interstate and interparty relations.

With respect to military organizational development, socialist internationalism is manifested in our nation in the creation and perfection of the military organization of the multinational Soviet state, in equality in the performance of unified military duty by all citizens, regardless of nationality, and in the indoctrination of the personnel in a spirit of friendship of peoples of the USSR and combat comradeship with the peoples and the armies of fraternal socialist nations.

Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism are important elements of the public awareness and a source of spiritual strength for the homeland's armed defenders. The social activeness and the constant combat readiness selflessly to defend the homeland and the revolutionary conquests depend upon the degree to which principles of patriotism and internationalism master the minds of the Soviet people and fighting men in the Armed Forces. The CPSU therefore considers its most important task to be that of instilling principles of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism in the minds of the workers, primarily the young generation, and fighting men of the army and navy. "It is the party's sacred duty," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th CPSU Congress, "to indoctrinate the workers in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and a sense of pride in belonging to the single great Soviet homeland."

The development of the Soviet fighting man as a fervent patriot and a convinced internationalist is a complex process. It begins long before the individual enters the military service. The family, the school, VUZs, the labor collectives, soviets of workers' deputies, the Lenin Komsomol, the trade unions, DOSAAF, the All-Union "Znanye" society, creative unions and other collectives and organizations take an active part in it. The press, radio, television, various forms of mass political work and works of literature and art have a great role in this process.

Serving in the Armed Forces of the USSR is a remarkable school of patriotism and internationalism for the youth. By its nature and its purpose military service in our army creates favorable conditions for profoundly affecting the individual, for developing the qualities of a patriot and an internationalist in him.

Specific social and economic conditions, public-political relations and the spiritual atmosphere in which our youth live and acquire their knowledge and labor skills have an exceptionally important role in the multifaceted process of developing the soldier-patriot, soldier-internationalist. A developed socialist society has been built, powerful productive forces and advanced science have been created, and a single national economic complex--the material foundation for fraternal friendship of peoples--is being successfully developed in the Soviet Union for the first time in history. The USSR's portion of world industrial output has risen from 1 percent in 1922 to 20 percent at the present time. The RSFSR's industry alone now produces as much in two days as it produced in an entire year in pre-revolutionary Russia. Gross agricultural output, as the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed out, increased from an annual average of 82.8 billion rubles under the 7th Five-Year Plan to 123.9 billion rubles under the 10th Five-Year Plan, an increase of 50 percent.

Our multinational nation has achieved enormous successes in social development. A historically new society of people--the Soviet people--has come into being in the USSR. The process of bringing all classes and social groups to the same level is continuing today, a process leading to the establishment of a society with a classless structure, mainly and basically, within the historic framework of mature socialism. The friendship of our country's peoples is steadily growing stronger, and the flourishing and equalization of all nations and ethnic groups is accelerated.

The Soviet state has made great achievements with respect to improving the people's standard of living. In the 1970's alone real per capita incomes increased almost 1.5-fold. The Food-Production Program of the USSR for the period extending to the year 1990, approved at the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, is another demonstration of the Communist Party's concern for improving the welfare of the Soviet people. It set the task of assuring a stable supply of all types of food for the population, markedly improving the consumption of quality products and substantially improving the makeup of their diet.

During the years of Soviet power a gigantic leap has been made in our society's spiritual development. A scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook and the ideology of the Communist Party prevail inseparably in the nation. Under developed socialism cultural achievements are enjoyed by multimillion-strong masses of workers, every individual has access to knowledge, and extensive possibilities have been created for the development of gifts and talents, for the cultural flourishing of all nations and ethnic groups. The Russian language, voluntarily accepted by the peoples of the USSR as the language of international communication, gave all nations and ethnic groups broad access to the treasures of world culture. Numerous facts attest to the achievements of our science and culture. I shall cite only two of them. There were 200 scientific workers in Moldavia in 1940. There are now around 9,000, including 3700 doctors and candidates of science. The Armenian SSR has 1.7-fold more doctors per 10,000 people than the United States, 2.2-fold more than England, 5.2-fold more than Turkey and 7.6-fold more than Iran.

Mature socialism is a society of true democracy. In it have been created all the conditions necessary for active participation by the workers in the life of the state and in the administration of public affairs. The Communist Party, multi-national and thoroughly international with respect to ideology and policy, organizational structure and the principles underlying its functioning, is the leading and directing force of the Soviet society, the nucleus of its political system, its state and public organizations. The CPSU exists for and serves the people. The Party and its Central Committee demonstrate constant concern for the all round strengthening of friendship of the USSR people, creatively develops the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on nations and national relations, and resolutely combats such phenomena as chauvinism or nationalism and any sort of nationalistic division, which are alien to Marxism-Leninism and socialism.

The social conditions of mature socialism and the successes achieved in all areas of public development are objectively contributing to the development of such good moral-political qualities as patriotism and internationalism in the Soviet people. Every individual, whatever his nation or ethnic group, is proud to be a citizen of

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a part of the great Soviet people--a historically new community of people. A celebration for one of the republics becomes a celebration for all the Soviet people, for the entire large family of Soviet peoples.

The growth of social and class unity, the development of a single national economic complex, the equalization of nations and the strengthening of friendship of peoples are helping to enhance the multinational nature of republics, krays, oblasts and cities, as well as the labor collectives, and creating conditions conducive to the internationalization of all aspects of life. Representatives of many nations and ethnic groups work together in the labor collectives of huge construction projects. Members of 41 nationalities worked on the Kremenchug GES in the Ukraine, for example, 52 nationalities worked on the Bratsk GES on the Angara, and 48 on the Nurek GES in Tajikistan. Working together and performing common national economic tasks, the Soviet people are developing common features of character and conduct, which are strengthening their solidarity and fraternal friendship.

The objective social and political processes occurring in our society and the relations of close cooperation among representatives of all the republics of our multinational state are also reflected in the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces are multinational. The Soviet Army is the beloved creation of the multinational Soviet people. Members of all classes and social groups, all nations and ethnic groups of our great homeland, tightly coalesced into an indestructible union, serve as one in its ranks. We are creating our army, M. V. Frunze underscored, in such a way that no nationality feels neglected or wronged. The equal rights of all nations and ethnic groups are also realized in the composition of the officer corps in the ~~Armed Forces~~ Armed Forces. The officer corps of our army and navy is also multinational and infinitely devoted to its socialist homeland.

Objective conditions contributing to the development of the soldier-patriot, the soldier-internationalist, exist in the Armed Forces as in our country as a whole. The performance of common tasks involved in the combat and political training and the enhancement of combat readiness unites servicemen of various nationalities into a single combat family and develops in them an intense feeling of responsibility for defending the great homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In our socialist society internationalism has developed from an ideal of a handful of communists into profound conviction and a standard of conduct for millions and millions of Soviet people of all nations and ethnic groups. This is a truly radical revolutionary change in the public awareness, achieved as a result of implementing the principles underlying the Leninist national policy and successfully resolving the nationality question in the USSR.

The CPSU consistently and purposively implements the Leninist national policy. This policy, which conforms to the basic interests of all our country's nations and ethnic groups, performs the foundation for the patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet people and fighting men in the army and navy. As the principles of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism become a matter of

profound conviction on the part of Soviet citizens of all nationalities, they are becoming a powerful material force contributing to the achievement of new successes in the building of communism and in the strengthening of the country's defense capability.

We are continuing the processes of further improvement in the area of national relations, however, as we are in every other area of our public life. National relations, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, constitute a reality which is constantly developing and bringing forth new problems and tasks. At each stage in the creation of communism the CPSU, relying upon a scientific analysis of the actual situation, takes a historically concrete approach to questions pertaining to the development of national relations and resolves them in the interest of all the Soviet people and of each nation individually.

The Party develops in the Soviet people the ability to clearly understand that the performance of patriotic and international duty means first of all that every individual works conscientiously and creatively, with initiative, for the common good, does everything possible to enhance the effectiveness and quality of the work and takes an active part in the accomplishment of national tasks and in the continued strengthening of the economic and defense capability of the USSR and of the world socialist commonwealth.

The indoctrination of fighting men in the army and navy in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, of infinite devotion to the socialist homeland, as underscored in the CPSU Central Committee's welcome to participants in the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, must be at the focus of attention for army and navy communists.

Following the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee and of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on matters of ideological work, the commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations have universally accomplished a great deal to improve the patriotic and international indoctrination of the homeland's defenders. A well coordinated system of patriotic and international indoctrination has been developed and is constantly being improved in the forces. The military councils, commanders, political organs and party organizations structure this work on the basis of long-range plans, which are increasingly reflecting a comprehensive approach in the accomplishment of this task.

Life has confirmed the fact that the ideological and theoretical level of the military-patriotic and international indoctrination in the units and subunits has improved in recent years, and the forms of this work have become more remarkable and diverse. The subject of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism occupies a fitting place in the classes conducted in all forms of political training, party education and political information work, in the functioning of cultural and educational institutions and military press organs. Socialism's historical superiority and its impressive achievements in the resolution of extremely complex sociopolitical, economic and national problems, in the development of science and culture and the establishment of good moral values and communist principles are demonstrated in a convincing and well substantiated manner.

The humanistic, peace-loving nature of the socialist system, the advantages of our Soviet socialist democracy and the real opportunities for the workers to participate in production planning and control and in the implementation of the extremely important national economic programs are being described with greater clarity and diversity. In the propaganda and agitation work greater attention is being devoted to explaining V. I. Lenin's teachings on nations and national relations, and the prominent role played by the leader of the revolution in the development of the doctrine on defense of the socialist homeland and in the creation of a multinational Soviet state and a single military organization is being demonstrated.

At the contemporary stage the continued intensified study and extensive propaganda by all existing means of materials coming out of the 26th party congress and the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and of the Food-Production Program of the USSR have become the most important task of all ideological, political and indoctrinational work performed with the fighting men.

Enormous indoctrinational potential is contained in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's works, in his books "Malaya zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth], "Tselina" [The Virgin Lands] and "Vospominaniya" [Remembrances]. The fervent love for the homeland and true internationalism of the heroes of these works are not of an abstract or contemplative nature, but are active and effective. Devotion to the socialist homeland and to the cause of the Communist Party are brilliantly manifested in their specific deeds, in the heroic accomplishments of the builders and defenders of socialism. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books are real textbooks on patriotism, internationalism and communist ideological principles. They help the fighting men to understand more thoroughly the heroic path traveled by our people and their Armed Forces, and instill a sense of pride in our party and our Soviet homeland. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's books put the young generation, born since the war, into contact with the feat performed by their fathers and grandfathers, gives them the opportunity to take over the baton of courage and loyalty to military duty.

The work performed by commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations toward the patriotic and international indoctrination of the fighting men has become even more productive since the publication of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the 60th Anniversary of the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Preparations for this glorious anniversary have helped to enhance the effectiveness and the quality of patriotic and international indoctrination of the personnel. The state of this work is being more thoroughly and concretely studied by military councils, political organs, party and Komsomol collectives. Advanced know-how is better studied and disseminated. Theoretical and scientific and practical conferences and Leninist readings are being held more and more frequently in the forces. Ties with local party and soviet organs have grown stronger and become more practical and concrete. Festivities commemorating the 60th anniversary of a number of Union republics and their communist parties turned into exciting events demonstrating the great friendship of our country's nations and ethnic groups and the solid, indestructible unity of the army and the people.

The multifaceted work performed by the CPSU toward implementation of the Leninist national policy and the international unification of the workers, and the course outlined at the 26th party congress toward the further strengthening of friendship of the USSR peoples and toward the enhancement of each Union republic's material and spiritual potential are being more thoroughly, convincingly and brilliantly described in all forms of propaganda and agitation as part of the extensive preparations under way for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. The successes achieved by Union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and districts in the development of the economy, science and culture are being shown, and the improvement being made in the material welfare of the population is being demonstrated in the press, in oral propaganda and visual agitation.

The struggle against our class enemies has become more aggressive, and the anti-popular nature of imperialism, its reactionary and aggressive policy, which is based on nationalism, chauvinism and racism, are being exposed with greater determination and convincingness. Bourgeois concepts which falsify the history of our country and of the USSR Armed Forces and the national policy of the CPSU are undergoing well-substantiated and systematic criticism. Acts of ideological diversion by the enemy are being repelled more effectively, and the enemy's attempts to kindle national prejudices in certain Soviet people, to sow the seeds of national distrust among them, are being frustrated.

The role of socialist competition has grown markedly in the units. The initiators of patriotic undertakings and glorious deeds and the front-runners in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR are being rewarded and lauded. The experience of the best of them is becoming the possession of many.

The Komsomol organizations have greatly improved the patriotic and international indoctrination of the young fighting men since the 19th Komsomol Congress. In their endeavor to implement Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's paternal closing words to the Soviet youth and congress decisions, the Komsomol organizations are investigatively seeking and finding interesting new forms for the work and are doing a great deal to unite the military collectives and to motivate the Komsomol members and all young fighting men to provide a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. The Komsomol members have begun providing the commanders and party organizations with even more active assistance in the strengthening of military discipline and the enhancement of combat readiness on the part of the units and subunits.

Our friends--the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and the fighting men of their armies--are making extensive preparations to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. The number of contacts and friendly meetings between representatives of the fraternal armies of countries in the socialist commonwealth is growing in the process. These remarkable and exciting meetings are the living embodiment of Marxist-Leninist concepts regarding the unity of patriotism and internationalism, the result of the ideological, political and indoctrinal work performed by the communist and workers' parties.

We live and work in a complex international situation. U.S. imperialism, which now heads world reaction, is attempting to turn back history and exacerbating tensions in international relations. The arms race carried out by the Washington Administration has reached an unprecedented scale. Never before have there resounded such cynical statements about the possibility of an American "first strike," of a "limited" nuclear war, of U.S. intention to destroy socialism as a social and political system.

The imperialists, the ruling clique in the United States most of all, have a pathological hatred for our state and for the socialist system. Their ideal is a society in which a handful of millionaires and billionaires dictate their will to millions of workers; a society in which the despotism of "free" enterprise reigns, where the military-industrial complex sets the tone of public life, where militarism and racism, corruption and crime, drug addiction and pornography flourish, where the CIA is above the law, where the persecution of those with different beliefs is the law. They are prepared to challenge all of mankind, to destroy millions of people in the flames of nuclear catastrophe, in order to protect this corrupt system. Washington is now prepared to spend not hundreds of billions, but trillions of dollars, to preserve this society with armed force, to press its anti-human conditions upon the entire world.

It is the United States of America which are the real threat to universal peace. According to figures arrived at by the American Brookings Institute, the United States has used its military forces to achieve political goals 215 times during the 30 years between 1946 and 1975, more than once every 2 months. It has repeatedly resorted to nuclear threats during this period, and has dozens of times placed its strategic bombers on a combat readiness footing and sent them to the borders of the USSR and other socialist states.

In this situation the Soviet Union is demonstrating to the entire world its prudence and its sense of responsibility for the fate of mankind, its sincere interest in averting the threat of nuclear war. At the recent second special session on disarmament of the UN General Assembly, the USSR committed itself not to be the first to employ nuclear weapons. This step is a historic landmark in the struggle to prevent a nuclear catastrophe, to preserve and strengthen peace. In taking it, the Soviet Union naturally took into account the fact that there are still aggressive forces in the world, forces prepared to place the vital interests of mankind on the line, to resort to nuclear adventurism, for the sake of their narrow, selfish goals.

Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR minister of defense, stressed in this connection the fact that the USSR is familiar with the habits and the nature of the aggressive forces and will therefore maintain a high level of vigilance and keep the army and navy at a constant level of combat readiness adequate to meet the contemporary demands. Our defensive military doctrine, designed exclusively to repel the threat from without, will not be a passive one. It will rest on the unshakable foundation of Leninist doctrine on the defense of the socialist homeland, as it always has been. In case of aggression on the part of the imperialists our Armed Forces,

together with the fraternal socialist armies, will defend the gains of socialism without any hesitation whatsoever, with complete determination, using the entire defensive and economic strength of our states. The highest level of combat readiness on the part of all services and branches of troops in the Soviet Armed Forces, excellent combat training and military skill on the part of each serviceman are the guarantee of our homeland's security and a reliable defense for all nations of the socialist commonwealth.

The international situation, which has become more complex through the fault of reactionary circles of imperialism, above all the United States, and the increasingly acute ideological struggle demand of the Soviet people and army and navy servicemen great political vigilance and a constant readiness to defend the fatherland and the gains of socialism. Today all ideological and political education work in every military collective must be conducted particularly actively and aggressively. Commanders, political organizers and party and Komsomol organizations are called upon to assess critically their activity in educating servicemen and to resolutely eradicate shortcomings and omissions. And unfortunately, shortcomings do still exist.

It must be noted that in certain young servicemen one finds elements of unconcern and underestimation of the real military danger, the threat of war. In their consciousness patriotism and internationalism are not organically linked with the need to use their own daily, intensive military labor to strengthen the armed forces and do everything possible to maintain a high level of combat readiness. These qualities are abstract and passive in some people. So it is a most important task for all educators and all propagandists to strive to ensure that the patriotic feelings of the motherland's defenders are turned into concrete military deeds and help increase the combat potential of the armed forces in general.

The socialist content of patriotism is sometimes muffled in ideological education work with personnel. The 26 April 1979 CPSU Central Committee resolution requires us to cultivate in all Soviet people a sense of pride in the socialist fatherland, a sense of the indestructible fraternal friendship of the USSR's peoples and respect for national dignity and national culture and to promote the further strengthening of the great Soviet people's unity and cohesion.

The development in the young servicemen of a sense of collectivism, real military comradeship and discipline merits greater attention. The struggle against phenomena diametrically opposed to communist morality and against the least manifestations of nationalism should be waged more resolutely. The rallying of multinational military collectives and the creation of a sound moral atmosphere in them help to strengthen military discipline and promote the successful resolution of combat and political training tasks.

The report by Army General A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, at the sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries noted that certain party committees and party bureaus do not display sufficient concern for assuring that the content of ideological measures takes into fuller account the particular features of different

categories of servicemen and their increased requirements and ensures applicability to the specific processes taking place in military collectives or to ensure that ideological education work widely propagandizes examples of exemplary fulfillment of military duty and really attacks phenomena opposed to communist morality and the repositories of lack of discipline, nonregulation relationships and other antisocial phenomena. This applies fully to the work performed toward the inculcation of patriotism and internationalism.

In the near future our people will be celebrating important dates and events in the life of the Soviet state: the 65th anniversary of the USSR's formation, the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad and other outstanding victories by Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War and the 40th anniversary of the defeat of fascist Germany. Celebrations associated with the preparation and commemoration of these historic anniversaries and nationwide holidays are creating favorable conditions for further improving the patriotic and international education of the motherland's defenders. It is the direct duty of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations to make fuller use of these opportunities, to bring the work performed in patriotic and international education up to a new, higher standard and make it more effective and productive.

Soviet servicemen are boundlessly devoted to their great motherland and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. They vigilantly, and reliably protect the Soviet people's peaceful labor and the great gains of socialism and are always ready to fulfill with honor their patriotic and international duty.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 82 (signed to press 3 Aug 82) pp 55-61

[Article by Lt Col A. Cherkashin: "The Procedure for Performing One's Military Service: The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty"]

[Text] The purpose of studying this subject is to help soldiers and sailors of the fall 1982 call-up gain a firm understanding of the procedure for performing first-term active military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR and the basic principles of the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty.

A total of 2 hours is allocated for this class. It should be conducted in the form of a narrative or a lively, detailed discussion.

The following topics should be discussed during the time allocated: 1. The procedure for performing first-term active military service; 2. Basic obligations, rights and benefits and the responsibility of first-term servicemen.

It is important to note in a brief presentation that military service in the ranks of the Soviet Armed Forces is considered to be among the especially honored duties placed upon Soviet citizens by our state and by the Constitution of the USSR. This service gives the young person an opportunity not only to master one or another military specialty, but also to recognize the value of soldierly friendship, to have a sense of personal participation in his military collective, which is a part of that enormous force to which the people have entrusted the task of protecting their peaceful, creative labor, labor performed in the name of communism. As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has pointed out, the youth entering the family of soldiers lack the schooling of life. Upon returning from the army, however, they are now people with schooling in self-control and discipline, people with technical and professional knowledge and political training ("Leninskij kursum" [On the Leninist Course], Vol 5, p 535).

Fighting men just beginning their service face the noble and responsible tasks of taking a worthy place in the competition ranks, of adding to and developing the achievements of their comrades in arms during the current training year. To become an expert in the combat and political training, a master of military

affairs, honorably to fulfill the patriotic and international mission of defending our beloved homeland, our friends and allies, peace and security on earth--this is the calling of him who has today entered the combat formation of soldiers and sailors, him to whom the people have entrusted the powerful and awesome weapons created by their skillful hands, by their genius and industry, for this purpose.

### 1. The Procedure for Performing First-Term Active Military Service

When the presentation of the first topic is begun it should be pointed out that the procedure for performing military service is defined by the Constitution of the USSR, the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, the Statute on the Performance of First-Term Active Military Service in the Soviet Army and Navy, the military oath and military regulations, and orders issued by the USSR minister of defense.

The Constitution of the USSR states that protection of the socialist homeland is one of the state's most important functions and is a matter for all the people. "The Armed Forces of the USSR were created and universal military duty was established," states Chapter 5 of our Fundamental Law, "for purposes of protecting the socialist conquests, the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state." The same chapter defines the main requirements made of the Armed Forces of the USSR. It is their duty to the people reliably to protect the socialist homeland, to be in a constant state of combat readiness assuring an immediate rebuff for any aggressor.

The Constitution establishes the fact that the state provides for the nation's security and its defense capability and outfits the Armed Forces of the USSR with everything necessary. The obligations of state organs, public organizations, officials and citizens with respect to assuring the nation's security and strengthening its defense capability are defined by legislation of the USSR in accordance with the Constitution.

When this is discussed, the fact should be stressed that our Fundamental Law regards the protection of the socialist homeland as the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR and military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR as the honored duty of Soviet citizens. And so, the homeland's protection is the primary legal obligation of our citizens. At the same time it has always been and remains the noble, patriotic desire of the Soviet people, especially in times of difficulty for the nation.

It is a good thing for the instructor to back this up by citing examples of the courage and skill with which fighting men of the Armed Forces fought, performing their duty to the end, for the freedom and independence of the socialist homeland during the civil war years and the Great Patriotic War. The propagandist can find such examples in works of fiction, military memoirs and the fighting history of their unit or ship.

When these examples are cited, it should be noted that the baton of feats performed by the older generations has now been taken up by fighting men of the 1980's.

They have a good understanding of the difficult and noble tasks assigned them by our party and state with respect to reliably defending the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the historic conquests of socialism.

There is no greater honor for personnel of the Armed Forces than to serve vigilantly, to remain in a constant state of combat readiness to rout any aggressor which might encroach upon the security of our homeland. "Aware of the acuteness and the complexity of the international situation and of our party's concern for the fate of the world," states the greeting from fighting men of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the 19th Komsomol Congress, "we declare with complete confidence: The Soviet Armed Forces are always on the alert! And if this should be required in the interest of the beloved homeland's security, of the protection of peace and socialism, the Soviet fighting men will honorably fulfill their patriotic and international duty."

The fact should then be stressed that all of the main rules governing the performance of military service are set forth in the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty. This law was passed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 12 October 1967. It defines the principles and the procedure for manning the Armed Forces of the USSR, the training of the youth for military service, the conduct of the draft, the performance of the service, the release of personnel into the reserve and the performance of service in the reserve. The law also establishes the obligations, the rights and responsibility of servicemen and reservists. Its provisions are aimed at the continued enhancement of the nation's defense capability, the all round strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces and the steady improvement of their combat readiness and their combat capability.

According to Article 5 of the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, military service consists of active military service and service in the reserve of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The law states that all male citizens of the USSR, regardless of origin, social position or status with respect to property, racial or national origin, education, language, attitude toward religion, type and nature of occupation or place of residence are required to perform active military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Citizens on active military duty are called servicemen, those in the reserve are called reservists. They are all subdivided into soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers, seagoing and land-based warrant officers, and officers.

It should be explained to the students that male citizens who have turned 18 years of age by the induction date are called up for active military service. The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty states that a call-up for active military service is performed universally, twice each year (in May/June and in November/December), and for forces located in remote and certain other areas, also in April and October, by order of the USSR minister of defense. For those inducted into the Armed Forces in May/June, the period of active military service is computed from 1 July, and for those drafted during the second half of the year, from 1 January of the following year.

During the narrative, it is also important to point out the fact that male citizens expressing a desire to study at military educational institutions can be accepted at such institutions upon reaching the age of 17 years or if they will become 17 years of age in the year they begin the training. Citizens accepted at military educational institutions are on active military duty and are called cadets. They have all the obligations established for first-term servicemen. The cadets and their families enjoy the rights, benefits and advantages provided by current law for first-term servicemen and their families. When a propagandist explains this, he should stress the fact that cadets failing out of military educational institutions or expelled therefrom for failure to study or for lack of discipline, are sent to military units to perform the established period of active military service, if they have not served out the established period of active military service prior to entering the military educational institution.

Active military service begins the day the draftee reports to the military commissariat to be sent to his place of assignment. First-term active military service ends the day the serviceman receives papers releasing him into the reserve.

When newly arrived replacements are entered into the roster of the unit (or in the appropriate branch of forces in the navy) the primary military rank of private (or seaman) is conferred upon the servicemen. They then go through a program of training for new replacements. Upon completing this program the servicemen take the military oath of loyalty to their people, their Soviet homeland and the Soviet government, and are issued specific assignments.

The soldier (or seaman) completes the mastery of his service duties there in the unit (or on the ship). Individuals receiving assignments calling for rated specialists are given a rating upon acquiring practical experience and passing the required exams.

The fact should then be stressed that the next military ranks of private first class and senior seaman are ordinarily conferred upon the best fighting men, with the condition that they be assigned to corresponding positions. It is a great honor for every soldier and seaman to earn this right.

The procedure by which military construction workers perform their service is defined in a special statute. The basic requirements of the statute should be read off in classes for political training groups of military construction workers.

As he continues his narrative, the propagandist should explain to the students that the sergeant and petty officers are their immediate chiefs in the army and the navy. Servicemen in this category receive their training mainly in training units. The best members of the young replenishments are selected as candidates for the positions of junior commanders. The rank of junior sergeant (petty officer second class in the navy) is conferred upon the cadets when they have completed the course of training and passed the prescribed exams. Subsequently, as they rise to higher positions, they are granted the next military ranks of sergeant (petty officer first class), senior sergeant (chief petty officer) and first sergeant (chief ship's petty officer).

In addition, the primary sergeant or petty officer ranks of junior sergeant and petty officer second class can be conferred in the unit or on the ship to those soldiers and sailors who are performing the duties of junior commanders and have good or excellent ratings in the combat training and service and exhibit exemplary military discipline. These comrades must first pass the appropriate exams for the established program, however.

In the class the students should be told that servicemen in first-term active military service can subsequently become land-based or seagoing warrant officers. They must first serve at least 1 year of active first-term military service, however, and then complete a training course at one of the schools for the training of this category of personnel. Land-based and seagoing warrant officers and their families enjoy the rights, benefits and advantages specified by current law for career servicemen and their families.

The propagandist should illustrate his narrative with instructive examples from the service of outstanding soldiers, sailors, sergeants, petty officers, seagoing and land-based warrant officers of the subunit, unit or ship, and tell how they acquired military skill and about the successes they achieved in the socialist competition in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. The students should be called upon to try to equal the best men of their military collective, noting that the process of military improvement is a continuous one, that it requires great industry, persistence and the strict fulfillment of regulation duties and continues throughout the entire period of first-term active military service.

What are the periods of active military service? The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty states that the period is 2 years for soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Army, shore units and aviation of the Navy, order and internal troops, and 1 year 6 months for soldiers and sergeants with a higher education; 3 years for sailors and petty officers of ships, vessels and shore-based navy combat support units and naval units of order troops, and 2 years for sailors and petty officers with a higher education.

Soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers ordinarily serve in those units or on those ships to which they were assigned after being inducted or upon completing the appropriate training in training subunits. Servicemen in first-term active military service can only be transferred as a result of organizational measures or for other important reasons, as well as for reasons of health, the latter based on a military medical commission's finding.

The USSR minister of defense has the authority, when it is necessary, to retain servicemen in the active military service up to 2 months beyond the established periods, as well as to transfer servicemen from one service (branch of forces) of the Armed Forces of the USSR to another, with appropriate adjustment of the term of service.

After this the students should be told that servicemen who have served out the prescribed term of active military service are released from the ranks of the

Armed Forces of the USSR into the reserve. Soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers are released by the military unit command, on the basis of an order issued by the USSR minister of defense and within periods set by the USSR Council of Ministers. Time spent serving a sentence is not included in the term of active military service for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers serving sentences in disciplinary battalions.

Servicemen released from active military service are provided with military uniforms in good repair in conformity with a list established by the USSR minister of defense. They are required to report to the military commissariat to register themselves within 3 days after arriving at their place of residence.

## 2. Basic Obligations, Rights and Benefits and the Responsibility of First-Term Servicemen

When the propagandist begins his presentation of the second topic he should tell the students that the basic obligations of servicemen are set forth in the military oath. (The text of the oath should be read in the class.) The taking of the oath is of great moral-political and legal significance. The moment he takes the sacred oath of loyalty to the homeland every serviceman of the Soviet Armed Forces receives all his service rights and fulfills specific service obligations.

Our military regulations explain most fully the requirements made of Soviet fighting men. They regulate in detail the life and existence and the combat work of the troops and naval forces. The undeviating fulfillment of regulation requirements is a law of life for Soviet fighting men. Points covered in articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 139, 140 and 141 of the Internal Service Regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which define the general obligations of servicemen and the duties of the soldier and sailor, must be read to the students during the class.

The propagandist must stress the fact that the process of all round development of Soviet man's personality continues in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This process is based on a comprehensive approach to the indoctrination, which includes ideological-political, labor (military) and moral indoctrination. Political classes are exceptionally important to the development of every serviceman. They help to shape in fighting men of the army and navy profound ideological conviction, an active stance in life, an aware attitude toward one's duty and great political vigilance. This is why soldiers and sailors beginning their military service should become involved in the process of accumulating political knowledge during the very first classes and derive the most that is possible and beneficial for themselves from each minute of training time. This will help them to perform their assigned tasks with greater understanding and will create a solid foundation for the achievement of consistent successes in the combat and political training and for irreproachable fulfillment of their regulation duties.

The most important thing a soldier must do is to conscientiously grasp the meaning of the requirements contained in the oath and regulations, to do everything possible to make them his permanent practical aids. One of the most important

requirements is to be vigilant, to strictly guard military and state secrets. For the soldier and sailor this means, first and foremost, that he must always be prepared to thwart the aggressive plans of our enemies. Vigilance is therefore required of every specialist, regardless of the kind or the specific nature of the tasks performed by him, especially during the standing of guard and watch duty and when on the daily duty detail, as well as when performing alert duty and on long sea (or ocean) cruises. During the class specific examples should be cited in which servicemen of the given subunit, unit or ship have demonstrated great vigilance, pointing out that it is based on good political conditioning, the personnel's understanding of their duty and responsibility for reliably protecting the socialist homeland, a solid understanding of regulations and the ability to actually conform to them.

The students must then be told about the requirements made with respect to the discipline of servicemen by the oath and regulations. We know that discipline is the most important component of a high level of combat readiness for the troops and naval forces, the key to victory in a war. It is beneficial during the class to familiarize the soldiers and sailors with those articles in the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR which explain the nature of Soviet military discipline and the requirements it makes of the servicemen. It is important to point out the fact that the role of discipline and organization for personnel of the army and navy is steadily growing today. Speaking at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries and Primary Party Organizations, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, stated: "Without firm discipline, there is no combat readiness. This is self-evident. This has been known since armies came into being... While discipline always had a great role in the past, however, it has now grown immeasurably. In the age of nuclear weapons, military operations of enormous scope, dynamism and complexity, and unprecedented importance for the moral factor, the slightest nonobservance of the requirements for military discipline can produce the most serious consequences. This is why even isolated manifestations of negligence and lack of discipline are now absolutely intolerable."

From his very first day in the service it is important for the soldier and sailor to become accustomed to being obedient and disciplined, always and in all things. We need to achieve a situation in which the vital stance of every serviceman is defined by the conviction that a regulation or an order is a law which must be observed by everyone without exception, undeviatingly and unquestioningly. And we must strive resolutely for strict regulation order. Such order calls for the exemplary performance of alert duty, guard and internal service. It includes precise organization of the combat and political training, operation and maintenance of the equipment. Regulation order also involves proper interrelations among the servicemen, their strict observance of the daily schedule and aware internal self-discipline on the part of personnel. It is the duty and obligation of every soldier and sailor to become an active champion of all this.

It is important to then stress the fact that the main thing for a Soviet soldier is to be in a constant state of combat readiness. The propagandist explains that combat readiness is a combination of technical equipment of the forces, their military training, the moral-political, psychological and physical conditioning

of the servicemen, organization and ability on the part of every Soviet soldier to perform a feat for the sake of the homeland, for the sake of communism. It has become especially important today, when the existence of nuclear missiles and other means of mass destruction create a real danger of their sudden employment by the imperialist aggressors and their henchmen. Combat readiness can therefore not be a temporary, seasonal thing or stabilize at some certain level. Combat readiness must be constantly enhanced and improved. The efforts of all personnel must be directed toward this goal. In the interest of assuring a high level of combat readiness, every serviceman must first of all possess a solid understanding of his duties and conscientiously fulfill them.

In connection with this the instructor might point out the fact that success in the service comes only to those soldiers and sailors who work productively to achieve military skill, who steadily improve their practical knowledge and skills, who are strictly guided by the principles contained in the military oath and military regulations, in matters both large and small. There is no other way and there can be no other way to achieve good results in the combat and political training, because only a soldier's profound internal conviction of the expediency and the justness of the legal standards contained in our regulations and an irreproachable understanding of his functional duties create a desire to achieve service pinnacles, to act in exact accordance with the demands of military duty, and are manifested in concrete efforts to enhance the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

The instructor must then explain that those servicemen who work most zealously to master military affairs, who are disciplined and efficient, can be granted various awards for their patriotic efforts and their contribution to the continued improvement of combat readiness. It is a good thing to list the rewards which can be granted to soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers (Article 22 of the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR), to show the service records of the best fighting men of the given subunit, unit or ship, to challenge their colleagues to try to equal them. It is also expedient to remind the students of those penalties which can be imposed upon negligent servicemen (Article 48 of the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR).

The instructor should then tell about how our state grants its defenders, the same as other citizens of the Soviet society, broad social and economic and political rights and personal liberties. When he talks about this, he should mention first of all the right to material security. It should be explained to the students that servicemen receive pay, food, uniforms and living quarters in accordance with the standards established by the USSR Council of Ministers. First-term soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers receive complete support from the state and receive all the above types of rations, pay and allowances free. Nor do they pay postage on letters sent and received by them.

The right to health protection is an inalienable right of servicemen. During the performance of first-term active military duty soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers constantly enhance their political knowledge, studying under special programs, and acquire a new specialty in the army or navy or increase their rating in a job skill obtained by them prior to induction. Every soldier and sailor has

the right to enter any military educational institution, regardless of the service of the Armed Forces of the branch of troops in which he serves.

The right to rest, covered by the Fundamental Law of the USSR, extends to servicemen. In accordance with this right the daily schedule provides the fighting men with 8 hours for sleeping each day. In addition, they are allotted the time necessary to satisfy their personal needs and requirements. Soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers have a day off each week. Classes and work are ordinarily not scheduled for days off, just as for state holidays.

Our servicemen have the right to take part in the direction of state and public affairs. They elect members and can be elected to the soviets of people's deputies and take an active part in public and political work in party, Komsomol and public organizations. Many fighting men work productively as members of army and navy people's control organs existing in the Armed Forces and serve as people's assessors on military tribunals.

Servicemen have broad access to cultural achievements. An entire system of soldiers' and sailors' clubs, officers' clubs and libraries exists for this purpose in the army and navy. Every unit has its television sets, movie projectors and local radio facilities. The fighting men regularly attend the theaters and visit museums and exhibits, and meetings are arranged for them with prominent Soviet writers, scholars, scientific and cultural workers.

Under the Constitution of the USSR servicemen are granted the liberty of scientific, technical and artistic creativity. Many of them take an active part in amateur performance groups and are active in various studios, assemblies and literary organizations existing under the editorial bodies of army and navy newspapers. Technical creativity has assumed broad scope among fighting men of the army and navy.

After this the instructor should move on to talk about the benefits and advantages established for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. First of all, he should point out that the time spent on first-term active military duty in the Armed Forces of the USSR is included in their total period of work, as well as in their uninterrupted work time and their length of service in a specialty in accordance with current laws. For young specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education, who are drafted into the Armed Forces, the time spent on first-term active military duty is also considered as part of the required general service following graduation from the educational institution.

The executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies and those in charge of enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions are required to provide jobs in keeping with their specialty for first-term and extended-duty servicemen released into the reserve no later than 1 month from the day of application by the latter. In addition, individuals drafted for active military service during a period of training at educational institutions have the right, upon their release into the reserve, to register for the continuation of their training at that educational institution and in that course of study in which

they were enrolled prior to call-up, and those who worked at enterprises, in establishments or organizations prior to being drafted have the right to a job at that same enterprise, establishment or organization under the terms indicated above.

Individuals released from active military duty have priority for enrollment at higher educational institutions, and those returning to their former place of work have the right to receive material assistance with the acquisition of initial equipment. The procedure for providing these benefits is established by the USSR Council of Ministers.

First-term active duty servicemen retain the housing area which they occupied prior to being drafted into the army or navy. Our state provides a large number of tax benefits for the armed defenders. The tax benefits should be described in detail in the class. A study by the propagandist of answers to readers' questions published in the 12 February 1982 issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the heading "Tax Benefits for Servicemen" will help him to explain these benefits.

When the propagandist explains the benefits extended to the families of servicemen, he should point out that local agencies of authority have the right to extend such benefits only when the serviceman's family has obtained a special certificate issued by the unit commander.

The propagandist must then establish the understanding that the procedure and the rules established in the army and navy are aimed at creating for the fighting men the best possible conditions and opportunities for the successful fulfillment of their honored duties in the ranks of the Armed Forces, for the individual's all round development and for the steady improvement of the personnel's moral and political qualities and fighting efficiency. In the process it is important to familiarize the students with the daily schedule of their subunit, unit or ship, to explain to them that it is compiled on the basis of the main requirements of the military service and the specific nature of the given military collective, and calls for the corresponding arrangement of the lives of the personnel.

It should also be pointed out that one of the most important guarantees that the rights extended to servicemen will be dependably observed is the procedure established in the army and navy for appealing illegal actions on the part of officials. Under the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR a fighting man can submit a complaint about illegal actions and instructions pertaining to him on the part of commanders (or chiefs), about violations of rights and advantages established for the service or about unsatisfactory provision of rations, pay and allowances. The complaint is submitted to the immediate superior of that individual whose actions are being appealed, and if the individual submitting the complaint does not know who was responsible for the violation of his rights, then the complaint is sent through the chain of command.

At the same time the Charter requires every commander (or chief) to resolutely and firmly demand that his subordinates observe military discipline and order and that he not ignore a single infraction on their part. When a subordinate violates

discipline or public order the commander must consider the circumstances and remind him of his service duties or impose a disciplinary penalty upon him.

A serviceman responsible for a material loss bears the responsibility under the procedure established by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The most serious type of liability for servicemen is legal responsibility for the commission of military crimes. The terms and the procedure for holding servicemen criminally liable and the extent of that liability are strictly regulated by Soviet law.

For purposes of bringing into conformity with the Constitution of the USSR and further improving laws on the nation's defense, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 17 December 1980 issued the Ukase "On the Introduction of Changes Into the Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty." This is another demonstration of the concern exhibited by the Communist Party and the Soviet State for the Armed Forces of the USSR, for the strengthening of the Soviet Nation's defense capability and the enhancement of its power and prestige.

As he completes his presentation of the second topic, the propagandist must underscore the fact that it is not an easy matter to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR, but a very honorable one. The people have entrusted their fighting men with the most modern of weapons and combat equipment. They have trusted them to guard the most sacred of the sacred, their socialist homeland, and the peaceful labor and security of our friends and allies. Speaking at the 19th Komsomol Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said: "Peace is not a gift from heaven. A daily and difficult struggle is necessary to preserve and consolidate it. You, the youth, have been lucky to grow up and live in peace, not knowing the disasters of war. You should value this. You should preserve this valuable possession." This great trust places great obligations upon every Soviet fighting man. At the same time it evokes in the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers a sense of rightful pride in being members of the glorious Armed Forces of the USSR and a desire to fulfill their sacred constitutional duty in the best possible way. The Soviet Army and Navy are always on guard, always on the alert, in the highest state of readiness reliably to protect the revolutionary conquests of socialism against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and its henchmen.

As he completes the presentation of this topic the propagandist should briefly enumerate the tasks facing the fighting men of the given subunit, unit or ship during the new training year, orient the students toward the conscientious mastery of military affairs and productive military work for the sake of our great socialist homeland's security, for the triumph of communism.

The following topics can be discussed during the discussion with the students:

1. What is the procedure for the performance of first-term active military service by soldiers and sailors? 2. What are the peculiarities and the specific nature of service in the given subunit or unit or on the given ship? 3. What are the main obligations, rights and benefits of first-term military personnel? 4. Why is it necessary to have a good understanding of and skillfully perform the duties of a Soviet fighting man? 5. What are the basic tasks facing the

subunit, unit or ship? 6. What demands does a high level of combat readiness make of the soldier and sailor?

During the preparation for the class it is desirable to arrange for the fighting men to hear the record of V. I. Lenin's speech "An Appeal to the Red Army" and to see feature films and filmed documentary chronicles on the subject. Appropriate visual aids should be used in the class, as well as works of literary fiction and military memoirs.

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## ARMED FORCES

### OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON THE MILITARY OATH

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 82 (signed to press 3 Aug 82) pp 62-67

[Article by Col I. Babenko: "The Military Oath--The Fighting Man's Vow of Loyalty to the Homeland"]

[Text] This subject is intended for soldiers and sailors beginning their service, who are preparing to take the military oath. The purpose of studying this subject is to help the students gain a fuller understanding of the nature and the significance of the military oath and the need to fulfill its requirements strictly and precisely.

A total of 2 hours is allocated for the class. It should be conducted in the form of a narrative and a detailed discussion. It is recommended that the following three topics be covered: 1. The significance of the military oath in the life and work of Soviet fighting men. 2. The requirements made of servicemen by the military oath. 3. It is the obligation and duty of every fighting man to fulfill the requirements of the military oath in an exemplary manner.

The fact should be stressed in a brief introduction that for the present young soldiers and sailors military service is beginning in the remarkable year of the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR. The outpouring of political and labor enthusiasm by the Soviet people, brought forth by these events in the nation's life, continues to grow and expand and is producing remarkable examples of shock work and patriotic initiatives. The remarkable deeds of the Soviet workers embody the steadfast will of the Soviet people to fulfill the grand plans outlined at the 26th party congress for social and economic development and the Food-Production Program approved by the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, to lift the homeland's power and prestige even higher and increase its glory.

The homeland's armed defenders are expected reliably to protect the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people. The military oath, an extremely important state document, is an inviolable law of life for them. It embodies V. I. Lenin's precepts and the requirements set by the Communist Party, the Constitution of the USSR and our people for Soviet fighting men.

## 1. The Significance of the Military Oath in the Life and Work of Soviet Fighting Men

As the propagandist begins explaining the first topic, he must point out the fact that fighting men of the army and navy share the same life as the entire nation and the plans and aspirations of the workers of our cities and villages. Military work, which is directed toward the protection of the socialist conquests and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, is an important contribution to the national cause of creating the new society.

Induction into the Soviet Army or Navy does not eliminate an individual from the ranks of active builders of communism. Only his uniform changes, and the focus of his labor efforts, knowledge, abilities and skills. This extensive and complex military work by all servicemen, without exception, assures the nation's security and that the forces are in a constant state of combat readiness to totally rout any aggressor. This defines the purpose of military work, its ideological and political and its moral substance.

The instructor then points out the fact that after completing the young soldier's (sailor's) program, but no later than 6 weeks from the day of his arrival in the military unit, every fighting man takes the military oath of loyalty to his people, his Soviet homeland and the Soviet government. The oath is the fundamental law governing military life. Its mobilizing and inspiring force lies in the fact that the official demands made by the Soviet state of the homeland's defenders and formulated in the oath, are combined with the personal convictions of the fighting men and with their moral obligations.

The custom of taking the military oath was born during the first months of existence of our Armed Forces. The first Red Army regiments, formed at Lenin's decree, took an oath of loyalty to the homeland as they were sent off to the civil war fronts. In the beginning Red Army and Red Navy men, commanders and commissars themselves compiled the texts for the oath. Their content varied, and they were called a formal promise, a Red oath or a socialist vow and were taken in various ways: in groups as members of a subunit or unit or individually. The meaning was the same, however: The armed workers and peasants vowed to the party, the people and the great Lenin selflessly and fearlessly to fight for the power of the soviets, to mercilessly smash the enemies of the revolution and to defend the young Soviet Republic at any cost. On 22 April 1918 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee instituted by special decree a military oath of uniform text for the entire army. It was called the "Formal Promise." Its text was reviewed and approved by V. I. Lenin. It was printed along with an explanation in the "Red Army Man's Service Booklet."

Vladimir Il'ich attached enormous significance to the indoctrination of loyalty to military duty with the requirements contained in the oath. Lenin himself took the military oath on 11 May 1918, together with fighting men of the 4th Moscow Regiment, the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment and the Separate Composite Cavalry Detachment. Together with the Red Army men he added the words of the "Formal Promise" at the Mikhel'zon Plant in Moscow (now the Plant imeni Vladimir Il'ich):

"I pledge at the first call of the Workers' and Peasants' Government to take up the defense of the Soviet Republic against all dangers and encroachments on the part of all its enemies and in the struggle... for the cause of socialism and fraternity of peoples to spare neither my efforts nor my very life."

The flames of civil war were blazing at that time over the vast expanses of the young Soviet State. A mortal threat faced it from all sides. Whether or not there would be power of the soviets--this was the question. And people in overcoats and pea-jackets, took the oath to the homeland and in fierce battles wrote the first lines in the chronicle of our army's heroic historic. These were fearless soldiers of the revolution, fighting men of legendary boldness and valor. The people celebrated in songs and stories the feats of the legendary Red fighters, who kept their oath and selflessly defended the homeland of October against the armies of the White Guard and the armed forces of the most powerful capitalist states.

In March of 1922 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted a decree that all personnel of the Red Army and Red Navy be required to take the oath. All servicemen took the oath on 1 May, collectively, in formation, during a parade.

Certain changes were made in subsequent years in the text of the oath and the procedure for taking it, based upon specific historical conditions. The meaning of the oath was unchanged, however, and remains so. It is a sacred military oath of loyalty to the socialist homeland and a formal commitment selflessly to defend its honor, liberty and independence.

The instructor goes on to point out that the oath in existence today was established by an ukase issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 23 August 1960. The combined-arms regulations--Internal Service Regulations, Disciplinary Code and Manual of Garrison and Guard Duties of the USSR Armed Forces--open with the text of the oath. The statute governing the procedure for taking the military oath was established by an ukase issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 30 July 1975. It is contained in Addendum No 1 of the Internal Service Regulations.

The ceremony for taking the military oath should be explained in detail. The day on which the oath is taken is not a workday and is observed as a holiday for the given unit or ship. At the designated time the personnel form up into a formation, in time of war, wearing the field uniform and bearing personal weapons, with the trooping of the unit colors. Those taking their oath are in the first ranks. The unit commander makes a brief speech explaining to the soldiers (or sailors) the significance of the military oath and the great obligation which servicemen taking the oath of loyalty to the homeland bear from that time on. The fighting man taking the oath reads the oath aloud in front of the formation of his subunit, signs across from his name on a special list and returns to his place in the formation.

It has become a good tradition to take the oath at sites of revolutionary and combat glory, near monuments to the fallen heroes of the Great Patriotic War. The

young fighting men of certain units and military educational institutions of the Moscow Garrison take the military oath at the V. I. Lenin Moldoyem in Red Square, near the grave of the Unknown Soldier at the Kremlin wall or in that shop of the Plant imeni Vladimir Il'ich where the great Lenin took the oath in 1918. In Leningrad sailors take their oath to the homeland on the cruiser "Avrora." The fighting men of certain units of the Belorussian Military District take the oath at the burial mound of Glory. Sailors of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet take the sacred oath at the Malakhov burial mound, fighting men of the Volgograd Garrison, at the Mamayev burial mound. Representatives of local party and soviet organizations, army and navy veterans, heroes of labor and parents of the fighting men are invited to the oath ceremony. After the taking of the oath is completed, the unit commander congratulates the young fighting men on this important event and all of the personnel, on their new replenishments. The band plays the Anthem of the Soviet Union, after which the unit passes by in formal march.

Sight-seeing tours, sports games and competitions, evening discussions on special subjects and concerts by amateur groups are held on the festive day of the oath-taking. The military oath now becomes an inviolable law of life for the fighting men, a law from the requirements of which there can be no deviations whatsoever. The sacred vow expressed in the oath leads the soldier, the sailor and the sergeant throughout his entire military service. It inspires the fighting men to serve the homeland selflessly, to perform feats for the sake of defending it.

## 2. The Requirements Made of Servicemen by the Military Oath

When the second topic is discussed the instructor reads the text of the oath and explains each of its requirements in detail. The fact should be underscored that the oath expresses the demands set by the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and our people for their loyal defenders and defines the main and most important duties imposed upon them by service in the Armed Forces, as well as the most important moral-political and fighting qualities which the Soviet fighting man must possess.

The requirement for honesty is placed first in the oath. This was no accident. It is not just the army laws which demand honor and integrity of people. Our entire structure of life, both in the army and in the civilian situation, calls for honor and integrity in relations among people. There is no association more unpleasant than association with a false and dishonest individual, with an individual who cannot be trusted, who is not reliable. It is always difficult to deal with such people, and especially in the army situation. The army cannot exist without trust among people. The actions of the fighting men are always subordinated to a common goal. And they can progress toward that goal only with total unanimity, with calm certainty that the one next to them will not let them down. In reconnaissance, for example, the operation of fighting men in the area of the enemy always involves enormous risk. One must have infinite faith in the individual accompanying him. One has to know that the comrade will provide reliable support, that he would sooner give his own life than sacrifice yours, that he will come to your rescue and not abandon you in trouble. Dishonor is

worse than death. It is a disgrace to the fighting man. And in order to eliminate the possibility that a soldier or sailor will ever commit a dishonorable act, he must, beginning with his very first days, his first steps, in army or navy life, instill in himself this requirement of the oath to be honorable.

A lie is never acceptable, but it is especially dangerous in the combat situation. Let us imagine that the scouts have not managed to gather accurate information on the enemy. They do not want to admit this, however, and report fabricated information to the commander. The commander makes his decision and leads the subunit into battle on the basis of that information. The result is either unjustifiably large casualties or defeat. In short, the cost of dishonor in combat is too dear.

A soldier's honor is reflected in such moral features as modesty, self-control and readiness to help a comrade. In a combat situation Soviet fighting men have risked their lives to save their comrades from danger. Honest and just soldiers do not accept the mutual hushing up of infractions. A soldier or sailor must not only be honest and sincere himself with his commander, but must also encourage his comrades to be so. Lies, deception and cover-ups are detrimental to the military collective and destroy soldierly friendship. He who candidly points out errors and shortcomings to a comrade and helps him to eliminate them is an honorable and reliable friend.

When he takes the oath, the soldier vows to be brave. Bravery, a remarkable moral and combat quality, has long been a part of our people. The communist party and our entire Soviet way of life instill it in the Soviet people. Great political awareness, love for the homeland and devotion to the cause of communism form the basis of the Soviet fighting man's bravery and heroism. Bravery and heroism--the fighting man's ability to overcome fear for his life and go on to perform a feat for the sake of victory over the enemy even in the most difficult and dangerous situation. The highest form of bravery and courage, the highest understanding of one's military duty and of the oath are the deliberate sacrifice of oneself for the overall success, self-sacrifice for the sake of the common victory.

When fighting for the Soviet homeland's freedom and independence, our soldiers have always demonstrated boldness, persistence and determination in combat, bravery, fearlessness, heroism and contempt for death. The Great Patriotic War produced innumerable examples of this. In the schoolroom we learn about the feats of Aleksandr Matrosov, Nikolay Gastello and Viktor Talalikhin. And such feats were repeated during the war years by tens and hundreds of other valorous Soviet fighting men. The Soviet Armed Forces became famous throughout the world as an army of mass heroism.

The propagandist might tell about the feat of the gun crew commanded by Sergeant T. I. Morozov. They found themselves with only Sergeant Morozov's gun in the path of large counterattacking infantry forces supported by four tanks. The commander acted resolutely and calmly. He ordered the four soldiers on the weapon crew to lie down near the fire position and greet the extended lines of attacking fascists with submachine gun fire and grenades. The sergeant himself, together

with the gunner, took up their stations near the weapon, and when the enemy approached they greeted him with armor-piercing shells and grapeshot.

The enemy was rushing fiercely forward, threatening the flank of our attacking regiment. Sergeant Morozov's crew held the Hitlerites until reserves reached them with help, forcing the enemy to flee. Sergeant Morozov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. All of his crew members were awarded orders and medals.

It is possible that nuclear missiles would be used in a modern war, should the imperialists unleash one. There will be unprecedeted physical and mental stress, and even greater exertion of effort will be required of every fighting man. Under these conditions only the soldier well trained in the moral-political and the technical military sense, with good physical conditioning, bold and efficient and capable of demonstrating initiative, will be able to steadfastly overcome the difficulties and demonstrate real bravery in the combat. He needs to prepare himself for this right now, in peacetime.

The military oath requires that one be a disciplined soldier. Discipline is necessary in any army, as an organization designated for the conduct of combat operations. There can be no army, there can be no victory, without discipline and organization.

While the role of discipline has always been great, it has now increased immeasurably. In the era of nuclear weapons, military operations of enormous scope, dynamism and complexity, and unprecedented importance for the moral factor, the slightest nonobservance of the requirements for military discipline can result in the most serious consequences. This is why even isolated examples of negligence and lack of discipline are absolutely unacceptable today. It is precisely aware discipline and obedience to the commanders which unite dozens, hundreds and thousands of people into a single, controlled, whole element and make the troops into an awesome, monolithic force capable of opposing and gaining victory over the enemy. It is true what they say: "A soldier's capability is doubled by discipline." The instructor should stress the fact that Soviet military discipline differs in principle from discipline in the armies of the capitalist states. It is established on the basis of the new, socialist social relations. Instead of subordination based on fear of punishment, Soviet military discipline is based on each serviceman's awareness of his military duty and his personal responsibility for the defense of his homeland--the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The students should be made aware of the fact that there are no "minor matters" with respect to discipline. Dangerous violations of regulation order can develop out of "minor matters." He who becomes accustomed to lack of discipline and permits himself various indulgences today can commit an even worse infraction in the future.

At this point the propagandist should illustrate the importance of regulation order, efficiency, solidarity and combat coordination in the subunit, the crew or the team, using specific examples and based on the specific characteristics of the

given branch of troops, unit or subunit. He must also point out the deviations from the observance of regulation order committed by certain fighting men, deviations which could have a negative effect upon the unit's combat readiness.

The demand contained in the oath to be vigilant, to strictly guard military and state secrets, is closely linked to discipline. Vigilance is an extremely important moral and combat quality of the fighting man. It is primarily a matter of political alertness and the ability promptly to detect and halt actions by hostile elements, their ideological and military acts of provocation and sabotage, to strictly guard state and military secrets. Vigilance is based on political maturity and ideological conviction in the fighting man, on his sense of personal responsibility for the defense of the Soviet homeland.

After taking the oath the fighting men are assigned to the daily duty detail, including guard duty. The performance of guard duty is the performance of a combat mission in peacetime. The performance of a sentry's duties, as an example, requires special vigilance, observance, resourcefulness and boldness. Vigilance is clearly manifested in the fighting men's constant combat readiness to engage in a determined struggle with any aggressors and, as the oath demands, to defend our homeland's freedom and independence, sparing neither one's blood nor his very life. Vigilance is needed in all things: on alert duty and on naval cruises, on guard and watch duty, in tactical exercises and in the day-to-day service, both in the area of the unit and outside that area. It must always be borne in mind that the imperialists are infiltrating agents into our midst and using eavesdropping and recording devices. They are attempting to obtain our military and state secrets, in order to weaken our combat strength. It is the duty of every fighting man to guard service documents, to resolutely silence idle chatter, to carefully observe the rules governing radio and telephone traffic and not to divulge military secrets in personal correspondence--in short, to close off all channels to which the enemy might obtain military secrets and damage our homeland's security.

The students should also be reminded of the fact that on 16 October 1980 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed the ukase "On the Introduction of Changes and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the USSR on National Defense Matters." Additions were made to the text of the military oath under this ukase. Every individual entering the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR now solemnly swears to observe the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws. This requirement of the military oath has great indoctrinal significance. It helps fighting men of the army and navy to gain a more profound and thorough understanding of their sacred duty to the homeland, to understand the necessity of defending it. Our Fundamental Law states that the defense of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR and that military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the USSR is the honored obligation of Soviet citizens. The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty, combined-arms regulations and the military oath are based on these extremely important standards.

When he takes the oath the soldier or sailor vows to conscientiously study military affairs. When the instructor explains this point he should convince the students that the fighting man is not prepared to combat the enemy without an

excellent mastery of the weapons and combat equipment, without solid practical skills. The fighting man's strength lies in the weapon, in his ability to make maximum use of it in the performance of the combat mission, in his ability to fight. It is therefore the duty of the soldier and sailor to study with determination and persistence, to master the military specialty, to memorize diligently and firmly everything taught him by the commanders, to fulfill the regulation requirements in an exemplary manner. It is especially important to make efficient use of every minute of training time. With conscientious study of military affairs, many fighting men become rated specialists and experts in the training during their first year of service. At this point the instructor should name such fighting men from the given subunit or unit.

At the front the fighting men proudly wore the orders and medal received for combat feats. Today it is a matter of honor for the soldier or sailor to earn commendations and awards, to receive badges of military valor: those of the expert, the rated specialist or the rated sportsman. Military skill is not easy to acquire, of course. It is achieved through persistent, diligent work. V. I. Lenin underscored the fact that military training demands not a burst of activity, not a bidding and not a fighting slogan, but prolonged, intense, extremely determined and disciplined work ("Poln. sobr. soch.", Vol 36, p 325).

Thanks to the constant concern of the party and the people our Armed Forces have risen considerably above that level at which they were during the Great Patriotic War with respect to their technical equipment and organizational structure, their control and support system. The Soviet fighting men today handle extremely complex combat machines, missile complexes and radioelectronic systems, operate nuclear-powered submarines and supersonic airships, and master methods of employing various other kinds of military equipment in combat. Great effort is required of all the personnel, in order to achieve a high level of coordination in operations, to learn to handle the modern weapons to perfection.

Soldiers are not born, however, they are developed. A special role in the development of the fighting men is played by their active participation in socialist competition, which is being conducted during the year of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR with the slogan "For the Peaceful Labor of the Soviet People--Reliable Protection!" In the course of the competition Soviet fighting men are acquiring combat skill and learning military affairs thoroughly, according to V. I. Lenin's behest.

The military oath obligates the soldier and sailor to conserve military property and the property of the people. The weapons and technical combat equipment, military property and other equipment comprise the material foundation of the fighting strength of our Armed Forces. These enormously valuable things were created by the servicemen's fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, and large amounts were spent on their production. This is why the expensive combat equipment should be protected as our most valuable possession and always maintained in a state of good repair and readiness for combat. This demand of the oath is aimed at the all round strengthening of the Soviet State and our Armed Forces.

The instructor should use concrete examples and incidents from the life of the unit or ship to illustrate how the fighting men conserve the combat equipment, weapons, military property, fuels and lubricants, and cite as an example soldiers who zealously fulfill this requirement of the oath. The young fighting men should understand that concern for the preservation of the combat equipment and weapons must be demonstrated in their good care and competent operation, in the conservation of fuel and ammunition, in an effort to add new methods and techniques and make rationalization and invention proposals with respect to the practices employed in the servicing of the combat equipment.

### 3. It Is the Obligation and Duty of Every Fighting Man to Fulfill the Requirements of the Military Oath in an Exemplary Manner

When he begins this topic, the instructor should explain that the military oath has the force of both a state law and a moral duty. Its fulfillment is therefore an immutable service obligation and at the same time, a matter of the honor and the consciousness of every fighting man. Violation of the military oath is regarded as a grave crime, which entails harsh punishment and universal contempt. At this point, the instructor should mention that point in Article 62 of the Constitution of the USSR, which states:

"Protection of the socialist homeland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR.

"Betrayal of the homeland is an extremely serious crime to the people." And Article 63 states: "Military service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is the honored duty of Soviet citizens." Consequently, there is nothing more important, nothing more honorable for every soldier and sailor than to fulfill the sacred vow he has personally made. And there is nothing more disgraceful than to violate these formal commitments to the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and the people. "The oath is sacred for the soldier." and "Once he has taken the oath, he must not deviate from it in the slightest!" the people say.

Loyalty to the oath is expressed in specific deeds and acts. Also in peacetime, in the daily service and life, Soviet fighting men must demonstrate a high level of aware discipline, vigilance and bravery, and strive constantly to improve their combat skill.

The instructor should illustrate loyalty to the demands set in the oath, using examples of selfless and skillful actions and heroic acts by fighting men in peacetime.

In his report at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov stressed the special importance of the principle of teaching the soldier that which is essential in war, a principle tested by history. It must become an unshakable law governing army and navy training. The minister of defense demands that all the training of the troops and naval forces be conducted with the nature of modern combat, the demands of military art, in mind, primarily in the field, in the air and at sea.

These conditions demand of every soldier and sailor enormous effort, skill, strong will, persistence and constant self-control. Without developing these qualities it would be difficult and sometimes, impossible, to perform the duties of a missileman, a motorized rifleman, a pilot, a sailor, an airborne trooper, a tankman or those of fighting men of the other specialties. This is due to the complexity of the weapons and combat equipment, the degree of perfection required for servicing them and the methods of their employment.

"...No matter how high the level of an army's technical equipment," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has said, "man with a perfect mastery of the equipment remains the main and decisive force in a war. This is specially true today, in the era of nuclear missiles, when the outcome of a war will be determined by the people who handle the weapons and combat equipment, people with good moral and physical conditioning, infinitely devoted to their homeland, to the party and the people" ("Leninskij kursov" [On the Leninist Course], Vol 2, p 51).

The homeland values highly the intense military work of its defenders. Many soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, shore-based and seagoing warrant officers, officers, generals and admirals are singled out for high state awards for their successes in the combat and political training, for distinction in the military service. A large group of servicemen were rewarded for excellent successes, courage and resoluteness in the "Zapad-81" exercise.

Many fighting men are fulfilling their honored international duty in an honorable and worthy manner. They were mentioned with feeling at the 26th CPSU Congress by Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev: "And each time this is required in the interest of the national security and the defense of peace, when it is necessary to help the victims of aggression, the Soviet fighting man has shown himself to the world as a selfless and courageous patriot and internationalist, prepared to overcome all difficulties" ("Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], p 66). Soldiers and sailors serving beyond the borders of the homeland concern themselves with a sense of special responsibility for the observance of the requirements set forth in the military oath and regulations, both as fighting men of the new type of army and as representatives of the Soviet Nation, which is building the communist society. They never forget this.

As he completes his presentation of the material, the instructor should call upon the young soldiers and sailors to be loyal to the military oath, to observe their sacred military vow and regulations, always and in all things, to fulfill the requirements of military discipline with awareness.

Immediately prior to the study of this topic the instructor should arrange for the young fighting men to meet with army and navy veterans, representatives of party and soviet organs, and to visit museums and combat glory rooms. In the evening it is a good thing to show the filmed documentary chronicles "Prepare for Military Service," "On the Celebration of the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces" and "The Immortal Garrison" and the filmstrip "The Great and Honored Duty of the Soviet Fighting Man." The filmstrip "The Military Oath--The Fighting Man's Vow of Loyalty to the Homeland" should be shown during the narrative/discussion.

The following topics can be discussed during the discussion with the students:

1. What do you know about the history of the beginning of the Soviet military oath?
2. What is the role of the military oath in the life and work of the soldier, the sailor?
3. What examples do you know of the selfless fulfillment of military duty during the civil war years and the Great Patriotic War?
4. What is stated in our military oath?
5. What are the main demands made by the military oath of the homeland's armed defenders?
6. What does it mean to irreproachably observe one's sacred vow of loyalty to the homeland?

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## GROUND FORCES

### POLITICAL WORK IN A TANK REGIMENT

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 82 (signed to press  
3 Aug 82) pp 28-32

[Article by Maj G. Dmitriyev: "The Key to Strengthening Party Influence" (based on a regimental party committee's experience in assuring that the communists have the avant-garde role in the tactical-fire training)]

[Text] The regiment in which Guards Major V. Dorokhin is one of the battalion commanders, occupies a leading position in the training and competition in the Guards Tank Kantemirov twice Order-Bearing Division. The fighting men demonstrated good field and tactical-fire training in the wrap-up tactical exercise with live firing at the end of the winter training period. Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S. Moskolenko, deputy USSR minister of defense, who attended the exercise, gave their combat skill a high rating, pointing out the determination of their actions in the offensive, their firing accuracy and the commander's ability to direct the personnel and equipment in a complex tactical situation. Relying upon their accumulated experience, the tankmen are confidently making new advances in the improvement of their field training and the development of combat coordination among the subunits in the course of the summer training and are persistently fulfilling the socialist commitments they accepted in honor of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

The collective's consistent successes are a natural result of the focused organizational and indoctrinal work performed by the regimental commander, his deputy for political affairs and the party organizations, of the conscientious military work performed by the communists and Komsomol members, by all the personnel. The unit party committee is making an important contribution to their achievement.

In all their work the party committee members proceed from the demands set forth at the 26th CPSU Congress with respect to the need to increase the activeness, initiative and principle of party organizations and the avant-garde role of the communists. They also follow recommendations coming out of the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations that they regard the task of assuring that each party member takes an avant-garde role as the key to increasing party influence upon the accomplishment of the combat training tasks--not simply to discuss these tasks, but each time to find the party approach to their fulfillment, which is right for the given collective.

We know that the quality of tactical-fire training for the personnel depends primarily upon the commanders, those directly in charge of organizing the training and indoctrinational process. The better the officers perform their duties, the more effectively is each training hour and each field trip used, and the greater are the results from the servicemen's military work. The vast majority of subunit commanders in the regiment, beginning at the platoon level, are communists. The regimental party committee therefore gives the closest of attention to assuring that they set a good personal example and are highly responsible individuals.

To become convinced of this one need only take a look at the committee's monthly plans. Each of them outline measures aimed at enhancing the officers' ideological and theoretical tempering and calls for an individual study of the performance and the moral-political qualities of a specific communist-leader and an analysis of his training and indoctrination of subordinates, the presentation of reports by CPSU members in command of subunits on the fulfillment of regulation party duties, the summarization and dissemination of the experience of the best battalion, company or platoon commander, the rendering of assistance to the commander whose military collective is lagging in the training, and so forth.

By constantly visiting the firing range, the training center and the tank training ground, where the field training of the tankmen is formed, the party activists learn about both the workstyle of the communists-and-officers and the training methods they use, learn how consistently they are implementing the basic principle of combat training--to teach the troops that which is essential in a war, to orient them toward a creative approach to the job, to summarize and disseminate progressive experience.

What does it mean to take a creative approach to the training? It obviously means to search constantly, to find more effective methods and techniques for providing the fighting men with knowledge and skills. This applies most of all to those sections in which the so-called "bottlenecks" occur. This is done, as an example, by Guards Senior Lieutenant N. Samolyuk, commander of an excellent tank company and CPSU member. Concerned about the tankmen's tactical-fire training, the officer looked at the results of training firings by the young fighting men, recent graduates of training subunits and concluded that their lack of success was due to their lack of skill in performing the aiming procedures. The commander thought about how the shortcoming in the soldiers' training could be eliminated most rapidly and using a minimum of training time. He soon suggested that the craftsmen in the company produce a device called "the sight's field of vision," which he had designed. What is the advantage of this device? It has all the attributes, so to speak, of the sight installed in the tank and makes it possible graphically to teach the gunners how to perform the operation properly. The instructor assigns firing tasks to the trainees and observes how they line up the central angle bracket, how they use the sliding scales, and so forth. Any errors they make are immediately corrected, and through multiple repetition of the procedures they learn to perform properly. Because of this device the young tankmen learned within a brief period of time to perform the fire tasks competently. The party committee supported the communist's valuable initiative and explained its advantage to the officers. And officer Samolyuk had some followers. The regimental commander ordered that the device be made and used in all the tank companies.

It should be noted that many communists in the unit, especially members of the party committee, approach the job in a thoughtful and innovative manner. I would like to discuss in detail one of them, Guards Major V. Dorokhin, commander of the best battalion. In a recent tactical exercise he and his men demonstrated their ability to engage in modern combat.

The party committee is well aware of how the battalion commander achieved such a good training level among his men, because party committee member Guards Major Dorokhin shared his ideas and discoveries, and the secretary and other activists working in the battalion collected piece by piece and summarized the experience of the commander and the party organization. The battalion commander resolved the conflict between the increasing volume of knowledge and skills required by tankmen in modern combat and the lack of time to acquire them by combining various classes with tactics. During a battle drill exercise covering "The Company In An Offensive," for example, in addition to the main issues the fighting men worked on the tank refueling norms and practiced repairing "damage" to the tracks and suspension. In another exercise, in addition to the main problem, the tankmen improved their skills in checking the state of repair of the crew's collective protection system, in camouflaging and so forth. By combining various training subjects, performing concomitant and supplementary drills and running through a number of training exercises on tool maintenance days, the battalion commander is thoroughly preparing his men for combat and increasing the time available for tactical fire training. As a result, many of the tankmen have learned to perform competently in tactical exercises and to destroy targets with the first shot or the first rounds.

The party committee is extensively publicizing the experience of this outstanding battalion. At a party meeting the communists unanimously acknowledged that the comprehensive training method is the certain way to increase combat training intensity and improve its quality, and resolved to push for its adoption. CPSU member V. Dorokhin addressed the officers and told them what he does and how he does it. Demonstration classes were held in his battalion. It would appear that this would have been all that was necessary. Simply take everything useful, adopt it and apply it in your own subunit. The new does not take hold so easily, however. A commander sometimes seems to be using the same training methods and forms and the same working principles, but his results are not as good. We can obviously not disregard the individual's personal characteristics, neither in the actual experience or the workstyle. It is not just knowledge and pedagogical skills which are important in working with people, after all, but also the instructor's involvement, his character and his approach to the job. Furthermore, there are many similar, but not identical, problems in the military collectives.

On the surface it appeared that everything was being done in the battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Kharlanov as was done in the others. Comprehensive classes were conducted, the communists' tasks with respect to improving field training effectiveness and quality were discussed at party meetings, and all of the fighting men were involved in the competition. From one training period to the next, however, the tankmen of that subunit had lower results in the tactical fire training than did the other battalions. What was the trouble? The party committee decided to learn the causes of the collective's chronic lagging behind. The

activists spent more than just one day or even a couple of days at the tank training ground and the firing facility. They closely observed the workstyle of the battalion commander and other officers, looked into the party organization's work, compiled and studied the facts. Properly qualified communists were involved in the work.

Among other things, CPSU member Guards Major S. Neretin, under an assignment from the party committee secretary, began studying the battalion's firing results. He got out the documents and made a study of how various categories of fighting men participated in the firing exercises and of their evaluations. This is what he learned. First of all, the tank commanders were firing less frequently and with poorer results than the gunners. In the second place, an overall positive rating frequently hid a low percentage of excellent evaluations. No one expected these findings. It was assumed that the tank commanders were generally better trained. The opposite proved to be true. How, then, could they train their subordinates? Was this not the stumbling block? Why were there far fewer excellent ratings than good, and how could this ratio be improved?

These and other questions were thoroughly discussed at a party committee meeting at which the reasons for the collective's lagging in the tactical fire training were studied. The common effort produced solutions to the problems, of course, and defined ways to eliminate the shortcomings. The activists gave a great deal of useful advice to the battalion commander, its political worker and the party organization secretary. Among other things, they recommended that the individual work performed with the officers and junior commanders be improved and that formalism be eliminated in the organization of competition. The party committee assigned the more experienced CPSU members the task of helping communist V. Kharlanov and the subunit's party activists to acquire progressive know-how in organizational and indoctrinal work. All of this helped the commander and the communists in the lagging battalion and other officers. The situation in the collective was corrected.

In an attempt to increase their influence upon the tankmen's tactical fire training, the regimental party organization and its nucleus, the party committee, are striving with determination against weaknesses and indulgences in the combat training and for the effective use of training time. The communists as well as the Komsomol activists are called upon to do so at party and Komsomol meetings, conferences and briefings. Demonstration classes and other activities are conducted in the regiment. Party committee members assess from a standpoint of principle instances of negligence and irresponsibility on the part of certain communists in command of subunits with respect to organizing the training and indoctrinal process.

In a recent summing-up of inspection the men of CPSU member Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Volkov demonstrated poor combat training results. What was the reason? Advanced methods for training the tankmen are cast aside in the company, the classes are not conducted in an instructive manner, and the potential of socialist competition is not fully utilized. The main thing, however, is that the training

is simplified for the fighting men, the results are padded, and the crews are coached in performing live firings before the trainees have properly mastered the theoretical principles of the firing and its rules.

The struggle for a good rating is a worthy cause, a matter of honor for every communist. Does this mean, however, that everything should be subordinated to this cause, without considering the requirements set forth in the regulations and manuals? Was this not sometimes the case? Tactical exercises involving live firing would be scheduled for a subunit, and everyone would rush out to the training field to make corduroy roads through the impassable areas, fill in chuckholes, clear out the areas in front of targets, and so forth. Many people were involved in this work, and energy, strength and a great deal of time were spent on it. And for what? So that the tank could cross the field like a streetcar on rails. So that the gunner and the other crew members did not have to bother with hunting for the targets. In addition, the officers themselves sometimes prepared the guns and equipment for their subordinates and told them what targets would be encountered where and what sight to use for firing at them. What kind of lesson could be learned from such exercises. Would the excellent rating received by a soldier actually reflect his real knowledge and skills? Of course not.

The party committee members talked more than once with communist A. Volkov, who was irresponsible in the performance of his assigned job and had relaxed his influence upon the training and indoctrination of his men, and tried to help him. When it became clear that he was not deriving the proper conclusions for himself, however, he was brought to party accountability. The party committee also makes great demands of the other communists, forcing them to improve their workstyle, eliminate deficiencies and take an earnest, party approach to the task of improving the field training.

The junior commanders have far from the least important role in the tactical fire training of the tankmen. They regularly conduct drills and exercises and serve as instructors at the training stations. And experience has shown us that in those subunits in which purposive work is conducted with these individuals, they become reliable assistants to the officers in the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

Throughout the training year the regimental party committee keeps its eye on the work performed by the party organizations with the NCO's. This has been discussed more than once at party meetings and party committee sessions. The work is also reviewed in the subunit party organizations. In the advanced battalion which we discussed, for example, company commanders Guards Captain G. Nikiforov and Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Rudnyy presented reports on the quality of training and indoctrination for the NCO's. The party organization recommended that they teach the junior commanders methods of performing the combat training tasks in a comprehensive manner and teach them how to create a complex tactical situation in the drills and how to make efficient use of training hours, including the time spent traveling to and from the exercise site. The officers-and-communists gave heed to these recommendations. The pathological skill of many of the sergeants has now improved markedly.

The party committee members made a thorough study of experience in exerting party influence upon the NCO training accumulated in the right-flank companies, summarized it and are striving to see that it is applied in all the party organizations. Guards Senior Lieutenants A. Rudnyy and N. Samolyuk, communists and the best methods experts, and their skillful teaching of the training process to the junior commanders were discussed in seminars conducted for various categories of officers. The activists told about their methods for training and indoctrinating the NCO's in individual talks with the junior officers. These and other measures had the objective of teaching the communists in command of companies and platoons to work constantly and purposively with the NCO's in every exercise, whether it involve driving the tank, firing or a tank gunnery drill, providing for indoctrination of the trainees and developing their morale, fighting efficiency and commander's qualities.

By establishing in the party organization a climate of responsibility, efficiency and demandingness, the party committee is enhancing the communists' influence with respect to creating in the regimental collective an atmosphere of wholesome dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, creative quest and nonacceptance of shortcomings.

The results of the military collective's daily combat work are the best criterion for assessing the effectiveness of party influence upon the combat training. Regimental personnel are successfully coping with the tasks assigned to them. The regiment is considered to be the best in the division with respect to field and tactical fire training. This means that the party committee and the party organization are on the right course in general.

A stricter assessment of what has been achieved will show that the communists still have work to do, however. There are still many problems awaiting solutions, after all. This applies to enhancing party influence with respect to increasing the number of rated specialists, making a more effective effort toward achieving a good level of combat coordination among the crews and subunits, training them to destroy targets and maximum range and with a minimum of ammunition, increasing the communists' contribution to the effectiveness of competition by task and norm, and improving the individual indoctrinational work performed with the fighting men. The party committee members are aware of these reserves and possibilities and intend to direct the efforts of all party organizations more persistently into the proper channels, to enhance the avant-garde role and the personal example of the communists in the effort to intensify and improve the tankmen's combat and tactical fire training.

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## GROUND FORCES

### POLITICAL CHIEF ON TASKS OF PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 82 (signed to press 3 Aug 82) pp 33-40

[Article by Col Gen M. Popkov, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces: "Improve the Work Style of the Staff Communists"]

[Text] Upon returning from visits among the forces the officers of our political directorate invariably make the following comments. Political organs, party committees and party bureaus have become markedly more active since the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. They are more serious and are showing greater initiative and principle in their daily work. They are working in a more focused manner and with greater results to mobilize the communists and all the personnel to successfully fulfill the requirements set for the Soviet Armed Forces at the 26th CPSU Congress. Party organizations are exerting a greater influence with respect to the accomplishment of concrete tasks pertaining to combat readiness, the mastery of the equipment and weapons, the field training, the strengthening of discipline, organization and order.

Commanders, political workers and party activists are taking into fuller account the peculiarities of the contemporary military-political situation and the specific nature of the military service performed by the units and subunits. They direct the efforts of the personnel toward the quality fulfillment of plans and programs for the most important, summer combat training period and toward preparing a fitting reception for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The reports delivered at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, and Army General A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the subsequent resolution stressed the need to increase the responsibility of the staff party organizations and other control organs for the all round training of the officers, for their mastery of military art, methods of training and indoctrinating the troops and advanced know-how. The USSR minister of defense named those qualities which are now most needed by the

Soviet military leader. They are competence, an intensive sense of the new and the ability to assume responsibility for the accomplishment of the complex tasks, to promptly spot and support initiative and to mobilize the will and the energies of the personnel. The nature of modern combat demands that the military leader of any rank or ability think and function within an extremely rigid time limit, under enormous moral-psychological and physical stress.

Staff political organs, party committees and organizations have a large role in the development of these important qualities in the communists-and-officers. In their daily work they must take into account the fact that the staff's functions are now more responsible and multifaceted. It has essentially become the main organizing and binding link within the entire system of administrative work directed to the performance of decisions made by the sole commander. Marshal of the Soviet Union S. S. Biryuzov stated very aptly in his memoirs that the "staff can be compared with the central nervous system of a human being." As a control organ the staff helps the commander to resolve questions having to do with maintaining the combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops at the proper level and with the vigilant performance of alert duty. Based on the commander's decisions and orders, the staff plans and organizes the operational, combat and political training. Coordination of the troops' service and the strengthening of discipline, law and order are also an inseparable part of its work. The organizational work performed by staff officers out in the forces is becoming increasingly important, particularly the verification of fulfillment of orders and instructions and the rendering of on-the-spot assistance, including the adoption of specific measures to correct shortcomings.

In view of all this, the political organs, party committees and party organizations of staffs and directorates are expected to constantly concern themselves with the matter of making certain that the communists master the Leninist style of work and supervision. This is a creative style, which calls for a high level of responsibility for the assigned job, a critical approach to the assessment of one's own work results and demandingness of oneself and of others, a style which rules out complacency, arrogance and conceit, and opposes every manifestation of bureaucracy and formalism. The most important features of the Leninist style of control are a high level of communist ideological conviction, profound faith in the vitality and the correctness of Marxist-Leninist principles, a scientific approach to the job, party principle, efficiency and concreteness, effective flexibility and purposiveness, discipline and creative initiative, and the ability to smoothly organize one's own work and that of his subordinates and to achieve good end results.

V. I. Lenin taught us that to make control more effective is to contribute to "the aware selection of means, techniques and methods of struggle capable of producing the greatest and the most lasting results with the least effort." This idea is manifested throughout decisions coming out of the 26th party congress and the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The party attaches prime importance to the task of improving the style and methods of leadership on the basis of Leninist principles and control and to the development of initiative, responsibility and principle in the cadres. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report at the plenum

defined with maximum thoroughness the task of improving the work performed with the cadres. "Trust in those in charge," Leonid Il'ich said, "a demanding and concerned attitude toward their work and the rewarding of initiative, while at the same time increasing personal responsibility for the assigned job--this is the essence of party policy in this matter." We must also approach from this position the task of enhancing party influence with respect to improving the work style of military cadres in general and of staff and directorate officers in particular.

A study of the work of staff political organs and party organizations in a number of military districts, groups of forces and formations of the Ground Forces has shown that under the influence of decisions coming out of the 26th party congress and of decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee, party organizational and political indoctrinal work aimed at developing initiative, efficiency and responsibility in the communists is being conducted more purposefully and concretely. This is characteristic, as an example, of the work performed by the political section of the staff and directorate of the Belorussian Military District, which is headed by Colonel E. Kapustin. When the forces were preparing for the "Zapad-81" exercise and during the exercise the political section thoroughly studied the scope and the substance of tasks assigned the district staff. Taking the nature of these tasks into account the communists's role and place in their successful accomplishment were defined at party organization meetings. The emphasis was placed upon the personal responsibility and the example set by each CPSU member in the fulfillment of their functional duties and in the enhancement of organization, efficiency and quality in the staff work. Decisions adopted at meetings required this of the party members. Their study of the functioning of staffs in operations of the Great Patriotic War and previous large-scale troop exercises and maneuvers helped.

In their work to assure that the communists took the avant-garde role in the exercise, the political section workers and members of party committees and bureaus attempted first of all to employ operational methods in their indoctrinal work with the personnel. These included, as an example, meetings and individual talks with the officers performing tasks involving the greatest responsibility, arranging for individual assistance for those who had not held their positions long and were taking part in this kind of exercise for the first time, operational conferences and instruction sessions for the aktiv, political briefings and so forth.

Socialist competition was skillfully used for developing creative initiative among the staff communists. Political section workers and secretaries of party organizations gave the directorate chiefs a great deal of assistance with respect to defining well conceived commitments, the best individual commitments for the officers.

For summing up the results the chiefs of directorates, sections and services used criteria worked out jointly with the political section and the party organizations with respect to evaluating the performance of each of their subordinates. These are a few of the criteria: performance efficiency, knowledge of the job, diligence in the performance of service duties, quality and timeliness with respect to

filling out reports, mutual assistance, amount of work performed and amount of time used in the process, participation in the organization of uninterrupted communication and interaction among directorates and within the individual directorates, control and verification of the fulfillment of orders, directives and instructions.

In all the phases of the exercise the political section and political organizations publicized the results of the communists' work. The staff was informed every day both about who had performed the best and demonstrated the most initiative and the communists who had been criticized for shortcomings and failings. Leaflets were issued on the outstanding officers, individual talks were held with those who had committed errors, the causes of shortcomings were explained and help was provided in eliminating them.

The atmosphere of efficiency, demandingness, party principle and attention to every communist, which was created in the party organizations, helped to increase the party members' sense of responsibility for the assigned job and for the successful fulfillment of tasks set for the exercise period.

Something else is also typical. The staff political section and district directorate, party organizations of the directorates, sections and services thoroughly and critically scrutinized the results of exercises, constantly utilized the experience gained therein and take effective steps to introduce everything positive into the tactical combat and political training and the party-political work.

Taking into account the experience accumulated in the "Zapad-81" exercise, the political section is devoting special attention to the problem of improving control. Party meetings and seminars for party organization secretaries, chiefs of directorates and sections and the ideological aktiv discuss questions pertaining to the need for the communists to set the example in the mastery of scientific control and the enhancement of precision and organization in the work. They were discussed in detail at a practical and scientific conference of officers.

I feel that even this brief description of the practical work of the staff political section and the directorate of the Belorussian Military District and staff party organizations demonstrates the fact that by employing various work forms and methods they are enhancing the efficiency, initiative and responsibility of the communists with respect to accomplishing the tasks set for the troops by the USSR minister of defense.

We know that the staff party organizations include the most competent, mature and experienced communists, well trained in all respects. They are at the source in the struggle for quality fulfillment of combat and political training tasks and the enhancement of combat readiness among the forces. The results of training and indoctrination for the personnel in the subordinate units depend in great part upon their ideological maturity, competence and sense of responsibility for the assigned job, upon concreteness and purposiveness in their work. This is why it is the main concern of political organs and staff party organizations to assure that the staff communists set a good personal example in all things, that they develop good political, work and moral qualities.

Systematic and substantive political-indoctrinal and party organizational work with the party members and the creation of a wholesome, moral-psychological climate in the staffs and directorates has a prime role in the achievement of an avant-garde role for the party members.

Positive experience has been accumulated in this area by the staff political section, the directorate in the staff party organizations of the Carpathian Military District. Party organ workers, party committees and bureaus give daily attention to the task of improving the ideological-theoretical and the military-professional training of the communists, the uniting of the officer collectives and the achievement of harmonious and creative functioning on their part. They combine effective assistance for the instructors and students of Marxist-Leninist officer training groups with strict party demandingness. The quality of the classes has improved as a result. The political section makes extensive use of such forms of indoctrination as discussions and theoretical conferences for the communists on general party documents and of individual talks with CPSU members in charge of directorates, sections and services. These talks reveal how thoroughly a communist is studying Marxist-Leninist theory, decisions coming out of the 26th party congress and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and decrees issued by the Central Committee, what sort of conclusions they are drawing therefrom for their own practical work and how they are applying their knowledge as they work with the personnel. Officers of the political organ prepare carefully for such a discussion and study the state of affairs in the area which the communist heads, his work, political and moral qualities and his participation in the work of the party organization. Their advice, recommendations and critical comments are therefore always well substantiated and are gratefully accepted by the communists.

The political section and party organizations have organized good political briefings for the staff and directorate officers and good technical military propaganda. Twice a month lectures are presented for them on current problems of CPSU policy, foreign and domestic life by leading district personnel, lecturers from the political directorate, party and soviet workers, scientists and instructors from the city's higher educational institutions. The technical military lecture group also conducts classes twice a month. They include lectures on matters of military art and scientific control, training films and discussions of material published in collections and military magazines.

It is a rule in the district that 1-day seminars are conducted throughout the year for chiefs of directorates, sections and services, together with party organization secretaries, which discuss how demands set forth at the 26th party congress and decrees passed by the CPSU Central Committee are being implemented and how the communists in charge are fulfilling the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy and directing the work of party organizations toward the successful fulfillment of combat and political training plans and for the strengthening of military discipline.

All of this is helping to make the communists more active in their work and in public affairs. They have made a thorough study of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report

at the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and his speeches at the 17th Trade Union Congress and the 19th Komsomol Congress, and are actively helping to explain to the personnel these fundamental documents and the Food Production Program of the USSR. Assessing their work from a standpoint of general party demands, the staff and directorate communists are attempting to work more effectively this anniversary year, to make their contribution to the achievement of higher indicators in the combat and political training and the strengthening of combat readiness among the district forces.

Unfortunately, some staff party organizations are still not demonstrating proper activeness and initiative in the ideological indoctrination of the communists. This is one of the reasons why certain staffs have party members who appear to be trying to distinguish themselves with conscientious work and exemplary conduct but are not always successful. They now permit themselves to weaken their efforts and become passive, now look impassively at the errors of others and deficiencies in the work.

We can clearly not accept such things. In accordance with recommendations made at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, the political organs need to devote greater attention to their supervision of staff party organizations and create in them a climate of nonacceptance of any manifestation of an unconscientious attitude by a communist toward the expansion of his ideological-theoretical perspective, toward the fulfillment of his party and service duty and his participation in the ideological work. It is important for us to be more demanding of the CPSU members, to take every step necessary to see that the staff communists set an example of activeness in the work and public-political activities, treat the personnel with sensitivity and attention and show concern with respect to satisfying their needs and requests.

The CPSU Central Committee demands that party organizations at the administrative level develop initiative and a sense of responsibility in the communists with respect to the struggle to implement party policy and take a principled stance against deficiencies in the work and indoctrination of the personnel, against the cases of lack of discipline. The decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Further Improvement of Control and Performance Verification in Light of Decisions Coming Out of the 26th CPSU Congress" states that party committees (party bureaus) must take steps to further step up control and to enhance discipline and the responsibility of the cadres for the absolute fulfillment of party decisions.

Implementing these party demands, many political organs, party committees and staff party organizations have begun devoting greater attention to the work style of the communists out among the troops and are attempting to see that they function not as disinterested recorders of events but as active organizers of the training process and indoctrinators of the personnel, that they carry the party word to the masses of fighting men.

The party committee of the staff in which CPSU member R. Gorelov serves, as an example, demands that as the directorate communists work in the forces, they concentrate mainly on thoroughly studying the personnel and the state of affairs and

on an in-depth analysis of the situation in which the personnel have to perform. When the officers are to verify the fulfillment of orders and directives issued by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, they are of course instructed by the corresponding chiefs. The party committee in turn inquires as to how a certain communist understands the task assigned to him and the extent of his sense of responsibility for its fulfillment, and reminds him of the need to be objective and principled, while at the same time being sensitive and attentive toward the personnel.

We know that checking on fulfillment produces the greatest results when control is combined with assistance at the site, with personal participation in the elimination of shortcomings. Certain generals and officers are still not doing this, however. For example, three groups of officers from higher staffs visited unit "X" of the Kiev Military District during a 6-week period. They all noted good and bad points in the organization of tactical and fire classes, but took practically no steps to disseminate positive experience, eliminate shortcomings and improve the combat training quality.

This incorrect approach to the matter is also to be found in certain other staffs. The communists sometimes limit themselves strictly to a role of instructors and administrative agents, making no special effort to check on the fulfillment of orders, instructions and plans, the implementation of practical matters or the work to eliminate shortcomings. This applies to communists in the party organization headed by Colonel I. Kot, among others. Before performing the combat training mission, for example, the staff prepared all the paperwork and issued the necessary instructions. The officers-and-communists did not concern themselves with the main thing, however, that of checking on actual fulfillment. This had a negative effect upon the quality of the training process. This occurred in great part because the party committee did not look into the performance of the communists and did not correct the imbalance in their work style in good time.

It is very important for the political organs and party organizations to work on a daily basis to instill in communists of the control organs principle, demandingness and objectivity in the assessment of the true state of affairs in the forces. Nor can we accept cases in which higher organs do not confirm evaluations given at lower levels, when they make their inspections among the forces. This very failing is typical of certain communists of the staff and directorate of the North Caucasus Military District. Unfortunately, the staff political section, the district directorate and the party bureau in which Colonel P. Babayev is secretary react belatedly to such negative developments, instead of preventing them, sometimes limit themselves to a general discussion of the inadmissibility of lack of principle and objectivity, instead of bringing the guilty parties to strict ~~punish~~ account. What happens is that a problem is repeatedly discussed and decisions adopted, but the attitude of certain communists toward the job remains the same.

We must constantly adhere to those great demands set at the 26th CPSU Congress for the work of the system of party and state organs, for the work of all those in charge. The paperwork style of leadership which has taken root in some places,

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "creates great harm. It takes the cadres and the aktiv away from the vital work and does not contribute to the proper indoctrination of the personnel."

The party's demands also fully apply to the work of our administrative organs, their political sections and party committees. We must strive persistently to see that the unit commanders and political workers receive concrete assistance from the staff officers during each trip among the forces by the latter, that every communist who works there considers it his duty to organize the correction of deficiencies on the spot.

Staff political organs and committees are expected to focus the attention of the communists upon the study and summarization of progressive experience and upon its application in the life and the practical affairs of the forces. The need to improve this work was pointed out at the sixth All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. Certain communists, however, who took note of and studied advanced know-how in one or another area of the work frequently lack the persistence and patience to keep from stopping half way through the job, to take the next and most important step, that of introducing this experience into the practical work of other units and formations.

I would like to cite the following example. Each year the Military Council of the Ground Forces, at the recommendation of the military councils of military districts and groups of forces, names the best formations and units from the results of the combat and political training, and awards them challenge Red Banners. Based upon last year's results the title of best unit was awarded to a number of units of the Carpathian and Leningrad Military Districts and the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and others. Naturally, other units can learn something from the best military collectives. The experience of commanders, political workers and party organizations of these units is poorly publicized and adopted in the districts and groups of forces, however.

The following also occurs. When certain officers work in the units, they see only the shortcomings and consider it something of an honor for themselves to find as many as possible. To point out shortcomings is only half of the job, however. The main thing is to teach the officer cadres, using positive experience, how to correct the situation, how to organize the work to produce good and consistent end results. The summarization of progressive experience and its adoption on the practical level should actively assist this process. Furthermore, the system of qualified administrative organs is required to take an active part in the creation of such experience, in order to use it for training the cadres. This area provides a virgin field of work for the staff political organs and party committees.

It is a constant task for the political organs and party commissars of staffs and directorates and of staff party organizations to develop personal discipline and good moral qualities in each communist, to increase his personal contribution to the strengthening of military discipline and the establishment of regulation order in the units and formations.

There have been no incidents for several years now, and firm regulation order is maintained in the formation in which officer D. Abashidze serves as political worker. This is a result of thoughtful, planned and purposive work on the part of commanders, political workers and party organizations. The staff communists have performed a large portion of the work to achieve these positive results. The demanding selection of personnel to perform guard, internal and motor pool (parkovaya) duty, the daily monitoring of the troops' service, the providing of assistance to unit commanders with the maintenance of regulation order, the acute and principled reaction to every instance of negligence, coupled with real concern for the personnel--all of this is typical of the work style of the staff communists.

This is not the situation in all cases by far, however. In some places there is no concerted effort by commanders, political organs and staffs, party and Komsomol organizations, the rear and medical services and military legal organs to strengthen discipline. We are talking about a situation in which a campaign is conducted on a broad front to further strengthen military discipline, in which the staff political organs and party organizations increase the responsibility of the communists of branches of troops and services for the state of discipline among the troops, for the enhancement of the quality and the results of their organizational results to prevent incidents. The political organ, party committee and party bureau cannot and must not in any case ignore the matter when the staff neglects its records, does not strictly monitor the return of personnel from leave, from hospitals and temporary duty assignments, and so forth. Some staff communists accept shortcomings in the service of the troops and in internal order. We can clearly not accept all of these shortcomings, especially the lack of discipline on the part of certain CPSU members-and-officers who work within the staffs.

In order to be on top of the tasks assigned to them, the political organs, party committees and party organizations of staffs are expected to demonstrate constant concern for improving intraparty work, taking into fuller account in the process the specific nature of control organs and the qualitative makeup of the communists.

The successful performance of staff party organizations is based on the development of activeness in party members and the enhancement of their responsibility for affairs in the section in which they work. Every kind of support should therefore be given to the practice of hearing reports and accounts from the communists of staffs, directorates, sections and services on the fulfillment of requirements set forth in the CPSU Charter at party bureau sessions and party meetings. Experience has demonstrated that this helps to enhance their work and political activeness. Errors are made in the use of this effective form of indoctrination, however. A number of staff party organizations attempt to receive as many reports and accounts as possible, and this results in superficial and formal discussion.

The practice of preparing and conducting party meetings within the staff party collectives is also in need of further improvement. Many party organizations are devoted to the discussion of results and tasks which have usually been discussed at service conferences just prior to the party meetings. A study of agendas has shown that they rarely include discussion of questions having to do with increasing principle and efficiency in the work of the communists, with the methods they

employ in their work in the forces, with the elimination of cases of dependency and formalism in this work, with advanced know-how and its application on a practical level. The moral makeup of the party members themselves is rarely discussed.

Criticism is still weak and impersonal at certain meetings, and this indicates an omission on the part of party sections, party committees and party organizations of the staffs. It is wholesome criticism, however, which must help to eliminate errors and failings in the work of certain communists in charge, bureaucracy, red tape and disregard for the needs and requests of the troops, immodest personal conduct and indifference toward the job.

The 26th CPSU Congress and the May 1982 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee demanded that we establish in all party organizations a spirit of earnestness and efficiency, organization, discipline, self-criticism and rejection of shortcomings. The undeviating fulfillment of these demands will make it possible to further improve the organizational and the ideological-indoctrinal work of the political organs, party committees and party organizations of the staffs, to enhance their influence with respect to assuring that the communists take the avant-garde in the struggle to improve the combat readiness of the forces.

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## GROUND FORCES

### REVIEW OF BOOK ON COMBAT RECORD OF THE 18TH ARMY

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 82 (signed to press 3 Aug 82) pp 74-77

[Review of book "Vosemnadtsataya v srazheniyakh za Rodinu. Boyevoy put' 18th armii" [The 18th in Battles Fought for the Homeland: The Combat Path of the 18th Army], Voenizdat, 1982, 528 pages]

[Text] Events of the Great Patriotic War are receding into the past, but everything connected with that time is carefully preserved in the people's memory. Documents from the war years, memoirs of contemporaries and books which truthfully and brilliantly tell of the selfless struggle waged by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces against the fascist invaders help us to grasp the worldwide historical significance of the victory gained by our nation, under the leadership of the Communist Party, over the Hitlerite hordes, to feel the atmosphere of those harsh times. When one reads these books, it is as though he is in touch with the sources of a national feat, and one gains a better understanding of its greatness. A book recently published by the USSR Ministry of Defense's Voennoye izdatel'stvo on the combat path of the famed 18th Army is unquestionably one such book.

As an operational field force the combined-arms army is the element linking together strategy and tactics in the execution of both defensive and offensive missions. Telling about its combat path means telling about the experience in military art, the preparation and conduct of operations, showing the work performed by the army command, the military council, the staff and the political section in various combat situations. It means demonstrating the mass heroism shown by the fighting men, depicting their entire life at the front. It should be stated to begin with that the group of authors headed by M. I. Povaliy, of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, coped well with its extremely difficult task of shedding light on the 18th Army's combat path. The book gives a thorough account, on a documentary basis and in chronological sequence, of how the army's troops, led by veteran military leaders and inspired by the fervent word of the political workers and communists, defended the Soviet homeland and routed the enemy, beginning with the border encounters occurring during the summer of 1941 and extending to Victory Day.

We learn from the book how the 18th Army, formed during the first month of the war out of the directorate of the Kharkov Military District and troops of the Kiev Special Military District in June/August of 1941 as part of the forces of the Southern Front, courageously fought off an offensive by a numerically superior enemy on the Right-Bank of the Ukraine and between the Prut and Dnepr rivers. In September it engaged in fierce fighting with enemy forces on the Left Bank of the Dnepr and then in the Donbass. In November of 1941 it took part in a counter-offensive by Soviet forces near Rostov-na-Donu, as a result of which serious losses were inflicted upon the German 1st Tank Army, and a plan under which German fascist forces were to penetrate into the Caucasus was frustrated. In the summer and fall of 1942 troops of the 18th Army fought on the Don, the Kuban and in the foothills of the Caucasus.

The chapter "In the North Caucasus" tells in detail about the determined battles fought on the Maykop-Tuapse axis against an enemy attempting to overcome from the march the northern spurs of the Main Caucasus Range and reach the Black Sea coast. The army forces accomplished the assigned mission. The enemy did not get through. And in January/February of 1943 the army, together with other Soviet field forces, launched an offensive like a devastating avalanche. After the liberation of Krasnodar its field directorate was transferred to the area of Tuapse, where it set about performing an amphibious army (since the middle of March 1943 the 18th Army was not listed as amphibious in the official documents, but all of the soldiers and officers continued to call it such). The book points out that on 1 April 1943 Major General S. Ye. Kolonin was named member of its military council and Colonel L. I. Brezhnev became chief of its political section, in order to strengthen the 18th Army's command. Their arrival gave new impetus to the work of commanders, staffs, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations.

The chapter "The Battle for Novorossiysk" tells how army forces held a bridge-head to the south of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast for more than 220 days during the spring and summer of 1943. The bridgehead went down in history as "Malaya zemlya." In September/October the Eighteenth took part in the Novorossiysk-Taman Operation. At the beginning of this operation was the complete liberation of the city of Novorossiysk, which was a sort of key to the enemy's entire defense on the Taman Peninsula. Army troops were subsequently the first on the North Caucasus Front to force the Kerch Strait, landing in the Crimea on 1 November 1943, in the area of the settlement of Eltigen to the south of Kerch. The bridgehead they occupied later became known as the "fiery land." The courage, valor and selfless heroism of the amphibious soldiers is attested, for example, by the fact that 44 of them were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

The chapters "In the Offensive From the Dnepr to the Carpathians," "Across the Eastern Carpathians" and "On the Prague Access" tell about how, in the winter of 1943 and the fall and summer of 1944, the army fought as part of the 1st Ukrainian Front and from August 1944 to the end of the war as part of the 4th Ukrainian Front. During that period it took part in the Zhitomir-Berdichev, Proskurov-Chernovtsi and L'vov-Sandomierz operations. Its troops routed the German fascist

invaders in Poland, Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. During the concluding period of the war the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps operated as part of the 18th Army.

Many books, articles and memoirs have been written about the 18th Army. The most brilliant of these are Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's memoirs "Malaya zemlya," which are read with enormous interest today not only in our country, but far beyond its borders as well.

In producing this book on the history of the Eighteenth, the group of authors of the Institute of Military History set for themselves the goal of revealing the entire difficult path covered by the army, a path of struggle and victories stretching 3500 kilometers, of telling about it in detail, sometimes in hours and in days.

The entire book is imbued with Lenin's idea that victory in any war is ultimately determined by the morale of those masses who shed their blood in the battlefield. The authors demonstrate the direct dependency between the combat capability of the forces and well organized party-political work, thoroughly discuss the organizational work performed by the army's military council and its political section, commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations to instill good moral-political qualities and fighting spirit in the personnel.

The army's political section was headed for more than 2 years by veteran party worker Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom prior to the war. He was the spirit and the organizer behind all large party-political activities in the army. The work quotes the words of its commander, Lieutenant General A. I. Galistovich, who wrote that L. I. Brezhnev "organized the work of the army's political organs and its formations so well that the military council could always be totally confident that the troops would be in a good moral-political state." As they resolved questions pertaining to political support for combat operations, the army's political section and L. I. Brezhnev personally demonstrated constant concern for improving all forms and methods of work, seeing to it that it was conducted continuously and purposively.

The book cites numerous instances to demonstrate that L. I. Brezhnev, relying upon his extensive prewar experience in party organizational work and having high principles, a sense of responsibility for the assigned job and an enormous capacity for work, constantly influenced all aspects of the combat work and the life of the army's troops. Together with the commander, members of the military council, the staff and the chiefs of the branches of troops and services of the formation, he resolved difficult problems pertaining to the development of plans of operation and their implementation, and concerned himself with enhancing the combat readiness and the combat capability of the troops, with providing them with everything necessary to achieve victory over the enemy. At critical times the chief of the political section with his personal example instilled confidence in victory in the fighting men and commanders, and bore all the burdens, dangers and deprivations of the war along with them.

L. I. Brezhnev enjoyed enormous prestige as a political leader not only among the army's forces. His personal charm was felt by everyone who had the opportunity to work or to meet him. There are many examples of this. We cite below one of these examples, which is included in the book.

In December of 1944 the army's political section was housed in the home of Stefan Andreyevich, a resident of the village of Stancha in Vostochno-Slovatskaya Oblast. "We were captivated by the amazing sincerity and human charm of this individual. At the same time, we could not fail to notice the enormous prestige which he enjoyed... To us Soviet Major General Brezhnev embodied all of the best qualities of the Soviet soldier and of Soviet man...."

The great prestige enjoyed by the army's political section, the force of the party-political work conducted in the field force and its invariable effectiveness were due in great part to Leonid Il'ich's outstanding organizational abilities, his ability to delve thoroughly into the state of affairs, into the essence of a development, his sincerity and simplicity in dealing with the fighting men. The chapter "The Battle for Novorossiysk" states that L. I. Brezhnev instilled his style in the work of the army's political section and those of the formations. As soon as he assumed the position of political section chief he began spending most of his time in the forces, studying the combat situation, the needs and the mood of the personnel, talking with the soldiers and officers. He demanded the same of all the political workers. When he first made the acquaintance of the officers in the army's political section, as well as those of the formation political sections, with the deputy commanders for political affairs and the party organs of battalions and companies, he stressed the fact that their main task was one of increasing in every way the combat readiness and the combat capability of each subunit, unit and formation, of maintaining good fighting spirit and good and healthy morale among the personnel.

The soldiers and officers could see the political section chief in the most difficult sectors of the front, who inspired them to perform combat feats. The book tells, for example, how, when he was in the 318th Rifle Division defending to the east of Novorossiysk, L. I. Brezhnev visited the company of Senior Lieutenant G. Dzherbinadze, only 20 meters from the enemy. He had to reach the company from a cement plant by crawling and with short rushes, since there were no concealed approaches to the company. L. I. Brezhnev talked with the soldiers and officers, listened attentively as they told about the party organization work, including that conducted with fighting men who had a poor knowledge of the Russian language, and shared his observations and plans. L. I. Brezhnev approved of the party organ's work and gave it a great deal of practical advice.

The chapter "In the Offensive From the Dnepr to the Carpathians" cites the following incident. In December of 1943 the enemy suddenly switched to an offensive of the defense sectors of the 11th Rifle Corps. The army commander ordered reserves to be sent there. Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev immediately alerted the officers in the army's political section, which was located not far from the site where the enemy had become active, and they immediately entered the battle. When our ~~machine~~ machine gun fell silent, Leonid Il'ich rushed up to it and opened fire on the enemy.

The chief of the army's political section repeatedly visited Malaya zemlya during the fighting near Novorossiysk, risking his life to reach there each time.

The book discusses the extensive experience in party-political and ideological indoctrinal work among the army troops. Typical in this respect are the chapters which describe events occurring during the period of the fighting for Novorossiysk and the liberation of the Taman Peninsula, for example. As we read these chapters we learn about the close attention devoted to the growth of the number of company party organizations, to the enhancement of their activeness and militancy and to increasing the avant-garde role of the communists. As of 1 September 1943 the field force had more than 600 company party organizations, each of them with a membership of 7 to 15 communists.

A great deal of attention was devoted to the training of the party and Komsomol aktiv. In June of 1943, for example, the army political section held a seminar on the work conducted in light of the decree passed by the Central Committee of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] on the structural reorganization of army party and Komsomol organizations and instructions issued in connection with this by the Main Political Directorate of the RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army]. A conference of party organs was then conducted on this matter, and a few days later, a conference of Komsomol workers.

All of this work was conducted purposively, taking into account the situation and the combat missions arising out of it. During the defensive battle attention was focused on matters of instilling insuperable steadfastness and combat activeness in the personnel. By the beginning of April 1943 the army had received around 10,000 new men. Talks were conducted with them on the combat path traveled by the units and formations in which they would be fighting, about what the enemy was like, about methods of combating tanks, and on other subjects. A conference of propagandists and agitators was held in the army's political section, which discussed the matter of stepping up agitation and propaganda in the forces and enhancing the role of the communists with respect to developing mass political work among the personnel.

The Eighteenth, like other Red Army field forces, was multinational. As of 20 May 1943, for example, 2,497 Georgians, 3,432 Armenians, 2,704 Azerbaijani, 199 Uzbeks, 272 Tartars, 152 Kazakhs and members of other nationalities comprising the friendly and fraternal family of peoples of the Soviet Union were fighting shoulder to shoulder in it, along with Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. Active individual work was conducted with the personnel.

The tradition of observing the anniversary of the formations and units was strictly observed in the army forces. Summations of the battles were conducted, the young soldiers met with heroes of the engagements, learned from them and took pride in them at special personnel meetings conducted on those important days. If the unit was in a forward position, soldiers and officers arrived for the festivities as delegates from subunits on the forward edge to take part in these meetings.

During preparations for the complete liberation of Novorossiysk, penetration of the Blue Line and the expulsion of the fascist occupiers from the Taman Peninsula, and during the Novorossiysk-Taman Operation, one of the main areas of party-political work consisted in instilling and maintaining a high level of aggressive spirit in the fighting men. Oral and visual agitation and issues of the army newspaper SNAMYA RODINY and division newspapers were extensively used for this purpose. Meetings and group and individual talks were conducted, the organizers including, along with commanders and political workers, activists from among the well trained, steadfast and courageous soldiers and junior commanders. Patriotic films were shown, battle leaflets and special pamphlets were printed, and the successes of Soviet fighting men on the other fronts were publicized. The "Guide for the Fighting Man of the Amphibious Forces," the leaflets "The Advice of Veteran Fighting Men" and "Perform Boldly, Resolutely and Skillfully" and others were valuable aids for the soldiers.

Party-political work, the book notes, was based on the specific conditions, on the mission which was assigned to each unit, to each formation. During the Novorossiysk-Taman Operation it was necessary to land a group in the enemy's rear area. The 166th Guards Rifle Regiment, the command and all the personnel of which had demonstrated themselves in previous battles to possess initiative, a creative approach to the performance of the assigned missions, courage and valor, was a part of it. The regiment had not participated in landing operations, however. The army command and its political section therefore devoted special attention to preparing it for the landing operation. Special classes were conducted for personnel of the regiment. Party and Komsomol meetings were held in the subunits, which discussed questions pertaining to the forthcoming landing operation. The army's political section sent political workers to the regiment, who told about previous experience with landing operations. Agitators explained the "Guide for the Fighting Man of the Amphibious Forces" to the guardsmen, and conducted talks on the forthcoming battles. All of these measures were conducted within a very brief period of time. As a result of the work conducted in the regiment it was possible to create a high level of offensive enthusiasm, and the fighting men and commanders began performing the difficult mission with confidence and coped with it successfully.

The good moral-political and combat qualities of the fighting men and their selfless devotion to the cause of Lenin's party were especially clearly manifested in the mass heroism demonstrated by the fighting men and commanders. Many pages of the book tell about their courage, valor and self-sacrifice in the performance of their sacred military duty.

These are but a few examples. In the spring of 1943 the German fascist command began implementing its "Neptun" plan with the objective of eliminating forces of the 18th Army at Malaya zemlya. They concentrated large forces for this purpose. At the beginning of the offensive the Hitlerites had more than a two-fold superiority over those defending Malaya zemlya with respect to personnel in the rifle subunits, a two-fold superiority in guns and mortars, and more than a two-fold superiority in the number of aircraft assigned to provide support. The enemy had approximately 30 tanks for breaking through the defense lines of the

Soviet troops, while the defenders of Malaya zemlya had none. They held the bridgehead, however. When the Hitlerites began retreating, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev composed a letter from the army's military council to the defenders of Malaya zemlya. It contained an appeal to break the enemy forces and hold out. The book cites the following words by Leonid Il'ich about how the defenders of Malaya zemlya received this letter/appeal: "It traveled among the trenches and dugouts. The men cut their hands and signed it with their blood. I sent one copy to I. V. Stalin, to let him know how the soldiers were fighting." The defenders of Malaya zemlya held out.

Each battle produced new heroes in all the formations and units. One cannot read certain chapters in the book without a feeling of pride and admiration for the amazing bravery and valor demonstrated by the marvelous knights of the Great Patriotic War.

...The year was 1945. Victory Day was approaching. The battles being conducted at that time in Czechoslovakia by the army forces, fulfilling their international duty to liberate the peoples of Europe from fascism, were no less fierce than before, however. Once our battalion's command post was surrounded by several hundred enemy landing troops. The few brave men located at the command post entered into the battle without hesitation. When the situation became hopeless, however, they summoned fire upon themselves from their own artillery. Lieutenant B. K. Pachenko, commander of a mortar battery, did the same thing, when the Hitlerites surrounded the battery's observation post and attempted to capture it.

Many pages in the book are filled with emotional accounts by publicists. He who reads them perceives the events experienced by fighting men of the 18th Army, with both their hearts and their minds. They can see the harsh military reality, the awesome years on the front.

The book "Vosemmadtsataya v srazheniyakh za Rodinu" is well illustrated. It contains more than 150 photographs. The maps and diagrams showing the combat path traveled by the field force are executed with graphic clarity. This is evidence of considerable work by the printers.

This book, which records a part of the heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces, contains a broad coverage of extensive combat experience in multifaceted party-political work in various combat situations. Accumulated during the years of the Great Patriotic War, it is of prominent importance even today, and the Soviet fighting men study it with interest and great benefit. The value of this book lies primarily in this. The book about the 18th Army will unquestionably find a broad range of readers and evoke a fervent response in them.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### COMMAND TRAINING OF YOUNG OFFICERS DESCRIBED

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[Article by Capt B. Khudoleyev: "The School Graduates Have Arrived In the Subunit"]

[Text] The antiaircraft missile battalion commanded by Major I. Kozlov is frequently referred to as the "lieutenants'" battalion since it has considerably more young officers than does any other collective in the unit. There is an explanation for this. Lieutenants do not remain long in that position. Acquiring experience and knowledge, they develop rapidly, receive new positions and are replaced by others. Kozlov himself, who assumed his position by way of a promotion, has performed the duties of a commander for a relatively brief period of time. He has dealt with many school graduates, however, who proved themselves to be competent specialists and skilled indoctrinators. They became so as they completed the school of maturation in the good atmosphere of the outstanding subunit, a fact confirmed by a study conducted by the unit political section of the work performed with the young officers. Let us look at a few aspects of the indoctrinal practices employed by the commander and the party organization of the battalion, which won first place in the unit in many areas of the training.

...Two years ago, three lieutenants were assigned to Captain Ye. Katsero's battery at one time. First off, they had a meeting and a talk with the battalion commander himself, who invariably wants to know just what the recent school graduates are like, what store of knowledge they possess and their attitude as they set about performing their duties. The commander simultaneously briefed the lieutenants on the daily concerns of personnel in the subunit and advised them where to begin, in order to prove themselves to be organizers of the training for their subordinates and as their indoctrinators.

The same was done by Captain Ye. Katsero, who is also deeply convinced that accelerated development of the young officers is inconceivable without an individual approach to them, without the ability to direct their energy, enthusiasm and their desire to prove themselves in the first period of their service into the necessary channel. The battery commander invited his new subordinates into the combat glory room and acquainted them with the history of the order-bearing collective, which distinguished itself in battles with the German fascist invaders.

He told them how the present generation of missilemen has now retained the title of excellent unit for several years in a row and is a right-flank participant in the competition to achieve new heights in combat readiness, that the personnel have accepted especially large commitments for this training year. He noted that each of the newly arrived officers would have to make his own contribution to their successful fulfillment and that in order to do this, he would have to rapidly demonstrate good ability in the training and indoctrination of subordinates, inspire them with his personal example to conscientiously fulfill their service duty.

"One other thing, and remember it well," the officer stressed. "Demandingness of oneself and the strictest of self-discipline are an absolute condition for success. Attempt to be very demanding of yourselves overall. Learn demandingness from your older and more experienced comrades. You can count on their help and support at all times."

What battery commander Captain Ye Katsero said was confirmed. Literally from the very first days the young lieutenants were enveloped in the attention and concern of their colleagues. Yevgeniy Petrovich himself frequently visited the dormitory, in order to spend as much time as possible in direct communication with his subordinates, to reveal their strong and weak points as rapidly as possible. It was learned, for example, that Lieutenant A. Razarenov had studied in school a different weapons system than the one he would have to service in the subunit. What was the best way out of this situation? Additional classes were agreed upon. The battery commander took personal charge of this matter.

Another of the new men, Lieutenant V. Samarskiy, had an easy time with the training, but his own lack of organization frequently stood in his way. He had once been expelled from school for a disciplinary act and only managed to complete his training as a private in the forces. This meant, Ye. Katsero noted, that the individual had been able to derive the proper conclusions for himself, but that increased demands should be made of him. And there was every indication that Lieutenant V. Slepyshev would not have an easy time of it. He was somewhat too self-confident, in addition to which he possessed inadequate practical skills.

Taking the characteristics of his subordinates into account the captain helped each of them compile a detailed plan for fitting into his position. The lieutenants in turn went straight to work, as they say, and within a relatively short period of time mastered the skills required for operating the complex equipment and passed the tests permitting them to stand alert duty by themselves.

In short, the young officers began to climb, as they say in such cases. The process of developing as commanders was far from a smooth one for some of them, however. A study of the lieutenants' work style helped to reveal that they frequently wasted their efforts because of a poor understanding of their men and the inability to perform indoctrinal work with the latter.

Lieutenant V. Samarsky's situation posed special concern. He was not establishing smooth relationships with his men. From the very first days the officer handled

them in a completely official manner, keeping what he believed to be the proper distance. He soon began to feel the chill of alienation. He decided to change his tactics, and became exaggeratedly pleasant, obtrusively attentive to the men, and this excessive familiarity ended with a loss of his prestige as a commander. All order on the team was lost. He attempted to take some of the inadequately disciplined men in hand, but his demandingness was regarded as nagging.

Private A. Yan'kov was one who felt that he was being picked on, for example. The young officer first overlooked certain acts of negligence on the part of this well-trained operator, from which the soldier concluded that the lieutenant could not get along without his help. He began exhibiting arrogance toward his colleagues. When Samarskiy caught on, however, and tried to influence the violator of regulation order, Yan'kov declared himself to be a "victim" of prejudice.

None of this escaped the battery commander's attention. Even prior to this, when Private Yan'kov had been discussed, Captain Katsero had constantly reminded the lieutenant of the prime importance of developing aware discipline, ideological conviction and moral strength in those who handle the complex modern equipment. Yevgeniy Petrovich was now convinced that he had to have a stricter talk with Samarskiy. And this sort of real service discussion took place between them. The senior comrade helped the lieutenant to outline specific steps to strengthen discipline on the team, to develop a wholesome moral climate therein, and shared his experience in working with individuals.

Knowing that he would not remedy the situation with discussions alone, all the more since young officers' errors were very similar, the captains shared his thoughts with the battalion commander and the secretary of the party organization. As a result of the discussion of current problems and at Katsero's suggestion, a long-range plan for the development of young officers was adopted in the subunit, which was based on the lieutenant's personal comprehensive plans. They covered the improvement of the ideological-political level and professional skill and the intensive study of military regulations and the basics of Soviet law, and called for the young officers to take an active part in the collective's public life. A great deal of attention was devoted to providing the lieutenants with recommendations from military pedagogics and psychology and with skills in conducting daily indoctrinational work with subordinates. The main purpose was to promote the simultaneous development of the young officers as specialists, as indoctrinators and finally, as individuals.

The realization of this plan proved to be a painstaking process not only for the lieutenants, but for their commanders as well, including Captain Katsero. Among other things, he made a great effort to eliminate any lack of coordination which might interfere with the realization of the plans outlined.

As an example, Lieutenant V. Slepyshev was unsuccessful at first. In an attempt to reshape his work with the men as rapidly as possible, he would try to resolve several problems simultaneously, frequently not finishing what he had started. He had to be given specific individual assignments for each day.

Adjustments were also made in the personal plan of Lieutenant A. Razarenov, who was able to achieve his goals ahead of plan. The battery commander assigned him some new reference points and helped him to overcome the obstacles encountered on the way to reaching them. Officers V. Zayets, I. Yukhmchuk and D. Tsypin contributed in the same way to the lieutenants' accelerated development. They generously shared their own extensive know-how with their charges, taught and are still teaching the young commanders to be highly demanding of themselves. Critiques of the lieutenants' indoctrinal practices, regularly conducted in the outstanding subunit, also contribute to the achievement of these goals. Their merits and deficiencies are carefully analyzed in the course of these critiques, and specific recommendations are made.

This collective constantly seeks new forms and methods of influencing the minds and hearts of the people. It has to be this way. In order for the indoctrinal work to conform to the demands of today, everything new is constantly followed and an attempt is made to absolutely fulfill the recommendations contained in the guiding documents, to apply existing know-how and tested forms and methods of indoctrination, creatively and in conformity with the changing tasks and ~~situation~~.

The young officers, most of whom are communists, periodically submit reports at party meetings. The discussion is strict and demanding, and special stress is laid on insuring that the lieutenants set a good personal example. It was once pointed out to A. Razarenov, for example, that he sometimes appeared out of uniform. Lieutenant V. Samarskiy was reproached for not keeping sufficiently precise order in the dormitory. These might appear to be minor matters. The battalion communists do not consider them to be such, however. And they are right. There is no such thing as trifling matters in a commander's development. No matter how much authority an individual has, the right to direct others in every case also requires personal irreproachability in all things.

An individual is judged by those around him primarily on the basis of his actions. What kind of impression did Lieutenant A. Petrov make on his coworkers, for example, when the entire section worked late correcting a malfunction in the equipment, while he remained idle. His comrades think that he did not act in good conscience.

The lieutenant was held strictly accountable. It was demanded that he measure his every act against the requirements contained in the regulations, that he live and work in accordance with the dignity, the honor, conscience and duty of a Soviet officer. And although there is no such thing as secondary articles in our regulations, it would doubtfully be right to reproach the officers in charge in the battalion for the fact that they most frequently reminded and continue to remind their junior comrades of the need to perform their service duty irreproachably, to assume special responsibility for developing an acute sense of collectivism in the fighting men. In connection with this, I could not fail to mention the following incident out of the life of Lieutenant Samarsky's subordinates.

At one time some of them began attempting to transfer part of their load onto the shoulders of their colleagues, that is, there was a danger of nonregulation interrelations among the servicemen. The carrier of this "infection" was Private A. Fominykh, who came from a nearby subunit. His negative influence upon certain colleagues had been overlooked.

The process of shaping a collective is not a simple one, of course. Anyone who has served as a soldier has seen how, during the very first days, small individual groups begin to form in each subunit, consisting of people with similar interests, needs and merits and... similar shortcomings. It is important then to detect every such group in good time, especially those with negative manifestations. A shortcoming tolerable in one person can develop into large problems, if it goes unnoticed in several fighting men linked together by common interests.

Special attention should have been given precisely to those near to Private Fominykh, in order to save them from the bad influence. This task demanded a great deal of tact and restraint on the part of Lieutenant Samarskiy and all the subunit activists. With a concerted effort they were able to demonstrate to his colleagues the true nature of the private's actions, to prove that his moral platform was frail and brittle as an autumn leaf. The day arrived when his "prestige" faded away and the collective told Fominykh: "That's enough. We won't stand for anymore."

The veteran fighting man, it was stated at a personnel meeting held in the subunit, has only one privilege--to always be where it is difficult at the forward edge, to rally his colleagues with his personal example to storm new heights in military skill, to help the newcomers develop, to share his combat work experience with them. This is precisely what is done by Sergeant N. Voytovich and Privates M. Katrayev and A. Bol'shakov, experts, first-class specialists and Komsomol activists. Another thing. Among those whom the fighting men use as their frame of reference, once again, were the names of the young officers-and-commanders.

Now, when Lieutenant Samarskiy speaks of his subordinates, there is pride in his words. Even the "incorrigible" Yan'kov is not the same person now. Did a pedagogical miracle take place, or what? No, there is no such thing as miracles in the matter of indoctrination. There was a painstaking, daily struggle for an individual by an officer. And the lieutenant did not engage in the struggle alone. He had numerous reliable assistants: the section commander, the Komsomol activists and most importantly, the entire section collective, small but united. The fellow had a far from simple personality. Everything was tried, including satirical verses in the wall newspaper and a strict discussion conducted in the Komsomol manner at a meeting, before the soldier began to understand that he had chosen the wrong reference points in the service.

This difficult science of indoctrinating subordinates did not come to Samarskiy immediately, of course. He required a great deal of time to alter, to reshape his own work style, with the assistance of the subunit communists. The young officer began strictly to monitor not only the behavior of his men, but also

himself, his own deeds and actions. Even the slightest error, insignificant at first glance, now forces him to think, to analyze, to critically assess his actions. Without this, he now knows very well, a commander will not have real authority, which means that he cannot effectively influence the processes occurring within the collective. If he wants to develop in his subordinates such qualities as conviction, conscientiousness and discipline, he must first instill them in himself.

The lieutenant grasped another fact: The same measure cannot be used on all people. After all, there are as many different personalities as there are people. In order to find that secret key to their hearts, one must study the individual's characteristics, his mental state, his attitude toward the service and his comrades, and much, much more. And this cannot be done without a profound understanding of pedagogics and psychology. This is why one sees him more and more frequently with a book in his hand.

...Captain Katsero's entire day was filled to the maximum. Starting in the morning he worked with his subordinates to ready the equipment for an inspection. A short time later he was hurrying to the command post to see how the crew on the alert shift was doing. When he returned, he found some Komsomol members waiting with questions, with suggestions and letters from families. There was still work to do that evening. He had compiled a personal plan for the next day, to have a talk with Private A. Sesikov (whose development was progressing very slowly), to prepare for a scheduled talk....

First of all, however, Katsero made a trip to the battalion commander and reported that Lieutenant Samarskiy would be married the following week. He inquired as to the possibility of assigning an apartment to the new family.

"Well, now, a wedding is a good thing," Major Kozlov answered with a smile. "He is a worthy officer in all respects. It is time for him to establish a good home front." After a brief pause he added: "I think it is time to advance the lieutenant to a new position. What is your opinion? Can he do it?"

"I have confidence in Samarskiy," Katsero answered. "But whom are you going to send me in return?"

"A lieutenant, naturally. The very first school graduate we get. It will not be an equal trade, of course, but your new man will undoubtedly develop rapidly. Incidentally," the major said as he glanced in his notebook, "the political section is preparing a practical and scientific conference devoted to the work performed with young officers. It has been suggested that we make a report. It seems to me that you can handle this better than the others. You have something to tell, something to share...."

The captain returned home unhurriedly. A man of duty unable to put things off until later, he had already mentally outlined in general terms the talk he would give at the conference. His thoughts kept returning stubbornly to Samarskiy, however. In his heart he was at the same time sad and glad. Sad, because he would have to part with the lieutenant, in whom he had invested not simply a great deal

of work, but a part of himself as well. Glad, because he could rightly consider the lieutenant's success to be also his own. Glad, because he would have a good opportunity to help the next young lieutenant take his place solidly in the sub-unit's general formation. A subunit, which, the captain was confident, would become a stepping stone in yet another officer's career.

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

TRAINING TIME MISUSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Engr-Col B. Lyapkalo: "Parasitism"; letter and commentary]

[Text] Dear editors! The following circumstances forced me to write this letter. Approximately a month prior to the end of the winter training period, almost half of the personnel of the launch battery which I command were replaced. People joined the battery who unfortunately, are not distinguished by successes in service and combat training. Naturally, this was reflected in the subunit's indices in the winter training period.

Recently, it has become a rule in our unit where during hours for combat training specialists are engaged in construction and administrative work and are diverted for the accomplishment of other tasks not connected with service. All this inflicts harm on combat training. And when, let us say, the time comes to accomplish training live firings the best specialists are taken away in the subunits and are sent to the range as part of the battalion launch control. It is also planned to do this on the forthcoming exercise. But only for this reason--to reinforce a subunit which is going out to the range; the two best chiefs of sections and operators from our battery have been scheduled to go there. They are proceeding in the same manner with others of our officers and warrant officers [praporshchik]. Some of them have already travelled to the range with all the subunits of the unit. How can there be any talk of competition under these conditions? Such a practice has great moral costs in the indoctrination of people.

I reported my opinion about the shortcomings which are present to the chief of the political department and the deputy unit commander, but nothing has been changed. Therefore, I decided to turn to the editors.

Captain N. Novoselov

Our correspondent visited the unit where Captain N. Novoselov serves. Here is what he reported.

The shifting of specialists from subunit to subunit, which is reported in the letter, actually was conducted. True, the unit commander did not see any special harm in this. On the contrary, he reproaches Captain Novoselov for the narrowness of his view: He should also live with the interests of the entire unit, he says.

No one disputes the right of the unit commander to shift personnel when this is necessary. Only the fact that the shifting was conducted at such an inappropriate time and had too mass a nature causes us to prick up our ears. Is it justified? In order to answer this question, we will begin systematically.

Captain Novoselov is one of the best officers in the unit. The battery under his command is leading in the socialist competition and is excellent. This year, an order arrived from higher headquarters to generalize the experience of his work in the training and indoctrination of subordinates and the teamwork of the launch sections. Unquestionably, he is training skillful specialists from among those who were sent to him in place of experienced men, too... But it is offensive to the officer: it is he who gives all his strength to the training of the launchermen in the shortest times while other commanders do not especially hurry, counting on the fact that before the trip to the range they will be given, as they say, battle-hardened specialists all the same. The author of the letter is correct: what kind of competition is taking place here--it does not take place under equal conditions.

I ask the commander of the battalion to which Captain Novoselov's subordinates--chiefs of launcher sections Sergeants V. Makarov and A. Pokorchak--were transferred:

"Really, can't you get by without them?"

"Our chiefs of sections are being released to the reserve. So that in the period of preparation for the trip to the range and on the range there will be no one to head the sections...."

This was the reply of the battalion commander. But just where was he at the beginning of the training year and why wasn't he concerned about the training of a worthy replacement for those released to the reserve as the same Novoselov does?

Unfortunately, there are also other commanders in the unit who have a parasitic attitude. Why, they say, overstrain ourselves and, what is more, risk a grade since they can give us more reliable specialists from other subunits? And this parasitism is connected not only with the training of the privates and sergeants. It is also extended to the officers and warrant officers. For example, Captain N. Ageyev, Lieutenant I. Furman, and Warrant Officer V. Panchenko of the excellent battalion in which Captain Novoselov serves travelled to the range not only with their own subunits, but also as part of sections of other subunits in the unit.

"Is this good?" I ask Lieutenant Furman.

"For me, even very good. The range is the best school for combat training," he answered.

And what about the others--about those who are not trusted, whom the experienced specialists replace? Really, don't they have to sharpen their professional skill?

They do. But some time passed--and Captain Ageyev and Warrant Officer Panchenko were again notified to be ready for a trip to the range with other sections.

The chief of the political department, the deputy unit commander, and several other officers with whom I talked believe that shifting of this type is a negative phenomenon which inflicts damage on the upbringing of people. But nevertheless, for the present they have not displayed proper persistence and devotion to party principles in combating it.

It should be noted that there also were other, in my view not completely substantiated, reasons for the mass shifting of specialists from subunit to subunit at such an inappropriate time. At the end of March, an automobile accident occurred in the unit through the fault of a serviceman who served in a city where he lived prior to call-up to the army. The senior commander ordered all soldiers and sergeants who are serving in their place of residence to be transferred at once to other cities and populated places. And this was done. But the number of men who had to be shifted proved to be extremely impressive. And, as a rule, they occupied the posts of leading specialists.

At first glance, nothing special, they received in return as many as they sent. But in fact, at one stroke damage was inflicted on the teamwork of many missile sections which required more than hours and days to perfect. To this, it should be added that in the subunits of the unit performing standby duty there are many sportsmen counted who are not seen here, either. But you see, in such subunits each specialist is strictly accounted for.

As we see, you don't reproach Captain Novoselov for a narrow view. He is genuinely anxious about the state of affairs in the unit and about the successful accomplishment of socialist obligations.

It is believed that the senior commander and the political organ will give an evaluation based on principle to shortcomings which are present and will help to bring about proper order in the unit.

6367  
CSO: 1801/014

## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### 'RINGERS' USED ON FIRING RANGE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Borovkov and Sr Lt I. Sas, Transbaykal Military District:  
"Not at Any Price"]

[Text] In a talk with us, the commander of a surface-to-air subunit, Major A. Syrovashin, experienced some embarrassment. Why was this? It appeared that he should only rejoice and be proud. For the missilemen returned from the range, having earned an excellent grade for a sniper-like launch. They completely accomplished the socialist obligations for the winter training period. Just what concerned the officer? It will all become clear soon.

Yes, the subunit actually did receive the highest grade on the range. To a great extent, success was furthered by the skillful actions of the specialists of the missile guidance station who are headed by Senior Lieutenant T. Rebrin. But here is what received our attention. Until recently Rebrin, by the way the best specialist in the unit, served in another subunit. And he was transferred here only on the eve of the range tests.

Almost simultaneously with Rebrin, on order of the unit his subordinate operator, Sergeant N. Teterin, who is also one of the best specialists was transferred. Just what is the reason for such an unexpected transfer? It is explained simply: the subunit commanded by Major Syrovashin prepared for a trip to the range. And here they decided to "strengthen" it using the best specialists of the unit.

Of course, it would be incorrect to place under doubt the excellent grade of this subunit which was obtained for the accomplishment of firings. In the last analysis, the overall success depended on all sections. And they operated irreproachably under difficult conditions. And who knows, if there had not been a substitution it is completely possible that the final grade would have been no lower and then neither the subunit commander nor the other missilemen would have had to look aside with embarrassment when hearing the praise addressed to them.

But the fact of the substitution remains present, and this provides grounds for certain reflections. Let us say, who did the grading, what damage was inflicted here to the moral indoctrination of the men? For they know that far from the best means were used in the pursuit of a high grade.

The case which has been presented, perhaps, is not even typical of our daily reality. But at times, one can still encounter cases where individual commanders and political officers strive to earn a high grade at any price.

...A tactical exercise was under way. After completion of the first stage, their unit political department required the submission of a report on party-political work which had been accomplished during this time. Such a report was soon prepared. From it, it was seen how the subunit personnel operated on the signal for assembly, on the march, and in the assembly area, and what forms and methods of party influence were used to maintain a high combat spirit in the men and for the striving to accomplish the mission in an exemplary manner. It remained to sign the document and send it to the political organ. But the text of the report seemed very dry and commonplace to the subunit political officer, Major V. Buryakov. He wanted "give it a lift" somehow.

And here lines about the initiative actions of the chief of vehicle, Sergeant N. Vasilishin, were inserted. Thanks to him, the subunit could arrive at the designated area in full strength and exactly at the designated time. And events subsequently developed as follows. In briefing the activists, Major Buryakov persistently recommends popularizing Sergeant Vasilishin's actions and teaching the young servicemen using his example.

And such talks took place. Operational news sheets with the call to learn from Vasilishin also appeared. But here, many men exchanged knowing glances. The one who "distinguished himself" also looked away with embarrassment. And there was a basis for this. In fact, his deed could not serve as a model for imitation.

Just what occurred on the march? The vehicle with which Sergeant Vasilishin moved stopped en route. It turned out that the soldier-driver carelessly fastened the camouflage net between the cab and the body. On a bumpy road its end hung down and was wound on the Cardan shaft.

What was to be done? Unwinding the net means losing precious time hopelessly. So Vasilishin made the decision to cut the net and continue to move. Bayonets and knives went into action.

Of course, it is good that the sergeant did not become confused and adopted the correct decision in the situation which had developed. But you see, he is greatly to blame for what happened. Vehicle commander Vasilishin was required to check thoroughly how the driver prepared it for the march and whether all table-of-organization equipment was reliably fastened. This was not done. And the result--a spoiled camouflage net and a critical situation on the march.

"It would have been better to punish me for this incident," said Sergeant Vasilishin himself, grieving. "I am now ashamed to look my subordinates in the eye."

It is not difficult to understand his state. For undeserved honors are extremely distressing and they bring no joy. Besides, the ethical aspect of the matter proved to be forgotten here.

The striving to be among the leaders of the competition and merit honors at any price pushes individual officers to embellish the state of affairs and even to downright deception.

On the final lesson the platoon commanded by Senior Lieutenant V. Kourov distinguished itself in firing training. The results were not bad, but the overall grade nevertheless did not reach a "five." But that was what was wanted.... And when the examiner assigned the platoon leader to rewrite the draft record in a clean copy, the latter corrected several good grades to excellent in it. This "inaccuracy," of course was discovered. It was necessary to hold Kourof strictly accountable.

Any strained interpretation or bargaining with one's conscience in any matter, large or small, has an adverse influence on the moral climate in the collective and reduces the role of the moral aspect in competition. Only an honest, open rivalry lifts the competitors.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS HAMPER COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jun 82 p 2

[Article by Col I. Ivanskiy, Belorussian Military District: "Counting on a Weak 'Enemy'"; published under the rubric, "The Commander and Contemporary Battle"]

[Text] The drill approached its conclusion when the operators of a surface-to-air missile battalion discovered a high-speed maneuvering target. This was unexpected to some degree: the target was in an area which abounds with echoes from local objects and where no "enemy" airplanes had appeared prior to this. After a short delay the guidance officer, Senior Lieutenant A. Matrosov, gave the command to the manual-tracking operators to lock on the target. Literally seconds remained to the training launch of the missile when the blip disappeared on the scopes of the indicators--the aerial "enemy" executed a sharp altitude maneuver. The first attempt to again lock on the target was not crowned with success, and time no longer remained for a second attempt. And only after the unit command post redirected an adjacent subunit quickly was the training mission accomplished.

Why did failure befall this battalion? The basic reason was sluggish, unconfident actions by the section of operators headed by Senior Lieutenant Matrosov who, by the way, is a first-class specialist. But we will not hasten to reproach this section. As an analysis showed, its failure is the consequence of omissions in the organization of combat training in the subunit.

Let us take the working out of actions against high-speed maneuvering targets. With the aid of simulation equipment what at first glance was a rather difficult situation was created here each time: the targets changed speed, course, and altitude and employed various types of jamming. The conditions of the drills were not simple ones for the missilemen and they first placed them in a difficult situation. But as skills were acquired the actions of the men became more confident and clearer. It would seem that logic itself prompted: the aerial situation should become gradually more complicated and greater variety should be introduced into it.

Unfortunately, this was not considered in the battalion. Some insignificant changes were introduced into the drills but, on the whole, they were transformed into a repetition of what had already been covered. Simulated targets appeared in familiar areas and moved over known routes, and at certain lines they began to execute maneuvers in course, speed, or altitude. In short, the raids of the assumed aerial enemy became stereotyped in concept and this circumstance, naturally, entailed

the stereotyped actions of the missilemen. Here, they did not even consider that when the target executes sudden maneuvers the configuration of its blip usually changes.

Unfortunately, still not all commanders create a difficult, instructive situation on lessons and drills. At times you encounter the obvious striving of the leader of the drill or exercise to designate a weak enemy who is not very active and maneuverable. Of course he is easy to defeat and to earn a high grade. However, with what and how can the damage caused by such an approach to matters be measured?

Some commanders undertake the complication of the aerial situation, but again, for the sake of form and counting on a not very exacting checker.

Not so long ago, I had the occasion to attend a drill of a battery led by Major V. Kostin. Much, it seemed, was envisaged here: various special situations, equipment failure, and the replacement of specialists. But there were no genuine complexity or instructiveness. Units and assemblies which had no substantial influence on the work of the missile complex "failed" and, for some reason, the specialists replaced one another namely at those moments when "peak" situations were concluded and a relative lull had set in in the combat work. And it was only necessary to put out of operation one of the manual tracking scopes for an interruption to occur in the clear actions of the specialists. The guidance officer, Senior Lieutenant S. Mikhaylenok, became confused. Nor did the battery commander know what he should undertake in the first instants. And when, nevertheless, a way out was found, it turned out that operator Private First Class Yu. Zinevich was not trained for actions in such a situation. That was when it was urgently necessary to replace the operator! But such a decision was not adopted at once--the factor of surprise was felt here in full measure.

Later, in analyzing the situation which had developed, Major Kostin found many flaws in the training of his subordinates. He was also critical of his own actions.

Later, Major Kostin began to fight against simplifications in combat training more decisively.

It is clear that exercises and drills have the greatest value in the case where the achievements of military science and the accumulated experience of combat training are contained in their concept and if the tactical capabilities of the aerial enemy's means are considered in them to the maximum.

Every leader of an exercise and drill understands this well. But why do some of them undertake simplifications and indulgences? Most often, this is explained by the striving to obtain a high grade at any price and to merit the praise of the senior commander.

Observing the course of a drill in the subunit commanded by Major V. Tsarev one day, I noticed that the majority of the specialists are working without strain. It was necessary to point this out to the leader of the drill.

"But the raid of the targets is rather dense," Major Tsarev tried to justify himself. "And really, many of the special situations were complicated."

At first glance, it would seem that everything was just like this. The targets followed one after the other, and special situations arrived rather frequently. And still, reduced capabilities of the aerial enemy were simulated. The routes of the targets were selected without consideration of the special features of terrain relief and actual flight profiles of the aviation, and raids were accomplished at medium altitudes and from the very same directions. Judging from everything, the sections of the subunit were well trained for such "enemy" actions.

Few innovations and special situations were introduced. It was felt they were all being used in such a way as to hamper the actions of the specialists but not so much as to influence the quality of their work. Let us say, according to one of the special situations the "enemy" employed nuclear weapons. Right here the command followed and the missilemen put on individual protective equipment. The drill continued without noticeable complications.

And would combat work proceed like this under actual conditions? Let us take only one circumstance for analysis. The enemy's employment of nuclear weapons at such a distance would lead, first of all, to the failure of the station's antenna system. And then the sections of the subunit would find themselves in a difficult, unexpected situation which requires decisive actions. But why was this element of combat actions not worked out on a drill, especially since the special situation itself presumed it? The answer is simple: the leader of the drill was afraid of being found wanting before the senior commander. He was afraid that he himself and his subordinates might be late and accomplish misses. By the way, this is what happened when, nevertheless, it was necessary to put the station's antenna system out of action provisionally.

Nor can we fail to mention that another commander tries with all his strength to create a difficult, instructive situation on the drill but he is not very successful--he does not have enough experience. It is not an easy task to master advanced experience and become a master in organizing battle, and persistent labor and thoughtful independent study lead the commander to success. This is easily seen from the example of officers V. Ryabkin and A. Alekseyev. They make a deep analysis of different variants of combat work, find optimum solutions, and investigate them in practice. Each one has his own approach to working out course tasks. But there is much in common in the procedure which they employ without which, evidently, it is difficult to count on firm success: thorough preparation of the lessons and drills and the creation of a situation on them which excludes stereotyped actions. Typically, in planning drills these commanders also envision varied special situations with the goal of improving their own skills in the control of a battle. And this is very important. For commanders are also encountered who lose sight of their own personal training. And what is the result? They become lost when the situation changes unexpectedly and suddenly.

On a combined drill, the direction of which proceeded from the unit command post, the firer, Major A. Ponomarenko, was assigned the mission to fire on one of the targets. The missilemen had a sufficient reserve of time, but here the situation began to become more difficult: new targets appeared. Soon the unit command post was put out of operation through a special situation. Communication with it was suddenly brought to an end. What did Major Ponomarenko undertake in this situation?

Instead of displaying independence and, without dallying, adopting a decision to open fire, he began to establish communications with the command post through alternate channels. And only when it became obvious that this would not succeed did Ponomarenko take over control of the subunit. A provisional launching of a missile at the first target was accomplished on his command. But at this moment another target was also located in the zone of fire. There was not enough time to fire on it.

The situation which developed, of course, cannot be relegated to the category of simple ones. But neither is it so exceptional in its way that it was impossible to envisage ahead of time and work out in details. And if Major Ponomarenko had used the available capabilities for the complication of work more thoughtfully and creatively and had a deeper knowledge of the tactics of actions by the aerial "enemy," such a situation would hardly have nonplussed him.

Let us note, by the way: the battery commanded by Major A. Alekseyev also found itself in a similar situation in this same combined drill. The loss of control with the unit command post did not in the least disrupt his clear and confident actions. All aerial targets were fired on in good time and with high quality.

Thus, only a thoughtful, creative approach to the organization of combat training, the basis of which is formed by increased requirements for the training of the troops, can guarantee success in contemporary battle with a strong, maneuverable aerial enemy.

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## AIR DEFENSE FORCES

### RESULTS OF NIGHT TRAINING EXERCISES EXAMINED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jul 82 p 1

[Article by Maj V. Kryshtopa, commander of a missile battalion, master of combat qualification: "Lessons Take Place at Night"]

[Text] On a combined night lesson, the men of one of the batteries of our missile battalion accomplished the mission in preparing a missile for launch. The specialists worked with strain and with a high rhythm as they tried to keep within the daytime norms. Warrant Officer [praporshchik] S. Solomonov was among the first to accomplish the task assigned to him. He unrolled the cable, connected it up to the power unit, and reported its readiness. The stopwatch showed: the time allotted for the accomplishment of the operation was bested by two minutes.

This is a high indicator. It was thought that Warrant Officer Solomonov would emerge the winner in the competition at this stage. However, in checking the quality of accomplishing the standard it was disclosed that the technological sequence for accomplishing the operations had been violated and the power-supply unit was not grounded.

They began to investigate what had happened. It turned out that there were several reasons. Warrant Officer Solomonov had just arrived from regular leave. Something had been forgotten and his former skills were lost. And the main thing is that the battery had been placed under severe conditions and the specialists operated in a situation as close as possible to one of combat: without any illumination and on unfamiliar terrain.

The battery commander and battalion staff officers drew their own conclusions: henceforth drills must be conducted in a difficult situation and on unfamiliar terrain. And they must do additional work with those who, for some reason, had missed two or three trips to the field and night lessons and their skills must be brought up to the level of the best specialists.

This has now become a rule in the subunit. The battalion staff, battery commanders, and all officers are keeping a strict record of attendance at the lessons. Special attention is paid to the quality of conduct of combined lessons and the clear and correct accomplishment of each operation.

In the obligations assumed in the year of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR by the men of our battalion, night training stands as a special point.

To work at night in accordance with daytime standards--this is the goal which the missilemen posed for themselves. And the skills here should be irreproachable.

The tone in the competition for attaining the assigned goal is set by the battery under the command of Senior Lieutenant A. Sobolev. Despite his youth, this officer is a master of combat qualification. The other officers of the battery are also moving persistently toward the master's position. The work experience of Senior Lieutenant Sobolev in the organization and conduct of night lessons and drills has been generalized and is being actively introduced in the battalion.

What characterizes the work style of the leading battery commander? First of all, the ability to think things out and the comprehensive working out of each subject. On the eve of night lessons, Sobolev describes in detail the stages of combat work and determines the standards. This master missleman strives to make each trip to the field unusual, with elements of novelty and surprise, and with a great physical and psychological load. He always sees that the special situations are worked out without any conventionalities and completely. The officer thoroughly checks the equipment on the eve of night lessons: the condition of the storage batteries, the presence of fuel, the men's personal weapons, and individual protective equipment. For at night, even the slightest malfunction may turn into a serious hitch, delay, and sometimes even the failure of the lesson.

The saturation of night lessons with elements of surprise and work under field conditions with a maximum load further the development of the necessary qualities in the officers. For example, Lieutenant S. Tolstoy has served with us quite briefly, but he has already won the reputation as one of the best specialists. He is well trained tactically and knows the equipment.

Lieutenant V. Kozlovtshev is a match for this officer. On one of the recent lessons under difficult conditions on heavily broken terrain he managed to prepare a launcher in the standard time and perform all necessary calculations accurately. Here, the officer displayed independence and maturity. In particular, he made the decision for levelling the launcher using a procedure not indicated in the instructions. And no one reproached the lieutenant because, relying on firm knowledge and good engineer training, he adopted the decision which was most expedient in the given situation.

In our battalion, great attention is devoted to the critique of night lessons, the thorough checking of the equipment, and bringing it to a state of readiness for combat employment after field outings. It has become a law with us: lessons are considered concluded after inspection and servicing and the refuelling of all combat and transport vehicles. It is not easy to do this after a sleepless night, but we do not deviate from this rule.

In summing up the results at a general formation each section and specialist receives a grade. The results are summed up in two stages: first the chiefs of sections and battery commanders evaluate the actions of their subordinates, and then the specialists express their opinions. The leader of the lessons stresses attention to the main questions. In particular, how various elements of tactics were accomplished and what was the rhythm of combat work.

...The next night lessons had ended. Those who distinguished themselves are thanked in front of the formation. Commendations for outstanding combat work, a good word about the leaders in the wall press, telling about their experience in oral propaganda and in radio broadcasts--all this is directed toward instilling in the men a special, responsible attitude toward night lessons and drills.

Now almost half the sections in the battalion are already working at night in accordance with daytime standards. A group of officers is preparing for an examination for the title of master of combat qualification. In the fall, every fourth officer will have this honorable title.

6367  
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## LOGISTICAL SERVICES AND SPECIAL TROOPS

### DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER ON ACHIEVEMENTS OF CONSTRUCTION TROOPS

Moscow STROITEL'NAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Aug 82 p 4

[Article by Deputy Minister of Defense for Construction and Billeting of Troops, Mar Eng Troops N.F. Shestopalov: "New Frontiers Of Military Construction Personnel"]

[Text] Military construction personnel constitute an important component of the multimembered army of Soviet builders. They carry out missions related to erecting defense facilities. Additionally, civil construction projects are a major part of their operations. Military construction collectives build living quarters, schools, pre-school facilities, hospitals, sanatoria, rest homes, swimming pools, and athletic facilities. The main focus of military builders currently is the implementation of the 26th CPSU Congress directives relating to improving efficiency and quality, and reducing construction periods and costs.

Many buildings and structures erected by military builders or with their participation have received high evaluations. The USSR Armed Forces Central Museum, the Military Artists Studio imeni M.B. Grekov, the "Crimea" Sanitorium, and the soccer-field event complex situated on Leningrad Prospekt all were built by military construction personnel. They are also participating in construction projects along the Baikal-Amur Mainline [BAM].

In recent years, living conditions have improved significantly for officers and all personnel in the army and navy. The construction of living quarters and military posts is accomplished according to planned procedure at the appropriate technical level, with all normative requirements observed and with requisite engineering equipment. A great deal has been done to eliminate poorly built living quarters in garrisons. Programs are underway to conclude this work in the very near future.

Much is being done in military construction organizations and units to improve the architectural appearance of military posts. The directive of the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D.F. Ustinov relating to elevating the quality of living quarters and barracks construction not only to today's level of requirements but to tomorrow's as well is being fulfilled. Presently, new experimental barracks and service buildings representing new standard models are being erected to replace obsolete ones.

The current five-year plan will see a completed transition to construction of homes with improved planning and finishing, and having increased levels of comfort. It has now become the rule that at the same time living quarters are under construction, cultural institutions, athletic facilities, schools and pre-school facilities, in short, everything required for the normal work and relaxation of personnel and the families of servicemen are also being built.

Military builders, along with all the Soviet people, are working unremittingly toward fulfilling the decisions of the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and of the USSR Food Program. They are providing great assistance in harvest operations and in improving the material and food base. Our collectives have been charged with assisting military sovkhozes in the construction of a series of grain and vegetable storage facilities, livestock buildings, and to build hundreds of kilometers of approach spurs and other projects. In addition, military construction personnel who have served out their tours of duty, frequently as entire brigades or subelements are going to those areas in need of young, strong hands and qualified specialists, just as in the time of the virgin lands initiative.

Military builders are meeting their professional holiday with high indicators in their work. Socialist competition has been widely employed in construction organizations and units to fittingly greet the 60th anniversary of the USSR. The initiative of the Red Banner Odessa Military District, endorsed by the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Army and Navy, is supported everywhere. They appealed to the personnel of military construction projects, enterprises, and organizations with the patriotic call to widely employ competition to attain ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the annual plan for all technico-economic indicators under the slogan "Work Efficiently With Quality, Strictly Observe Economy". Competition based upon the principle of the "Work Relay" is gaining force. Instruction and supervision of young construction personnel are widely developed.

All this enables workers of the military construction projects to successfully accomplish tasks levied by the 26th CPSU Congress. The plan for the first six months of the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan has been fulfilled for all basic indicators: for volume of construction-installation operations, by 103.4 percent, for introduction of fixed capital, by 108.3 percent, and for introduction of living quarters, by 106.2 percent. Targets for the growth of labor productivity have been overfulfilled.

A confident start is underway in the 11th Five-Year Plan for military builders of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District and construction organizations headed by G. Glazunov, V. Moyseyenko, R. Khanov, B. Flerov, and A. Nafanov. All, for 1981 results, were awarded the traveling Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and the Komsomol Central Committee. Many military construction collectives were awarded red banners, pennants, and certificates from the USSR Ministry of Defense and labor union Central Committee. The most outstanding commanders and political workers, engineers and technicians were awarded USSR orders and medals, and the honorific title of meritorious builder of union republics was conferred upon 92 persons.

Leading military construction detachments commanded by Lieutenant Colonels A. Kornayev, B. Merimskiy, A. Zhumaleyev, G. Goncharov, Majors N. Sorva, I. Gordeychuk, and self-supporting brigades headed by comrades I. Savotikov, I. Osin, and others are well known at military construction projects. Soviet Army employee I. Savotikov was one of the first to support the implementation of the brigade contract on military construction projects and headed the first self-supporting brigade in the USSR Ministry of Defense. Today, his brigade is a leading, cohesive collective. In honor of the 60th anniversary of the USSR, brigade members undertook lofty socialist obligations: to construct and turn over the keys to 2 residential 16-story buildings, to reduce the normative period of their construction by 40 days, and to reduce estimated costs of operations by 11,000 rubles. For selfless and innovative labor, Ivan Vasil'yevich Savotikov was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor; he is a USSR State Prize laureate, and meritorious builder of the RSFSR.

Service in military construction units is an excellent school for ideological tempering and professional training. It provides the military builders with a speciality to which many remain loyal their entire lives. In just the past 2 years, thousands of volunteers, military builders, have traveled to key construction projects on Komsomol travel authorizations. This is a great detachment of outstanding specialists, of reliable and selfless laborers.

Military builders know full well that much remains to be done in fulfilling the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress in the effort to improve quality of construction, organization and cohesiveness of all elements in construction production, and fuller utilization of existing reserves.

In some construction organizations, there are instances of resource dispersion, violations of plan discipline, and the volume of unfinished construction is being reduced slowly. The achievements of scientific and technological progress must be introduced more consistently, as must advanced know-how in labor organization, the brigade contract, and planning-estimates functions must be perfected. Areas warranting increased attention are the strengthening of military and labor discipline, improvement of material-living conditions for personnel, and fuller satisfaction of their needs and requests.

Personnel of military construction units profoundly recognize their patriotic and international duty, and with a sense of high responsibility apply every effort to successfully accomplish those tasks levied by the party and government to further consolidate the defense capability of the country, and an appropriate greeting for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR.

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## PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

### COMMENTARY ON ISRAELI INVASION ON LEBANON

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 13 Aug 82) pp 7-11

[Article by Col Ye. Aleksandrov and Lt Col V. Saneyev: "Lebanon: U.S. Imperialism's Aggression by the Hands of the Zionists"]

[Text] On the morning of 6 June 1982 a 25,000-man interventionist corps of the Israeli Ground Forces supported by Air Force and Navy crossed the Lebanese border, marking the beginning of a new, wide-scale aggression by imperialism against a sovereign Arab country.

The invasion was preceded by a lengthy period where the Israelis whipped up tensions and carried out armed provocations in South Lebanon. Several months before the beginning of the aggression, there unfolded a provocative campaign of threats addressed to the Palestine Resistance Movement [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: PFLP], and above all the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] as well as warnings about "retaliatory steps" in case the Palestinians continued the "terrorist" actions against Israel at any point on the globe. Many foreign information agencies began to report the Israeli Army's preparations for an attack on Lebanon, reinforcement of troop groupings in the border zone, the conduct of Israeli subunit raids against the Palestinians in the southern parts of Lebanon, and activation of exercises by units in Israel's Northern Military District including the call-up of reservists for duty. Aerial reconnaissance flights and air raids against South Lebanese cities grew more frequent.

Immediately before the invasion of Lebanese territory the Israeli Air Force performed two days of intense bombing against positions of Palestinian armed formations, Palestinian refugee camps, and the country's administrative and industrial facilities.

Tel Aviv chose the attempt on the Israeli ambassador in London on 3 June 1982 as the direct excuse for beginning the military operation. Even the western press unambiguously hinted that this was very similar to the provocative method Germany used in World War I for unleashing aggression.

Israel's invasion of Lebanese territory pursued the objectives of defeating armed formations of the PFLP located in the southern part of the country, undermining the PLO's military and political structure, weakening its role as a legal representative of the Palestinian people, and burying forever the idea

of the creation of an independent Palestinian state. By exerting military pressure on Syria the aggressor planned to force it to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, which were located there by decision of the League of Arab States as inter-Arab peacekeeping forces. All this according to the plan of the Israeli Zionists and their foreign protectors was to create favorable conditions for replacement of the Lebanese government and arrival to power of a regime which, like the Egyptian regime, would agree to the conclusion of a separate "peace" treaty. In addition a task was set for intimidating the Palestinian Arabs living in occupied territories of the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip who were fighting for freedom and independence.

To carry out its expansionist plans Israel's military-political leadership took advantage of the situation in the Arab world resulting from the signing of the Camp David agreements. The separate deal worked out in Washington between Egypt and Israel introduced a split to Arab ranks and weakened the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist front.

In evaluating the situation in the Near East existing at the beginning of the aggression, foreign observers note that Tel Aviv's ruling clique was able to dare take up such an adventure only thanks to active support on the part of the United States, which assumed responsibility for providing its political, diplomatic and military cover.

According to western press reports, details of the operation were coordinated with the White House during a visit to the United States by Israeli defense minister A. Sharon on the eve of the invasion. It is also noted that it was obviously not by chance that the beginning of the aggression coincided with the voyage of American emissary P. Habib to the Near East. In addition, to exert pressure on Lebanon the American command sent a Sixth Fleet carrier attack group to this country's shores, consisting of the carrier "Forrestal" with 90 aircraft aboard and escort ships, as well as an amphibious group headed by the amphibious assault ship "Guam" with 1,600 Marines aboard.

Arms and military equipment made in the United States come in a continuous flow into the Israeli Army inventory. According to a report by the French newspaper QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, in a period of just a few days at the height of the aggression Israel received 15 tanks, APC's, artillery pieces and ammunition.

The basis of U.S. support of Israel's aggressive actions in Lebanon is the "Memorandum on Strategic Cooperation" signed 30 October 1981. This document merely formalized the long existing character of relations between the two countries. It indicates a full coincidence of the chief objectives of Washington and Tel Aviv in the Near East, which they do not even attempt to conceal: neutralization of the national liberation movement, a struggle against progressive regimes in the region, inclusion of the Arab countries in the Near East settlement under the Camp David format, and establishment of American-Israeli hegemony in this region. The United States also hopes to take advantage of the results of aggression in Lebanon to reinforce its military presence and influence in the Near East.

Having made the decision for an armed invasion, the Israeli government informed the command of the "Provisional UN Forces in Lebanon" about this only a half-hour before it began, actually bringing it face to face with a fait accompli. Moreover, in flouting elementary norms of international law, Israel performed a direct attack against forces of the international organization standing in the interventionists' path. Several UN officers and men became the first victims of the aggression. The Israeli militarists thus again cast an impudent challenge to the world public.

According to reports of western agencies, the invasion of Lebanon was carried out by an attack grouping on three main axes: coastal, central and eastern (see diagram [diagram not reproduced]). Operating in the first echelon on the coastal axis was a reinforced armored brigade, which rushed toward the city of Sur (Tyre). Another armored brigade with means of reinforcement moved in the direction of the city of En Nabatiye, located in the central part of South Lebanon. Troops operating on the eastern axis moved into the Bekaa Valley. Without entering into protracted fighting, first echelon forces bypassed strong centers of resistance in an attempt to split up Palestinian detachments and move to operational expanses. The second echelon was assigned the mission of neutralizing reinforced camps and strongpoints of the PFLP and national-patriotic forces (NPS) of Lebanon.

As the foreign press attests, on the very next day after the beginning of the aggression the Israeli grouping in South Lebanon grew from 25,000 to approximately 60,000 persons, and ten days later it exceeded 100,000 persons outfitted with all kinds of modern weapons.

The Israeli command also employed other branches of the Armed Forces in the war that was unleashed. For example, the basis of the air grouping comprised tactical air squadrons with the latest American F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers. The aircraft were used to deliver mass missile and bombing strikes against PLFP and NPS positions, Palestinian refugee camps and cities, and for giving direct air support to the ground forces. Helicopters were employed to land airborne assault forces in the rear of defending Palestinians. The aggressor made wide use of the American-made E-2C Hawkeye long-range radar detection and control aircraft and Boeing 707 aircraft specially fitted with electronics for vectoring aircraft to air and ground targets.

The naval forces supported the ground forces advancing on the coastal axis, patrolled the coastal zone and set up a blockade of the western part of Beirut from the sea. Amphibious forces with a strength up to several battalions were landed on the shore to the south and north of the cities of Sur (Tyre), Saida and Damur, for which a large number of ships was used.

Both amphibious and airborne assault forces were used to capture important hills and road junctions, to disrupt lines of communication on withdrawal routes of combat detachments of the Palestinians and NPS, and to conduct subversive actions in the rear and terrorist acts against the peaceful population.

With the aggressor forces' move to the vicinity of the Lebanese capital and to the Beirut-Damascus Highway, the front line stabilized somewhat. Israeli

occupiers shifted to tactics of delivering mass strikes against Beirut by all weapons (artillery, aviation and the Navy), political blackmail, and intimidation of the Lebanese people and government. Barbaric destruction of the capital of the sovereign state and annihilation of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples was carried out methodically.

The brutalities of the Zionists in Lebanon are very real genocide; the planned, calculated destruction of peaceful residents--men and women, children and the elderly. It is quite obvious that the aggressor could not have conducted himself so impudently were it not for a very large imperialist power, the United States, at its back as a partner. A message sent by Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev to the American president in early August 1982 emphasizes that "the tragedy of Lebanon, and especially of the capital's populace, will be an indelible blot also on the conscience of those who could, but did not, halt the aggressor."

American religious leader J. (Beydn), who was in Beirut during its siege, declared with indignation: "We were shocked by the behavior of our country's leaders, who are keeping their silence at a time when this slaughter continues. They condemn the violation of civil rights anywhere, but nevertheless pander to Israel's bloody attack on Lebanon, on its cities, settlements, people, and inhabitants of defenseless Palestinian camps. And so the blood which is on the hands of Begin and Sharon also falls on our hands."

According to a statement of Lebanese prime minister S. Wazzan, the number of victims of Israeli aggression reached 15,000 as of the end of June 1982 and over 50,000 were wounded. As reported by the Palestinian agency VAFA, the aggressor even used nerve gases, napalm and American-made antipersonnel bombs, specially intended for the destruction of the peaceful civil population, in Lebanon. And all this was done under the cover of profuse talk about a struggle against the so-called "international terrorism," by which Washington means the struggle of nations for their national liberation.

In preparing to take West Beirut by storm, the Israeli leadership repeatedly sent the Palestinians ultimatums through American emissary P. Habib about surrendering arms and evacuating Lebanon. In supporting its Zionist partner, the United States resorted to the threat of landing American Marines in the western part of the capital, which was concealed hypocritically by statements of the desire to "avoid bloodshed and guarantee the safety of Palestinians during an evacuation from the Lebanese capital."

At the same time, in the opinion of a number of foreign observers, U.S. attempts to threaten direct military intervention reflect its nervousness and concern in connection with the protracted nature of the conflict. Despite Israeli Army successes in the first days of the war, it did not succeed as planned to defeat completely in a few days the armed PFLP formations, a considerable portion of which managed to retain their combat effectiveness. The partners in the aggression also were not able to achieve the withdrawal from the country of Syrian troops, which firmly came to the defense of the Palestinians and Lebanese.

Foreign military specialists note that from the very beginning of the invasion forces of the aggressor and of the PFLP and NPS detachments were far from equal. The regular interventionist army armed to the teeth and enriched with the experience of past wars actually was opposed by Palestinian formations basically of a militia type. They had chiefly light small arms. Nevertheless the Palestinians' courageous resistance and the substantial losses in personnel and combat equipment they inflicted on the invaders forced a reckoning with the high morale of the fighting men defending their people's lawful rights and Lebanon's national independence. According to an admission of A. Sharon, Israeli losses in personnel reached 1,500 killed or wounded in the first weeks of fighting alone.

With regard to the Soviet Union, its constructive approach to the Lebanese events and to the situation in the Near East is aimed on the whole at not creating new obstacles, but clearing obstructions from the path of a Near East settlement. The flame of war must be extinguished, the aggression must be stopped and Israeli forces must leave Lebanese territory--those are the USSR's demands.

The war in Lebanon unleashed by Tel Aviv again posed in all acuteness the question of the situation in the Near East as a whole. It reaffirmed the justness of the position of aggressive forces, who believe that only an all-encompassing settlement and not a policy of separate deals is capable of giving peace to the Near Eastern nations. As noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, such a settlement must consist of three organically interconnected points: a cessation of Israeli occupation of all Arab territories captured in 1967; realization of the inalienable rights of the Arab nation of Palestine, including its creation of its own state; and assurance of security for all nations in the region.

Nations of the world are holding up to shame the impudent piracy inflicted by American imperialism through the hands of Zionist executioners, whose goal is to conduct a policy of genocide toward the Palestinian and Lebanese nations as well as to occupy Lebanese territory.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON PROBLEMS OF USE OF U.S. 'RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE'

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 13 Aug 82) pp 16-18

[Article by Col S. Semenov: "Some Issues on Deployment of the 'Rapid Deployment Force' (From the Experience of 'Bright Star' Type Exercises)"]

[Text] Concealed by the screen of the necessity for defending "vitally important" American interests in different parts of the world, the U.S. military-political leadership has created interventionist forces, the so-called "Rapid Deployment Force" [RDF], and has begun their intensive preparation for conducting aggressive military actions in foreign TVD's [theaters of military operations], and in the Near East and Southwest Asia above all. Combat training initially was accomplished basically on the territory of the continental United States and in Panama, where there are locations with the very same natural climatic conditions as in the Near East. Subsequently the Pentagon began to conduct regular exercises of the RDF (once a year) directly in areas of its operational destination.

The first exercise of this type, named "Bright Star-81,"\* was held on the territory of Egypt in November 1980. Its chief objectives were the practice, on a limited scale, of missions to organize and carry out air movements from the United States of troops, weapons and logistical support; familiarization of American servicemen with features of the TVD; and the conduct of desert combat actions.

Some 1,500 persons from the U.S. Ground Forces and Air Force were included in the exercise, including a reinforced battalion (900 persons) from the 101st Air Assault Division and subunits of the 150th Tactical Air Group (600). A company of Egyptian troops acted as the "enemy." The majority of the American troop command personnel had combat experience in the U.S. aggressive war in Southeast Asia, while enlisted men and NCO's had been used repeatedly for maneuvers of NATO Joint Armed Forces in Europe.

Practiced during the exercise were tactics of offensive and defensive actions by subunits in isolation from the main body in coordination with tactical aviation and fire support helicopters, the movement of personnel and weapons in

\*The exercise was designated not by calendar year, but by fiscal year, which begins 1 October (FY 1981 began 1 October 1980).

the zone of combat actions aboard helicopters, and organization of support under desert conditions. There also was a thorough analysis of features in employing weapons and combat equipment (chiefly aviation equipment) under Near East conditions and in arranging control and maintaining communications in an unequipped theater.

According to foreign press reports, the primary features of actions in desert areas of the Near East revealed during this exercise reduced to the following.

The commanders of ground force subunits constantly had to concern themselves with organizing a perimeter defense due to the presence of greater gaps between subunits and more exposed flanks than on conventional terrain, which hindered control and required creation of a special fire plan. The uniformity of the landscape considerably worsened orientation, especially for aircraft and helicopter crews, caused mistakes in determining distances to targets, and as a result substantially degraded the fire accuracy from all kinds of weapons, especially antitank weapons. Dense dust clouds formed when helicopters took off and landed, which practically led to total disruption of visibility, created the danger of collision during group flights, and sharply revealed the location of subunits. Helicopter flights over sand dunes were considered most favorable only at heights greater than 30 m and at a speed of 70 km/hr, since under these conditions dust clouds did not form, but the helicopters became more vulnerable to antiaircraft fire.

The high dust concentration in the air led to frequent weapon malfunctions during firing, clogged air filters and disrupted the seals of combat equipment engines, especially aircraft engines, increased the wear of rubbing parts, caused the malfunction of electromechanical contacts and other equipment components, and caused difficulties in the use of optical instruments.

Serious deficiencies were identified in maintaining the UH-60A Black Hawk, AH-1S Cobra-TOW and OH-58 Kiowa helicopters, where rotor blades were subject to partial destruction and deformation due to the effects of sand particles on them. It also was discovered that there was a drop in the effective range of fire of the basic automatic weapon, the M16 rifle (which usually is 400 m), and almost a twofold drop in the operating range of communications equipment in the UHF band.

The uniformity of the landscape, difficulties in orientation, reflected patches of sunlight and dust clouds constantly hanging in the air caused increased excitability and fatigue in people, especially flight personnel. The dust and sand entering the body during respiration and while eating food led in a number of cases to gastroenteric disorders. In addition, two-thirds of the potable water delivered to the area of "combat actions" proved to be unfit, since the U.S. Armed Forces rear service was unprepared for keeping water a long while in a hot climate.

The T/O&E camouflage means and field uniforms of American troops did not meet the demands placed on them.

The command element gave particular attention in the exercise to problems of organizing and carrying out the movements of troops, weapons and supplies from the United States to the Near East, as well as to logistical support of combat actions under conditions of the desert and an unequipped theater. The C-5A and C-141 aircraft made 180 trips (counting return movements) for this. According to estimates of foreign specialists, the cost of transportation expenditures and support of one person during the exercise (for 10 days) averaged over \$17,000, while overall expenditures were over \$25 million.

On the whole, as foreign specialists believe, this first measure of an operational nature conducted under conditions of the Near East permitted the Pentagon not only to practice a number of difficult missions of preparing RDF personnel for conducting combat actions, but also to expand the framework of its military presence in this area as well as to demonstrate U.S. readiness for military intervention in the region's affairs to achieve its hegemonic plans.

From late October to early December 1981 an exercise larger in scope and objectives was held on the territory of Egypt, Somalia, Sudan and Oman by the U.S. RDF and troops of those countries under the codename "Bright Star-82." Before it began the experience of the preceding exercise was analyzed thoroughly.

The chief objectives of the exercise were to test reality of plans for the movement and tactical employment of the RDF and its practical use of a poorly equipped theater in the Near East in coordination with Armed Forces of the Arab countries with pro-American regimes, to reinforce and expand U.S. military presence in the region, and to demonstrate Washington's capabilities for supporting reactionary regimes and exerting pressure on progressive countries. The invasion by American troops into this region was justified as being assistance given by the United States to Egypt and Sudan in repulsing a sham aggression by Libya, the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] and Ethiopia.

Participating in the exercise were operations groups of staffs (the RDF, the 9th TAC [Tactical Air Command] Air Army, the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82d Airborne Division and 24th Mechanized Division), an airborne battalion of the 82d Airborne Division, a reinforced mechanized battalion of the 24th Mechanized Division, Special Forces subunits, two tactical air squadrons from the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, one SAC [Strategic Air Command] bomber squadron, a Marine expeditionary battalion from Sixth Fleet and U.S. Navy ships in the Indian Ocean (a total of over 7,000 persons as well as over 500 wheeled and tracked vehicles including M60 tanks, Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced], and M113 APC's, M109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers, 20 F-16 and A-10 aircraft, six B-52 strategic bombers, C-5A and C-141 heavy military transport aircraft, Army Aviation helicopters and other equipment). Also placed in action were 600 servicemen from Egypt, 600 from Somalia, and 1,000 from Sudan. A landing ship was assigned from the Oman Navy. The total number of troops involved was some 15,000 persons, and around \$60 million were spent. Movements of personnel and equipment as well as the play-through of combat actions took place in three main phases.

In the first phase (25 October-13 November) personnel and materiel were moved by air and sea from the United States. In particular, 300 servicemen and 500 tracked and wheeled vehicles including M60 tanks, M109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers and the M113 APC's, were taken aboard a transport from the American port of Savannah, Georgia to Alexandria, Egypt. The entire main body of personnel (with the exception of a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division) and 4,000 tons of various cargoes were taken by air to the Cairo-West air base. The movement was accomplished by C-5A and C-141 military transport aircraft with aerial refueling by KC-135 tankers as well as with the use of American air bases as intermediate bases on the territory of the FRG. During this period 180 trips were made by the Military Airlift Command aircraft, with a total of 450 trips made. The flight of F-16 and A-10 aircraft from the United States to Egypt was accomplished by a similar method. After receiving the combat equipment delivered by sea, the reinforced battalion of the 24th Mechanized Division made a 200-kilometer march under its own power to the exercise area (100 km west of Cairo).

A number of independent exercises were held in the second and main phase (14-24 November). For example, an air assault force was dropped (Fig. 2 [figure not reproduced]) consisting of over 500 persons in a battalion of the 82d Airborne Division from C-141 aircraft on 14 November after an 11½-hour nonstop flight (with aerial refueling) from the United States. Prior to this a bombing attack was made against that area by six B-52 strategic bombers, which also made a nonstop flight from Minot air base (North Dakota) to the bombing area and back. The drop of the assault force was screened from the air by tactical aircraft of the U.S. and Egyptian air forces. Field firing and a demonstration of combat equipment and weapons of the American and Egyptian forces were arranged in this phase.

Simultaneously, on the territory of the Berbera naval base in Somalia there was a joint American-Somali exercise for practicing missions in support of the RDF's actions in the Near East. There were 350 U.S. servicemen and 600 Somali servicemen taking part.

In Sudan 300 U.S. Special Forces personnel and 600 Egyptian and 1,000 Sudanese officers and men participated in a joint exercise to practice antiguerrilla warfare missions.

In Oman the American Marine expeditionary battalion and ships from the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean as well as one landing ship of the Oman Navy practiced amphibious assault landing missions in a joint exercise for the purpose of seizing an important strategic point in the Persian Gulf.

From 27 November through 8 December there was a return movement of American Armed Forces personnel and combat equipment from Egypt to the United States.

Lt Gen Kingston, CIC of the RDF, exercised overall direction of the exercise with his headquarters at the Cairo-West air base. Concerning deficiencies identified during Exercise "Bright Star-82," he noted the technical difficulties in organizing and maintaining communications at the tactical level under desert conditions, problems in supplying troops with potable water, the

small number of American servicemen with a knowledge of the Arabic language, as well as a number of other deficiencies which had been revealed in the previous exercise and still had not been remedied fully. Kingston also emphasized the need to reinforce the RDF's leadership and announced that in connection with a decision by the U.S. Defense Department creating a new "Rapid Deployment Force" joint command, his headquarters would be located at MacDill Air Base (Florida), and an operations group of the headquarters numbering 100-150 servicemen would be on the territory of one of the pro-American countries in the Near East (talks on this matter were being conducted with the heads of certain Near East states).

On the whole, according to the foreign press, the RDF Exercise "Bright Star-82" was new evidence of further American penetration into the Near East and the consolidation and expansion of U.S. military presence with reactionary regimes of countries in this region. The demonstration of U.S. military might in the Near East was accompanied by an unconcealed threat addressed to progressive states of this region which do not wish to follow the channel of American foreign policy, which support the just struggle of the Palestinian people and which are against the Camp David Accord.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON DISCIPLINE IN U.S. ARMED FORCES

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 13 Aug 82) pp 23-24

[Article by I. Dzhuri: "Discipline in the U.S. Armed Forces"]

[Text] Special attention in measures of the U.S. leadership aimed at strengthening the Armed Forces as a tool of an aggressive foreign policy course is directed to the personnel's moral-political state. In the estimate of foreign specialists, the system for manning, preparation and training of servicemen existing in them basically permits the country's ruling circles to create a professionally trained, politically reliable army ready to defend the interests of monopoly capital. Meanwhile the Pentagon does not conceal its concern over the continuing existence of a high level of disciplinary infractions and military crimes, especially those which lead to the breakdown of equipment, a reduction in combat effectiveness of subunits, and great moral and material damage.

As can be concluded from statements by foreign sociologists, the nature of disciplinary infractions in the U.S. Armed Forces is contingent on the American way of life itself and on the class, political, national and social contradictions of society. For the population of many states of the world where the Pentagon has its military bases the impression of the American in a military uniform usually is associated with drug addiction, alcoholism, debauchery, brawls, profiteering and banditry. According to foreign press reports some 100 G.I.'s had been sentenced and were in foreign prisons for committing murders, robberies and for smuggling drugs as of the beginning of 1981.

In their estimate of the state of military discipline in the U.S. Armed Forces, western specialists consider problems of alcoholism and drug addiction to be the most acute. Abuse of alcohol and drugs basically is defined by military legislation as a disciplinary infraction. According to official Pentagon data, some 5,000 persons a year are subjected to various punishments for drug abuse just among American troops located in the FRG. The numerous infractions of discipline by servicemen on the soil of alcoholism and drug addiction (for example, over 35,000 incidents are noted in the Ground Forces annually) are forcing the command element to take urgent steps to organize a fight against them. To this end there are regular surveys, medical examinations and inspections of personnel by the Inspector General's service and a U.S. congressional commission, military police reports are collected, the network of specialized hospitals is being expanded, and so on.

During a questionnaire survey conducted in 1981 among 15,000 servicemen of all branches of the Armed Forces it was learned that 27 percent of those surveyed had taken drugs in the month preceding the survey and 36 percent had taken them during the year, and in this regard every fifth officer and enlisted man felt worse. Twenty-seven percent connect a drop in work capacity with the use of large amounts of alcoholic beverages. An increase was noted in the number of cases where these things were taken while performing operational readiness duties, exercises, and in the performance of official duties. This fact causes special anxiety in the public, inasmuch as drug addicts may obtain access to the "nuclear trigger": Even members of the crews of B-52 strategic bombers were among those who liked to "indulge a bit" in drugs.

Information gathered by a U.S. congressional commission during an inspection of American troops in Western Europe in the summer of 1981 showed that of 2,000 persons surveyed at 22 Pentagon military bases in the FRG and Italy, 16 percent of ground forces personnel and 25 percent of naval personnel use marijuana and hashish daily. Over half the ground forces and naval personnel, 40 percent of the Marines and 19 percent of the Air Force personnel used these kinds of drugs in the month preceding the survey. It is noted that almost all of them use drugs and alcoholic beverages not only in offduty time, but also in the performance of official duty.

AWOL's and desertion are considered to be a serious problem undermining the moral-political state of the U.S. Armed Forces. This form of disciplinary infraction is rather typical of the American armed forces. For example, during World War II of the almost 10 million persons called up for military service some one million evaded it (deserted, simulated various illnesses and so on). According to Pentagon data there were over 400,000 deserters when the United States was taking part in aggressive actions in Indochina. In recent years, according to foreign press reports, there are over 100,000 cases of AWOL's and desertion each year in units and subunits. Foreign specialists believe that the main causes for this lie in the misanthropic system for indoctrinating servicemen and in the "civil rights violations" of Americans in military service.

Infractions of military discipline connected with various kinds of discrimination continue to be very widespread. In 1981 the Inspector General's service noted a 35 percent increase in the number of incidents resulting from a restriction of rights of certain categories of servicemen for racial motives just in the U.S. Ground Forces in the European zone. In the first quarter there were 62 such infractions: 36 resulting from racial discrimination, 14 because of sexual discrimination, two on religious grounds and ten for other reasons. The service's report states that white servicemen are punished an average of 1.5-2 times less than "colored." Such a situation also was observed in the previous year. As the command was forced to admit, there is a biased attitude toward "colored" in the actions of commanders of all levels and of military justice entities.

Along with the aforementioned reasons, the extensive manifestation of dissatisfaction and distrust of commanders (chiefs) on the part of subordinates has a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the U.S. Armed

Forces. For example, during one of the surveys in which 425 ground forces personnel took part, over half declared that they did not trust their superiors and almost 70 percent believe that the majority of commanders "are concerned only with their own personal interests."

On the whole, however, as foreign specialists assume, the steps being taken by the command element to stop disciplinary infractions among personnel with the help of repressions and direct bribery as well as the ideological brainwashing of servicemen assure reliability of the U.S. Armed Forces as a tool of Washington's adventuristic policy.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY OF ENGINEER SUPPORT OF DESERT OPERATIONS

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 13 Aug 82) pp 25-30

[Article by Col (Res) Yu. Korolev, candidate of military sciences, docent; and Col (Res) V. Shamshurov, candidate of military sciences, docent: "Engineer Support to Desert Combat Actions (According to Views of American Military Specialists)"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source.]

[Text] American military specialists take engineer support to mean the practical activity of subunits, units and combined units (including engineer, combat engineer and others) for the purpose of, on the one hand, creating favorable conditions for their forces and, on the other hand, hindering enemy actions and reducing the effectiveness of his employment of weapons to the maximum extent. Engineer support is of a specific nature and its scope depends on whether or not there is an existing friendly and enemy grouping or one is being created, and on the preparation of a theater of war, the combat situation, availability of personnel and means, and the physical-geographic and climatic conditions. According to views of American military specialists, combat support is intended to accomplish the following missions: support to mobility and countermobility, troop protection, and general missions.

U.S. military experts believe that to assure MOBILITY in an operation (combat) it is necessary to accomplish missions contributing to continued high rates of advance by friendly forces, and to provide for COUNTERMOBILITY, missions must be accomplished which reduce the enemy's rate of advance.

TROOP PROTECTION is taken to mean the set of engineer activities to organize positions, slit trenches for personnel, and fortified areas, camouflage, laying smoke screens and so on.

U.S. specialists include among GENERAL MISSIONS of engineer support to troop actions the measures carried out in brigade and division rear areas, specifically: preparation and maintenance of crosscountry routes and roads, organization of positions (areas) for air defense and field artillery, construction and maintenance of airfields and helicopter pads, construction of control points and various logistical facilities, supplying water to troops, laying and detonating nuclear (chemical) mines, crossing water obstacles (over 150 m wide) and others.

As reported in the American military press, engineer support under desert conditions<sup>1</sup> is accomplished in conformity with basic regulation provisions and requirements, although it has a number of features which will be examined below.

As under ordinary conditions, the planning of engineer support to division (army corps) combat actions is the responsibility of the division (corps) engineer and his staff, while missions in the troops' interests are accomplished by subordinate engineer (combat engineer) units. As American military specialists assume, at least two separate engineer battalions and up to four corps-level companies as well as a division combat engineer battalion usually will operate in each division zone. Four corps engineer battalions can support division combat actions on the axis of main attack (in addition to the division's own resources),<sup>2</sup> and up to two engineer or combat engineer companies will be assigned additionally to each brigade for direct engineer support.

Organization and conduct of reconnaissance in general and engineer reconnaissance in particular is one of the most important missions for commanders of all levels during desert operations. This is performed by personnel of march security and battle outposts, by screening forces to which combat engineer scouts have been added by the commander's decision, and by separate engineer reconnaissance patrols for obtaining information about the most important terrain features (water lines, crosscountry routes and so on) and the enemy (fortifications, minefields and so on). For example, when a division makes a march along three routes, a company operates in the advance party of the brigades. It is recommended that this company have an engineer reconnaissance section in an APC numbering at least five persons. Flank security and rear guard subunits (line platoons) perform engineer reconnaissance in the interests of the brigades with their own personnel and means.

In some cases, by decision of the combined unit commander, the engineer reconnaissance patrols may be taken to points aboard helicopters. It is also recommended that specially fitted helicopters be employed for radar and visual detection of obstacles (for example, in accompanying columns in the rear of friendly forces). Devices are employed for precise topogeodetic survey of engineer and reconnaissance subunits under desert conditions which permit a determination of their location as well as the location of objects and targets on the terrain based on celestial bodies, and measurement of the distance with a high degree of accuracy. The U.S. ground forces have the AN/PSS-11 and AN/PRS-7 mine detectors to perform engineer reconnaissance. In addition it is planned to use the VMRMD<sup>3</sup> mine detector, which is to become operational in 1984. It will be capable of road reconnaissance at a speed of 10 km/hr.

1. For more detail about features of conducting desert actions see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 4, 1982, pp 27-32 -- Ed.
2. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 1, 1981, pp 31-35 on the division combat engineer battalion -- Ed.
3. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 5, 1980, pp 32-36, about mine detectors and mine clearing systems -- Ed.

According to American military press reports, obstacles are used to reduce enemy rates of advance, and these are subdivided into conventional and dynamic (laid by remote mining systems). Conventional obstacles usually are laid ahead of time, before the beginning of combat actions (basically on the defense), while dynamic obstacles are laid during offensive and defensive actions, on the march and so on. While during World War II an American combat engineer company would lay a mixed minefield 350 m wide and 250 m deep manually in eight hours, at the present time the modern equipment in the inventory of U.S. Ground Forces units permits minelaying in a matter of minutes.

American military specialists plan to employ M157 and M173<sup>3</sup> distributed mine-clearing charges as well as other means for supporting high rates of ATTACK by combined units and units, especially when they cross minefields. It is planned to use special mineclearers of various types when attacking a defending enemy. But American experts consider the use of tanks with roller flails under sandy desert conditions and with mines buried deeply in soft soil to be inexpedient, since such a flail becomes jammed and forms a mound of sand ahead of it, while deep mining does not make it safe for the combat equipment following behind. At the same time, despite low productivity, manual mineclearing may be effective in a number of cases even under present-day conditions thanks to better adaptability to concrete combat conditions. Therefore it is noted in U.S. Army manuals that on the attack it is necessary to have combat engineer subunits outfitted with highly sensitive equipment for detecting mines and clearing them.

As American military specialists assume, the preparation of crosscountry routes will present no difficulty when attacking in stone (rocky) desert and takyr. The primary amount of work goes into grading the roadbed with tractor-mounted bulldozers and autograders, as well as rolling it with rollers following a preliminary soaking with water delivered by tank trucks. Various kinds of vehicles and machinery being used in civil construction find extensive use in addition to the special engineer equipment in the Ground Forces inventory. As specialists emphasize, however, their effectiveness in accomplishing special missions will depend on the additional equipment with which they will be outfitted.

Irrigation systems, cotton and rice fields and main canals may be serious obstacles for the troops in the vicinity of populated points and in irrigation farming areas. To cross such obstacles it is recommended that organic equipment be used--prefabricated and short-gap bridges, river crossing equipment and so on.

When preparing roads under desert conditions the primary amount of road work goes into reinforcing the roadway with prefabricated surfaces. To this end it is planned to use flexible road surfaces made of class 30, "Mo-Mat" and "Columbus" aluminum plates intended for improving trafficability of wheeled equipment and for constructing temporary helicopter pads and Army aviation runways. The M8A1 road mats welded together into treadways, the basis of which is an impermeable nylon film (T-16) placed between the surface and bed of the road, have received a positive appraisal from U.S. specialists. The engineer troops have a special engineer vehicle for laying a flexible road surface

(class 30) (with a laying speed up to 32 km/hr). It is reported that a surface 3.4 m wide and 77 m long is made in 10-15 minutes.

According to U.S. specialists' views, DEFENSE in the desert is arranged at a number of tactical positions and sometimes in cooperating strongpoints, not on vast linear alignments. Strong reserves usually are set up in each echelon of the defensive combat formation. According to foreign military press reports the primary mission of engineer support to defensive actions in the desert is the construction of obstacles with consideration of terrain accessibility for actions of armored and mechanized troops. In areas of loose sands or the so-called "sand seas," where troops may attack primarily along roads, obstacles are set up in sectors favorable to the enemy, and in rocky (stone) deserts and takyr (during the dry time) they are set up across the entire front and to the entire depth.

In deserts there are few natural obstacles restricting movement and so, as noted in the American press, it is necessary to make wide use of minefields, which should be set up in key sectors of terrain, near manmade structures and near sources of water.

The participation of infantry and tank subunits in organizing obstacles is limited to direct screening of their own positions. The purpose for making obstacles and mixed minefields is to increase the effectiveness of all kinds of fire and antitank weapons as well as to reduce the rates of enemy advance.

It is noted that of great importance in planning engineer support is the placement of minefields on open terrain and measures to confuse the enemy with respect to the true obstacle system, which is achieved by creating dummy minefields.

Nonexplosive obstacles also may be organized along with the mixed minefields: barbed wire, earth ramparts and embankments, antitank ditches, dragons' teeth and counterscarps.

The best of the barbed-wire obstacles is considered the wire tape, which is five times more effective than barbed-wire obstacles (it is ejected from a package in 20-meter sections; a 100-meter obstacle can be laid in 6 minutes with transportation available or in 30 minutes by two soldiers), as well as the "Barrier Z" obstacles (crossed only by cutting) and "Concertina," from one section of which (13.38 kg) an obstacle 15 m long is set up in 2 minutes. Judging from American press data, the most optimum interval between obstacles is considered 200-500 m.

In speaking of antitank ditches, U.S. military specialists have in mind a new type of obstacle distinguished by a high degree of effectiveness, which is improved thanks to the employment of the wire tape, antipersonnel and antitank mines, as well as the laying of minefields. It is believed that construction of such antitank ditches is more productive than simply mixed minefields.

The obstacle system which is created usually is part of measures of the defense plan. It has to be difficult to negotiate, be under the observation of

friendly forces and provide for fire support. It is prescribed that obstacles be echeloned in depth, which allegedly forces the enemy to deploy and regroup continuously.

When offensive and defensive actions are being conducted antitank and mixed minefields usually are laid using remote mining systems in areas of enemy troop disposition, on his routes of advance and deployment, in front of the forward edge of defense, at boundaries and flanks, to give assistance to screening forces in disengaging from immediate contact with the enemy, for closing passages and breaches, and for constraining the actions of airmobile and airborne assault forces in the rear of friendly troops.

American military specialists assume that of the remote mining systems extensive use in conducting desert combat actions will be found for the M56 helicopter system (a specially fitted UH-1H helicopter), the artillery ADAPT system (a 155-mm howitzer which can lay antitank, antipersonnel and mixed minefields; a typical minefield is 350 m wide and 250 m deep, formed by 12 cluster shells); the SLU-MINE missile system and the GEMSS ground system,<sup>4</sup> as well as the GATOR aviation system. The use of nuclear and chemical mines as a reliable means against enemy personnel is not precluded.

The HEMMS set will be used to mark minefields in units. A minefield with a perimeter of 700-1,000 m can be marked using the set.

When conducting desert combat actions American specialists plan to use smokes and artificial fogs which help camouflage movements, organization of positions, and the laying and crossing of obstacles. They also hinder the enemy in orientation in a situation and on the terrain, in conducting fire and so on. Every combat vehicle in the U.S. Ground Forces can be equipped with smoke generation units for these purposes, and engineer units have a special smoke support set accommodated on three vehicles by which a screen 3 km long can be laid down in 6 minutes.

Organizing field defenses on desert terrain is considerably hampered. Specialists explain this first of all by soil features and secondly by an acute shortage of local construction materials. Depending on the time, importance of defended axes and means available, field protective works and in some cases permanent installations may be erected at troop positions. Fabricated parts of corrugated and smooth steel components as well as other parts, including improvised means, are used in their construction. The overhead cover of shelters and dugouts sometimes are reinforced with concrete elements. It is planned to use light overhead cover in making trenches and dugouts in sandy soils. The set includes a sheet of polyester film (1.5 x 2.4 m), four terylene cords 4 m long and aluminum stakes 10-15 cm long. The overhead cover is set up along the edges of the emplacement and a layer of sand up to 45 cm thick is poured on top (it withstands a pressure up to 2 kg/cm<sup>2</sup>). Around 10 minutes are required for the installation.

4. See ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 9, 1979, pp 32-35 about mining systems -- Ed.

The basis of combined unit defense on mountainous desert terrain are battalion, company and platoon strongpoints prepared for perimeter defense on dominant hills and including a system of trenches, connecting passages, emplacements for guns, tanks and antitank weapons, weapon emplacements and personnel shelters as well as protective earth ramparts. Antitank lines, screens (ambushes) and positions for accommodating the reserves are made on the primary avenues of tank approach and in the depth.

U.S. military specialists explain the loss of 1,700 tanks in 20 days of combat actions in the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973 as the result of the tactically incorrect employment of armored forces by both sides and the effectiveness of a combination of various antitank weapons, obstacles and mixed minefields.

Under such climatic and physical geographic conditions a very important mission of combat engineer and engineer units and subunits is to provide personnel with water (reconnaissance and organization of water sources and laying water lines). As a rule, water supply points are set up in combined units and units at the location of the sources which have been discovered. Various water purification units (with a capacity of 1,590, 2,300 and 5,700 liters per hour) and mobile distilling plants (570 liters per second) are used depending on the kind of source, water reserves and water quality.<sup>5</sup> To purify water of radioactive dust and toxic chemical agents it is planned to use new units of varying output functioning under the reverse osmosis principle. They also include airmobile units which supply water to up to 2,000 persons a day. Water is delivered from water supply points directly to the units and subunits by different kinds of transportation, with the help of field water lines, as well as by pack animals and teams of carriers. In the desert it is recommended that each combat vehicle have its reserves in special containers.

A general purpose vehicle--a fluid dispenser (which reinforces the surface layer)--is used to reduce dust formation in the troops' interests. It is effective for use on individual road sections, helicopter pads and runways. In some cases cement soil is used for these same purposes. It is laid in strips 2.4 m wide and 90 m long in 15 minutes.

Camouflage and tactics of leading the enemy astray (diversionary actions, false information and simulation) are considered the optimum method for preserving personnel and materiel on desert terrain. It is emphasized in the U.S. military press that only the need for such actions which is deeply ingrained in servicemen's awareness and their practical implementation will contribute to seizing the initiative on the battlefield.

By virtue of the sparse vegetative cover and limited number of natural shelters for troops, it is more difficult to accomplish camouflage in the desert than under other natural conditions. Nevertheless the ridges, scarps, hollows and folds of the terrain which are present here provide troops with sufficient shelter from the ground enemy's observation. Observation from the air, however, basically permits uncovering the layout of facilities and troops. In

5. For more detail about field water supply facilities see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 12, 1977, pp 37-41 -- Ed.

recent years therefore the United States has been conducting R&D for creation of special camouflage paints and coverings which break up the shape (outline) of equipment; smokes and aerosol atomization means; mock-ups; as well as electronic computers for the combined unit headquarters level by which staffs will be able to assess the effectiveness of troop camouflage under specific conditions of a tactical situation.

Camouflage sets for troops presently are being manufactured in the United States in radio-transparent and radio-scattering versions and have two-way coloration, which reduces the probability of detection for camouflaged objects to 30 percent. The color is made the same as desert color--an almost brown color on one side and grayish on the other. Paint samples are standardized for 200 types of military equipment. Night movements or movements during sandstorms with preservation of communications security are practiced for purposes of concealment.

To confuse enemy reconnaissance it is believed necessary to create dummy facilities, positions and troop concentration areas and a semblance of activity on secondary axes, to camouflage tanks and guns as ordinary transport vehicles and so on. Mock-ups usually are made of rubber and foam-type materials as well as out of prefabricated components and are provided with a source of infrared radiation. The American military press stresses that measures for concealment and for leading the enemy astray require careful planning and that a lack of T/O&E camouflage means must be compensated with imagination and resourcefulness on the part of every serviceman and by use of field expedients. It is believed that everyone's efforts must be directed at "blending into the ground" and being unnoticeable against the background of surrounding nature, and this means that "one can survive under such conditions and win." This is why special camouflage training has become a component of combat and operational training programs for troops and staffs.

The significance of light discipline rises on desert terrain. For example, using image amplification the light from combat equipment reference instrument lamps is registered at a distance up to 1.5 km, and inside illumination (red or white) is registered up to 1 km.

The American military press has emphasized repeatedly that in performing missions in the interests of combat (an operation), engineer troops (units and subunits) themselves must ensure their own safety, i.e., they must have their own battle outposts and, with independent movements, march security. In case of extreme need they can be used as infantry units. Therefore the training of engineer troops is accomplished both under a special and combined-arms program.

Thus by virtue of the large scope, complexity and importance of engineer support, American military specialists view it as a very important kind of combat support to troop activities and they consider trends in development of military engineer affairs in the next few years to be improved maneuverability of engineer units and combined units, an improvement in their capabilities to lay or negotiate obstacles and mixed minefields, an improvement in equipment productivity and reliability under extreme operating, climatic and physical-geographic conditions, and an increase in its numbers on the battlefield. Steps in this area (development, testing, operation, drawing up recommendations for servicing and tactical use) are being taken in troop units, at test ranges and at centers both on the territory of the United States and of other countries.

PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON U.S. AIR FORCE COMMAND IN EUROPE

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[Article by Col V. Andreyev: "U.S. Air Force European Command"]

[Text] In relying on war as the primary means of attaining their aggressive objectives, U.S. imperialist circles set aside a special place for Western Europe, where they maintain the largest and most powerful grouping of their armed forces of all those stationed on so-called overseas territories. The Air Force is an important component of this grouping. Its personnel and means are included in the U.S. Air Force command in the European zone.\*

This command represents a major tactical aviation formation capable of accomplishing all its inherent missions under present-day conditions both independently and together with air forces of allies in the NATO bloc. As noted in the foreign press, even in peacetime up to 35 percent of all order of battle of the U.S. Air Force regular tactical aviation is concentrated within the command. The significant part of its aircraft inventory consists of the F-111 and F-4 aircraft which carry nuclear weapons and have a radius of action permitting attacks to be delivered against USSR territory.

Despite the presence of such a strong grouping of its aviation in Europe, which additionally can be reinforced considerably in short time periods by moving air units and subunits from the continental United States, the Pentagon's leadership does not cease to build up its combat might, cloaked in the hackneyed fabrication of the "Soviet military threat." An improvement of the aircraft inventory continues, control and communications systems are being modernized, and steps are being taken to improve the level of combat readiness of the units and subunits.

The U.S. Air Force command in Europe (its headquarters is at Ramstein Air Base in the FRG) is, in its administrative (permanent) organization, one of the main air commands of the country's Air Force, subordinated directly to the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. In accordance with the operational organization of the American Armed Forces, it is the air component of the Joint Command of U.S. Armed Forces in the European zone under control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter's sphere of "responsibility," in the

\*The foreign military press sometimes calls it the U.S. Air Force in Europe -- Ed.

concept of Pentagon strategists, takes in all Western Europe (except Iceland), the Mediterranean basin, North Africa and countries of the Near and Middle East. The U.S. Air Force in Europe is a component of the NATO Joint Air Forces and the basis of their attack power within the framework of the Joint Armed Forces of the North Atlantic bloc.

The CIC of U.S. Air Force in the European zone (he simultaneously is CIC of NATO Joint Air Forces in the Central European Theater) is, according to Western press reports, responsible for the planning and training of his subordinate combined units and units for conducting combat actions, assuring their precise and swift transition from a peacetime to a wartime footing, the reception and deployment of forces from the continental United States, and the conduct of air operations during a war both independently and in coordination with ground and naval forces.

The U.S. Air Force command in the European zone consists organizationally of three air armies (3d, 16th and 17th air forces), which include tactical fighter and reconnaissance air wings, control entities, and support units and subunits. The tactical fighter wing usually has three air squadrons, with each authorized 24 aircraft. The exceptions are the 81st Tactical Fighter Wing (which has six squadrons of 18 aircraft each) and the 32d Separate Fighter Squadron (18 aircraft). The reconnaissance wings have one or two squadrons each (18 aircraft).

Composition of the air armies is not uniform. According to estimates by foreign military specialists, 3d and 17th air forces are the strongest. They are intended for actions in the Central European Theater together with combined units and units of the air forces of Great Britain, the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as with Canadian air subunits in the FRG. All of them organizationally are included in the 2d and 4th joint tactical air commands of the NATO Air Forces.

The 3d Air Force is located on the territory of Great Britain (with headquarters at Mildenhall). It includes three tactical fighter wings (20th, 48th and 81st) and one reconnaissance wing (10th).

The 20th and 48th tactical fighter wings are located at the air bases of Upper Heyford and Lakenheath respectively. The first has three squadrons and the second four squadrons, which are equipped with heavy fighter-bombers and the F-111 nuclear weapon carriers (Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced]). These aircraft are fitted with equipment providing automatic nap of the earth flying at low altitude and terrain avoidance. They are capable of operating under any meteorological conditions. Judging from western press reports the 20th Wing has some 80 and the 48th up to 90 such aircraft.

The 81st Tactical Fighter Wing is equipped with the latest A-10 Thunderbolt-2 ground attack aircraft (Fig. 2 [figure not reproduced]), intended for combatting tanks and other mobile and fixed small targets on the battlefield and in the tactical depth of enemy defenses. The wing has six air squadrons (each having 18 A-10 aircraft). Their permanent stations are Bentwaters and Woodbridge air bases. They usually practice combat training missions, however, from airfields located on FRG territory, where from six to eight aircraft are

based periodically. It is reported that the U.S. Air Force command intends to have a forward air base near borders with the Warsaw Pact countries for each squadron of A-10 ground attack aircraft and a sector of operations assigned to it, and it is prescribed that the pilots of these subunits study the sector in detail in peacetime. At the present time four such air bases have been determined and activated (Ahlhorn, Sembach, Nervenich, and Lepheim). Talks are being held with the FRG government concerning the remaining two.

The 10th Reconnaissance Wing (Alconbury Air Base) has one squadron equipped with RF-4C Phantom-2 reconnaissance aircraft capable of performing aerial reconnaissance to a depth up to 600 km (and in some cases even more). In addition it includes the 527th Aggressor Training Squadron (F-5E fighters). It is planned to deploy one more reconnaissance squadron at Alconbury Air Base, and it is to be outfitted with TR-1 high-altitude aircraft (made on the basis of the strategic U-2 reconnaissance aircraft) which, using side-looking radar, are capable of performing aerial reconnaissance of the border zone of Warsaw Pact countries without violating their air space.

The 17th Air Force is based in the FRG (with headquarters at Sembach Air Base). It has four tactical fighter wings (36th, 50th, 52d and 86th), a separate tactical fighter squadron (32d), a tactical reconnaissance wing (26th) and one tactical air control wing (601st).

The 36th Tactical Fighter Wing (Bitburg Air Base) consists of three squadrons outfitted with the new F-15 Eagle all-weather air superiority fighters (Fig. 3 [figure not reproduced]).

The 50th Tactical Fighter Wing (three squadrons, Hahn Air Base), 52nd Tactical Fighter Wing (three squadrons, Spangdahlem) and 86th Tactical Fighter Wing (two squadrons, Ramstein) are outfitted with F-4 tactical fighters of various modifications, including the F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft (one squadron in the 52d Tactical Fighter Wing). To combat enemy air defense radars, the latter aircraft have special electronics and are armed with Shrike and Standard-ARM antiradar guided missiles. In early 1982 new F-16 Fighting Falcon light tactical fighters began being received by the 50th Tactical Fighter Wing. The foreign press reported that it is planned to complete the refitting of U.S. Air Force command in Europe units and subunits equipped with the F-4 aircraft (except for the F-4G Wild Weasel) by 1985-1986.

The 32d Separate Fighter Squadron is the only subunit of 17th Air Force stationed not on FRG territory, but in the Netherlands (Soesterberg Air Base). It is equipped with F-15C and F-15D fighters (18 aircraft).

The 26th Reconnaissance Wing (one squadron, Zweibruecken Air Base) is outfitted with the RF-4C tactical reconnaissance aircraft.

The 601st Tactical Air Control Wing (Sembach Air Base) consists of several subunits and supports staffs and command posts of tactical aviation in the European theaters with communications and control facilities. It has attached to it 30 OV-10 light aircraft (Fig. 4 [figure not reproduced]) and seven CH-53 transport helicopters.

The 16th Air Force is intended for operations in the Southern European Theater together with the air forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey (the 5th and 6th joint tactical air commands), and its headquarters is at Torrejon Air Base (Spain). It includes the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing and the 406th Air Training Wing as well as TUSLOG, the air group headquarters, and the 40th Tactical Air Group.

The 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (Torrejon, Spain) includes three squadrons armed with F-4 tactical fighters.

The 406th Training Wing (Zaragoza, Spain) trains flight personnel of USAFE sub-units in employing on-board weapons of F-15, A-10 and F-4 aircraft. A tactical weapons employment school is attached to it. There is a range for conducting practice firings, missile launches, bombing and so on.

The TUSLOG group headquarters is located in the city of Ankara, Turkey. It includes various subunits for supporting flights of American aircraft. In particular, the 10th Detachment services F-4 tactical fighters (up to a squadron) from the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, which are located at Incirlik Air Base under an "alternation" program.

The 40th Tactical Air Group is deployed at Aviano Air Base (Italy). It arranges communications and control of American tactical aviation on the southern flank of the European Theater of War. A detachment of F-4 aircraft, also from the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing, is considered to be its active force.

USAFE units and subunits have an overall total of more than 650 tactical aircraft in the inventory. In addition, it includes so-called "dual based" units stationed on the North American continent. The number of the command's personnel exceeds 57,000 servicemen. This air grouping is constantly being modernized. According to foreign press reports its units and subunits are at full strength in aircraft and combat-ready flight crews. The latter are replaced periodically by similar crews from the U.S. Air Force tactical air command.

In addition to this, the grouping's activities are supported by units and subunits from other American Air Force commands such as the Strategic Air Command, Military Airlift Command, communications, security and electronic warfare. They maintain an overall total of some 24,000 persons and a considerable amount of various kinds of equipment in Europe.

Coordination with other commands is organized along the following directions.

SAC assigns tanker aircraft subunits in the interests of USAFE for supporting tactical aircraft with aerial refueling during trans-Atlantic flights during combat training and the movement of reinforcing units.

MAC provides military transport aircraft for delivering servicing personnel of air units and necessary technical gear, and arranges meteorological support of all flights and the search and rescue of crews.

Several years ago SAC and MAC deployed two air divisions in Europe, the 7th and 322d respectively, to arrange effective coordination among the commands as well as with numerous allied entities.

The U.S. Air Force Communications Command supports this grouping with all kinds of communications and radiotechnical navigation facilities, and it services automated air control systems.

The Security and EW command formed the so-called European security zone, operationally subordinate to CinC USAFE. Its personnel and facilities provide the latter with data of communications and electronic intelligence, monitor the security of communications and control, and arrange electronic countermeasures.

USAFE maintains the closest coordination with the Tactical Air Command, which is the primary base for training tactical crews and retraining personnel of air units and subunits in new aviation equipment. But as noted in the foreign press, the important element is that TAC is a mobile, strategic reserve of the Air Force intended for rapid reinforcement of overseas air groupings, and in Europe above all.

Questions of receiving reinforcing units are decided together with U.S. allies in the NATO bloc. In addition to the 24 air bases in permanent use by American aviation in peacetime, the allies have assigned some 50 other airfields for joint basing. More than 600 aircraft shelters already have been built at all these air bases and up to 200 are in various stages of construction. In addition, hardened command posts have been installed at the bases and shelters for fuel tankers and other ground equipment have been built to increase the survivability of aircraft.

U.S. allies in NATO are assuming a portion of the efforts to support activities of American aviation in Europe, including joint servicing of aircraft, their refueling, loading of ammunition, as well as repair to aircraft damaged in combat. All these matters are practiced regularly during special exercises.

USAFE is striving to maintain a high level of combat readiness in its air units. Their crews are improving flying proficiency and learning the features of European theaters of war. Much attention in pilots' combat training is given to actions under near-real conditions. New simulators which imitate the threat of ZRK [surface-to-air missile systems] are being used widely for these purposes and practice aerial combat is conducted at a special range. A special role is set aside for joint training with the 527th Training Squadron based at Alconbury (Great Britain), the crews of which are aerial combat instructors. They especially study and master operating tactics of the probable enemy's aircraft as well as tactical experience gained in actual armed conflicts of recent years. In exercises and drills the squadron's pilots act in the role of enemy. In the American command's opinion this methodology allows practice aerial combat to approximate actual combat to the maximum extent while in peacetime and provides practical study of enemy tactics.

While carrying out operational and combat training activities U.S. tactical air subunits and units practice missions of winning air superiority, isolating an area of combat actions, providing direct air support and performing aerial reconnaissance. They make use of over 30 ranges provided by allies.

According to foreign press reports the operational and combat training of American aviation in Europe is conducted in close coordination with training of the NATO Joint Armed Forces.

U.S. Air Force units stationed in Europe participate actively in all exercises planned by the supreme commander of NATO Joint Armed Forces and planned at a lower level, as well as in various competitions and other activities arranged by the military leadership of individual bloc countries. During this time they practice missions of coordination with allied aviation and ground forces, learn new tactics for conducting combat actions, and study problems of control and communications. Much attention is given to matters of physical fitness and psychological compatibility.

During such exercises and competitions, in which the military leadership of the United States and NATO constantly strive to approximate combat conditions, questions are decided about providing maximum flexibility of maneuver, a target approach that is precise by place and time, effective control of aviation at all levels, and timely, complete provision of aerial reconnaissance data to the command element.

In addition to units which are a permanent part of USAFE, subunits of the Tactical Air Command and reserve components of the American Air Force intended for reinforcing the European aviation grouping take part in a majority of the activities organized by USAFE. In accordance with the "dual basing" concept, TAC subunits annually participate in the "Crested Cap," "Creek Bee" and other exercises, during which there is a nonstop movement of aircraft with aerial refueling from the United States to forward air bases of the FRG and other NATO countries. Each year 10-15 such activites are conducted.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

COMMENTARY ON NATO TACTICAL AVIATION IN CLOSE SUPPORT

Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 8, Aug 82 (signed to press 13 Aug 82) pp 46-49

[Article by Col (Ret) G. Osipov, candidate of military sciences, docent: "Tactical Air Capabilities in Direct Air Support (Based on Views of NATO Military Specialists)"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source.]

[Text] The military leadership of the aggressive NATO bloc believes that close air support of ground forces is one of the primary tactical missions facing the Joint Air Forces. The foreign press defines such support as ground attack operations by aviation against enemy objects on the battlefield or in close proximity to the line of contact of the opposing sides. It envisages the delivery of air strikes against targets which as a rule cannot be hit by ground forces weapons and where success of offensive and defensive combat or an operation as a whole is contingent on their destruction.

In the 1960's and early 1970's the air forces of NATO countries planned to carry out close air support with the F-105, F-104 and F-4 tactical fighters, but the high cost and low effectiveness of their employment against small, mobile targets as well as certain other deficiencies led to a revision of the views. As a result the A-10 Thunderbolt-2 ground attack aircraft began to enter the U.S. Air Force inventory, the Jaguar fighter-bombers were adopted by Great Britain and France, and the light Alpha Jet ground attack aircraft specialized for accomplishing close air support missions were adopted by the FRG.

At the present time, however, NATO military specialists believe that due to the increased scope of missions and increased difficulties in penetrating enemy air defenses, use of such aircraft alone now is not enough for solving this problem. In this regard the foreign military press has reopened the discussion of criteria of effectiveness of close air support and the possibility of employing various types of aircraft and kinds of weapons to give the ground forces such support. The possibility of employing multipurpose tactical fighters, aerial combat fighters and operational training aircraft is being examined above all.

EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT of ground forces were defined in the United States in the early 1980's. The primary ones (relative to the aircraft being employed) are as follows: reaction speed, all-weather capability, precision of approach to target and its identification, effectiveness of weapon employment, and capability of penetrating the opposition of air defense.

REACTION SPEED, according to views of American specialists, is characterized by the time from the moment ground forces request support until the strike against given targets by the aircraft called in. It is believed that under present-day conditions it is 15-45 minutes, and it must be reduced to a minimum in connection with the highly transient nature of combat. In their opinion this can be achieved by bringing the base locations of the air units closer to the area of tactical operations by taking advantage of temporary dirt airfields and landing sites and sections of highways, setting up a combat air patrol, reducing the time for their preparation for the next sortie, and improving control systems and entities.

U.S. and allied experts consider the use of vertical take-off and landing [VTOL] or short take-off and landing [STOL] aircraft for accomplishing close air support missions to be one of the most important methods for solving problems of bringing aviation basing nearer the front line. As the western press notes, however, the Harrier aircraft in the British Air Force inventory (Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced]) which have such capabilities, are less effective than conventional ground attack aircraft and fighter-bombers (chiefly due to the short radius of action and small payload).

At the same time the foreign press notes that far from all attack aircraft in tactical aviation of the air forces of NATO countries are capable of operating from dirt. In addition, the positioning of air units and subunits at temporary airfields near the front line inevitably will complicate their logistical support due to a lengthening of the supply routes and lack of necessary facilities and equipment, and it will increase the duration of aircraft preparation for the next sorties and the probability of personnel and equipment being hit by enemy weapons.

To solve the first problem the air forces of NATO countries are setting up certain stores of fuel, ammunition, other supplies and means for their rapid delivery to a given area.

Special mobile sets of the most necessary ground equipment and spare parts are being put together now in peacetime and there are regular drills for technical personnel (Fig. 2 [figure not reproduced]) and flight crews in order to provide for servicing under field conditions and reduce the time of aircraft preparation for the next sorties. In addition to this, it is planned to use aircraft with a large fuel reserve for delivering strikes against the enemy without their refueling between sorties.

It is prescribed that forward airfields and landing sites be chosen so as to reduce the probability of strikes against them by enemy personnel and weapons (if possible, outside their killing zone). It is planned to screen them with mobile surface-to-air missile and artillery systems and fighter aviation for protection against air attack. NATO country air forces are giving much attention to organizing ground defense both of permanent air bases and of forward airfields. It is planned to use personnel of air unit ground services and bring in ground force subunits to accomplish this mission.

ALL-WEATHER CAPABILITY OF AVIATION OPERATIONS in close air support is provided by making its aircraft capable of performing flights and delivering strikes against targets day and night under simple or adverse weather conditions (SMU). This is achieved thanks to instruments and equipment in the aircraft which are needed for piloting and navigation, as well as the presence of weapon systems for hitting targets with limited visibility or even a total lack of visibility. At the same time there must be a corresponding level of crew training.

As noted in the foreign press, the belligerents in past wars always tried to take advantage of SMU and the hours of darkness for conducting ground force offensive operations, which allowed a reduction in enemy air opposition. In the opinion of western military experts this proposition is current even today. All contemporary tactical aircraft have flying equipment for flights day or night, but only a few of them are fitted with navigational gear for a precise approach to the target and with weapons for their destruction under adverse weather conditions.

On the other hand, in an attempt to increase the tactical capabilities of their aircraft when they accomplish various missions, and in giving close air support to ground forces above all, NATO countries are giving considerable attention to improving the all-weather capability of aircraft. As the foreign press emphasizes, however, both in the past and now the intensity of air operations in SMU will be degraded considerably.

THE APPROACH OF AIRCRAFT TO TARGETS WITH THE REQUISITE ACCURACY under adverse weather conditions can be assured with the help of airborne radars, radio navigation systems and inertial navigation systems.

In the opinion of western military specialists, the existing airborne radars and TACAN and LORAN radio navigation systems are unreliable in giving close air support to friendly forces, since their aircraft equipment has poor electronic countermeasures, and ground stations may be destroyed by missiles homing on the electronic emission at an important moment. In addition, aircraft using such systems are capable of making a rather accurate approach only on stationary objects, and aircraft using airborne radar can do so only on targets which are distinguishable on radar. Therefore inertial navigation systems with high accuracy are considered the most suitable means for vectoring aircraft to ground targets under any conditions. They are autonomous and are not subjected to the influence of any kind of interference. Due to the high cost of such systems, however, only some of the most sophisticated and costly multipurpose tactical fighters are fitted with them for now.

Recognition of ground targets is considered an important factor abroad in the delivery of strikes against them. Under conditions of limited visibility this can be provided by intercept controllers. It is proposed to use varicolored smoke bombs and missiles and laser target designators for identification of targets for attack. In addition, aircraft crews may use infrared and television systems for locating and identifying targets. As foreign specialists note, however, NATO country air forces have practically no equipment for identifying targets in the absence of sufficient visibility and in operations from out of (from behind) the clouds.

EFFECTIVENESS OF WEAPON EMPLOYMENT. Attack aircraft will employ three primary kinds of aviation weapons in performing close air support missions: gun-cannon, bombs and missiles.

The gun-cannon weapons of modern tactical aircraft include 7.62-mm machineguns and guns in calibers of 20, 27 and 30 mm with a rate of fire from 600 (for simple machineguns) to 6,000 rounds per minute (for Gatling guns). The former are intended basically for destroying personnel, and the latter for hitting vehicles, APC's, tanks and other combat equipment.

Bomb weaponry includes conventional and controlled aviation bombs as well as bomb clusters loaded with shaped-charge and fragmentation elements or mines.

In recent years various air-to-ground guided missiles with electro-optic, laser and other guidance systems have found increasingly wide application in the tactical aviation of capitalist states. They are characterized by high hit accuracy and, in the opinion of western experts, are very effective in delivering attacks against small and mobile targets. In addition, their use considerably reduces or even entirely eliminates the time an air platform is within the system coverage of the target's air defense weapons.

NATO country air forces choose the type of weapon and variations in combat payload of aircraft assigned for providing close air support to ground forces with consideration of their effectiveness in operating against various targets, nature of the strike objectives, weather conditions and certain other factors. In particular, aircraft usually have bombs and bomb clusters for delivering a strike against an area target, and guided missiles (such as the Maverick) for strikes against small, mobile targets.

THE CAPABILITY OF PENETRATING AIR DEFENSE OPPOSITION is considered one of the most important criteria of aircraft tactical capabilities. It is provided by arming aircraft with EW [electronic warfare] means and UR [guided missiles] permitting the delivery of strikes without entering the kill zone of ZRK [surface-to-air missile systems] and ZA [AAA], and by the use of various tactics. Based on this, fighter-bombers and ground attack aircraft are fitted with detection receivers warning the crew about being "painted" by enemy radar, chaff and infrared decoy dispensers, active jammers, and appropriate weapons.

Crew operating tactics for penetrating air defense envisage the following basic techniques: in-flight at low altitude in an open combat formation, delivery of strikes against the target from different directions with a single run, performance of evasive actions against antiaircraft weapons and fighters, screening the strike groups from the air, and so on. It is considered inadvisable to loiter above the target or for several aircraft to make a run on it from one and the same direction.

(To be concluded)

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COMMENTARY ON AIM-54C 'PHOENIX' GUIDED MISSILE

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[Article by Engr-Col V. Dmitriyev and Engr-Lt Col B. Mikhaylov: "'Phoenix' AIM-54C Guided Missile"]

[Text] In their attempt to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, aggressive U.S. imperialist circles are placing certain hopes on aviation by building up its combat capabilities, which are linked inseparably with a qualitative improvement in aviation equipment and weapons, including various classes of guided missiles.

The American firm of Hughes Aircraft presently has begun series production of a modernized version (AIM-54C) of the Phoenix AIM-54A air-to-air guided missile, with which the F-14A Tomcat deck-based fighters are armed. Judging from foreign press reports, the primary reasons for modernizing this guided missile were its insufficient combat effectiveness in combating highly maneuverable targets at high altitude or low-flying targets against the background of ground or sea surface, and against group targets flying in close combat formation, as well as lack of correspondence with long-range requirements being placed on guided aviation weapons of the 1990's.

Development of the AIM-54C missile was begun in 1978. To reduce overall expenses of modernization and reduce the time period of modernization, American specialists took the path of modifying individual components of the missile, which include in particular control and guidance equipment in the middle leg of the flight trajectory, the analog autopilot, homing head (GSN), transceiver and radar fuze.

As a result of the work performed, the command-inertial control system was created in place of the existing control and guidance equipment with analog autopilot on the basis of a digital computer which also performs the functions of autopilot, and an additional gyrostabilized platform without a coupling. Thanks to this arrangement the new control system, according to American specialists' statements, permits guiding the missile along more complex and optimum trajectories, improving its effectiveness of combating high-altitude and vigorously maneuvering targets, and improving the accuracy of entering the terminal leg of flight in which the missile switches to the self-homing mode. In addition, the digital command-inertial guidance system gives the missile the advantage of

approximately a doubling of the reliability of on-board gear, while the presence of means of built-in automated control in the missile makes it possible to check it independently of the F-14A's AN/AWG-9 fire control system.

A new GSN transceiver with semiconductor components operating in a mode with linear frequency modulation has been developed for the AIM-54C in place of the existing GSN transceiver based on the klystron. It is believed that this improvement led to an increase in the missile's combat effectiveness (by the more sophisticated signal processing as well as the capability of separating out reflected signals and identifying the nature of the target) when firing in pursuit, against group targets, and against targets flying on crossing courses. In addition, the new transceiver includes means for compensation of aberrational distortions created by the GSN antenna fairing with significant angular deflections of its radiation pattern. American experts assume that such compensation is needed for eliminating large guidance errors arising, for example, when the target is at a significant height difference above the air platform, which also contributes to an increase in the missile's effectiveness in hitting high-altitude targets. The semiconductor base on which the AIM-54C transceiver is made also permitted an improvement in its operating reliability.

The new radar fuze is intended to increase the destructive capabilities of the AIM-54C, especially when fired against small, highly maneuverable targets (such as cruise missiles) as well as against those flying at extremely low altitude above the sea surface. In the opinion of American military specialists, the previous radar fuze installed in the AIM-54C does not have such capabilities. The advantages of the new design are explained by the more accurate calculation of delay time for warhead detonation, which depends on target size, speed and the missile's angle of approach with it at the point of impact, as well as by the use of pseudonoise modulation in the fuze transmitter, which improved its stability toward intentional and natural interference (such as to disturbance of the sea surface).

As emphasized by the foreign press, modifications in the AIM-54C missile were performed with consideration of retaining the missile's dimensions and aerodynamic configuration, as well as for maximum use of interchangeability of improved and existing components, which will permit modernization of all existing AIM-54A's (if appropriate funds are allocated). According to one of the estimates made in the western press, the tactical qualities of the modernized guided missile were improved fourfold in comparison with the existing missile, and with an improvement in its operating characteristics. Thus while the periodicity of mandatory checks and operational servicing of the AIM-54A presently is 6-9 months, this has risen to two years for the AIM-54C.

In 1981 Hughes Aircraft manufactured a test lot of AIM-54C missiles (15 missiles) for performing various tests and evaluations. In particular, six launches were made, five of which were declared successful, with a total of 12 planned. During one of the tests an AIM-54C was launched from an F-14A flying at an altitude of 11,000 m and at a speed of Mach 1.55 (see figure [figure not reproduced]). At this moment the target was at a range of some 160 km and an altitude of 9,000 m and had a speed of Mach 0.9. The miss distance at the intercept point permitted evaluating the missile launch, made without a real

warhead, as destruction of the target. The total flying hours of other models of the missile on the F-14A aircraft (in testing without launches) were some 550 hours. Up to mid-1982, in accordance with the contract, the firm was to manufacture a reference lot of 30 missiles and up to 1990, as noted in the foreign press, the amount of deliveries for Naval Aviation will be approximately 1,400 missiles.

At the present time Hughes Aircraft is continuing modernization of the AIM-54C on an initiative basis, aimed at improving its stability toward intentional jamming, a further increase in combat effectiveness and an improvement in operating characteristics. According to estimates by the firm's specialists, these modifications may be realized in practice in the period 1984-1987. It is believed that use of a new radar antenna with reduced level of side lobes in the AN/AWG-9 fire control system and an increase in radiating power of the missile's GSN transmitter will contribute to an improvement in noise stability, and the new fragmentation warhead will increase the probability of target destruction. A reduction in the GSN receiver's noise factor will permit an increase in the range of target detection and lock-on especially with a low area of effective reflecting surface. It is also planned to achieve an improvement in the missile's combat capabilities and operating characteristics by altering the control program in its digital command-inertial guidance system, which considers, for example, the technical specifications of potential targets or the probable enemy's use of new means and methods of electronic warfare. The American press emphasizes that such a system reprogramming will be possible from aboard the F-14A fighter over a cable connecting the AN/AWG-9 system with the missile gear.

A promising frequency synthesizer on integrated microcircuits is being made for the GSN transceiver which should simplify selection and change of operating frequencies. In addition a new self-contained system for maintaining nominal temperature regimes, functioning in a closed cycle, is being developed for the missile as a whole (the AIM-54A uses a liquid cooling system supplied from the flight equipment of the air platform). It is intended to improve substantially the missile's operating conditions on the F-14A aircraft when based on carriers. In connection with the system's adoption, primary modifications will concern above all the GSN transceiver, digital control apparatus and missile power source converter, and the introduction of heating elements, according to the specialists' estimates, will permit expanding the range of operating temperatures for the transceiver and control apparatus, and the power source converter will be redesigned.

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